FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

Daily Report

East Europe

FBIS-EEU-95-188
Thursday
28 September 1995

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Daily Report
East Europe

FBIS-EEU-95-188 *28 September 1995*

CONTENTS

NOTICE: This volume contains a representative selection of material previously disseminated in softcopy format.

ALBANIA

Italy's Fini Says Berisha 'Worked a Miracle' *[GAZETA SHQIPTARE 27 Sep]* 1
PSSh Deputy Chairman Criticizes Berisha *[ZERI I POPULLIT 23 Sep]* 1
Opposition Says Genocide Law Is Berisha's Weapon *[KOHA JONE 26 Sep]* 4
PSD Urges Berisha Not To Sign Genocide Law *[Tirana TV]* 5
PD Denounces Socialists' 'Anti-Western Platform' *[Tirana TV]* 6
Socialists: Brozi's Dismissal Session 'Unlawful' *[Editorial Report]* 6

BULGARIA

Minister Protests Inclusion on Schengen List *[Sofia Radio]* 7
Videnov Comments on Energy Accords With Russia *[TRUD 20 Sep]* 7
Commissions Discuss G-7 Note on Kozloduy Safety *[Sofia Radio]* 8
View Kozloduy as 'Political' *[Sofia Radio]* 9

CZECH REPUBLIC

Parliament Ratifies 10-Year Treaty With Russia *[AFP]* 10
Law Extended Banning Ex-Communists From Top Posts *[AFP]* 10
Czechs Move To Make Koruna Convertible Currency *[London FINANCIAL TIMES 28 Sep]* 10

SLOVAKIA

Schenk: Perry's Comments Should Not Be Dramatized *[PRAVDA 22 Sep]* 12
Commentary Views Outcome of Perry Visit *[PRAVDA 22 Sep]* 12
Meciar Interview Marks 1,000 Days of Independence *[Bratislava Radio]* 12
Envoy Accuses Hungarian of 'Besmirching' Slovakia *[Bratislava Radio]* 13
Car Belonging to Kovac Jr.'s Lawyer Set on Fire *[NARODNA OBRODA 22 Sep]* 13
Modernization of Nuclear Power Station Discussed *[Berlin DDP/ADN]* 13
Politician Dissatisfied With Mochovce Skoda Plan *[PRAVDA 22 Sep]* 14

HUNGARY

Army Ready To Assist U.S. in FRY *[Budapest TV]* 15
Ministry 'Intensively Studying' Romania's Proposals *[MAGYAR NEMZET 27 Sep]* 15
Finance Minister Promises End to 'Shock Therapy' *[Budapest Radio]* 15
Coalition 'Crisis' Seen as 'No-Win Situation' *[NEPSZABADSAG 27 Sep]* 16

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

Izetbegovic Interviewed on New York Accord *[Sarajevo Radio]* 17
Silajdzic Details Concessions Made to Belgrade *[Sarajevo Radio]* 20
Silajdzic: Offensive 'On' Until Serbs Sign Plan *[Mainz TV]* 21
Comments on Travnik Bombing *[Sarajevo Radio]* 21
Pogarcic Says Talks 'Fundamental Breakthrough' *[Sarajevo Radio]* 22
Envoy to Croatia Explains Conditions for Peace *[VECERNJI LIST 26 Sep]* 22
Lazovic Sees 'Serious Prospects' for Peace *[Sarajevo Radio]* 24

LBO Calls For Sacirbegovic Resignation *[Sarajevo Radio]* 24
Foreign Ministers Discuss EU Reconstruction Aid *[TANJUG]* 24
General Delic Interviewed on Army Successes *[Sarajevo Radio]* 25
Delic Comments on Latest 'Liberation Successes' *[Sarajevo Radio]* 30
Changes in Bosnian Army Top Leadership *[FERAL TRIBUNE 28 Aug]* 30
Karadzic Briefs Rybkin, Duma Delegation on Talks *[SRNA]* 32
Buha Explains Purpose of Visit to Moscow *[NASA BORBA 25 Sep]* 32
Pejanovic, German Envoy Agree on Unified State *[Sarajevo Radio]* 34
Serb Officials Comment on Bosnian Peace Accord 34
Koljevic: Accord 'Important' *[SRNA]* 34
Toholj: Brings End to War *[SRNA]* 34

CROATIA

Foreign Minister Views International Relations *[SLOBODNA DALMACIJA 24 Sep]* 35
Abdic Supporters Refuse To Return to Bosnia *[AFP]* 38
Joint Police Force To Supervise Refugees' Return *[Zagreb TV]* 38
Rebic: No Deportation of Refugees Planned *[Zagreb Radio]* 39
Serb Official Views Options in Eastern Slavonia *[POLITIKA EKSPRESS 23 Sep]* 39
Expert Dismisses Piran Bay Border Proposal *[VJESNIK 26 Sep]* 41
No Military Buildup Directed Against Slovenia *[VJESNIK 27 Sep]* 41
Legal Expert Views Changes to Electoral Law *[VJESNIK 24 Sep]* 42
SNS Considers Coming Elections Illegal *[Zagreb Radio]* 44

THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

High-Ranking Military Delegation Visits Britain *[MIC]* 45
Signs Cooperation Memorandum *[MIC]* 45
NDP Opposes Council of Europe Membership *[MIC]* 45

POLAND

Okonski Favors Participating With NATO in Bosnia *[Warsaw Radio]* 46
Offers Troops *[AFP]* 46
Laws Increasingly in Accord With EU Regulations *[Paris LES ECHOS 8-9 Sep]* 46
Shalikashvili To Hold Talks on Control of Army *[PAP]* 48
Ambassador to Russia Ends Six-Year Mission *[Warsaw Radio]* 48
Recalled at Walesa's Request *[Warsaw Radio]* 48
PSL Chairman's 'Behind-the-Scenes' Game *[RZECZPOSPOLITA 27 Sep]* 49
Progress on Constitutional Draft Reported *[POLITYKA 24 Jun]* 50
Bank Presents 1996 Financial Policy Projections *[GAZETA WYBORCZA 28 Sep]* 52
Minister Scierski Interviewed on Power Industry *[RZECZPOSPOLITA 6 Sep]* 53
Poll: Most Want Experienced, Educated President *[GAZETA WYBORCZA 27 Sep]* 56

ROMANIA

Tinca Sees Need for 'Efficient' Army Intelligence *[EVENIMENTUL ZILEI 25 Sep]* 57
Tinca Attends Antiaircraft Firing Drills *[CURIERUL NATIONAL 21 Sep]* 57
PRM's Tudor Calls For SRI Chief's Dismissal *[EVENIMENTUL ZILEI 20 Sep]* 57
PUNR Senator Comments *[COTIDIANUL 20 Sep]* 59
Draft Law Seen Giving SRI 'Unlimited Powers' *[COTIDIANUL 22 Sep]* 59
Organization, Duties of Development Agency *[BULETINUL OFICIAL 19 Apr]* 60

SLOVENIA

Drnovsek: Sea Access 'Precondition for Everything' *[Ljubljana Radio]* 63

Carinthian Slovenes Ask For Seat in Local Diet *[Ljubljana Radio]* 63
Economic Chamber Opens Information Center *[Summary]* 63

YUGOSLAVIA

Federal

Foreign Minister Comments on Peace Accord 64
Cease-Fire Before Peace *[AFP]* 64
Serb Position 'Improved' *[TANJUG]* 64
Equal Status Won *[TANJUG]* 64
Independence Achieved *[Belgrade Radio]* 65
'No Central Government' *[Belgrade Radio]* 65
Ready for Conference *[TANJUG]* 65

Serbia

Milosevic, Stoltenberg Welcome New York Accord *[Belgrade Radio]* 66
Sainovic Claims Peace Means Lifting Sanctions *[Belgrade Radio]* 66
'Sources' Hint Bosnian Peace Deal Signed Soon *[TELEGRAF 27 Sep]* 67
Radical Party's Seselj Assails New York Accord *[SRNA]* 67
Commentary Sees Causes, Results of Air Strikes *[NIN 22 Sep]* 67

Italy's Fini Says Berisha 'Worked a Miracle'

AU2709153495 Tirana GAZETA SHQIPTARE in Albanian 27 Sep 95 p 3

[Report by "P. Re.": "Fini: 'The Albanians Are Different'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tirana—"I am grateful, and thank the friendly Italian people," said President Berisha at his meeting yesterday afternoon with Gianfranco Fini, president of the National Alliance. For Berisha, "This visit is a further contribution to the very good relations between Albania and Italy." As for Fini, "The severity of the dictatorship in your country is a stain on the conscience of Europe." However, these were only his opening words. He continued, "Even though a short time has passed since the downfall of the dictatorship, you have worked a miracle here." Fini also met yesterday Tomor Malasi, deputy chairman of the People's Assembly. At this meeting, the National Alliance leader called our country a strategic point in the region.

Yesterday involved a very heavy program of meetings for one of the personalities of the "Pole of Freedom." The leaders of the Democratic Party [PD] set aside a special meeting for their guest. The many problems between our two countries such as emigration and cooperation of various kinds, including cooperation between the parties, were at the center of the discussions. Fini's visit to Albania has not passed without criticism. Skender Gjinushi expressed his reservations, saying, "His arrival in our country does harm to the Albanians in Italy, our emigrants." However, PD General Secretary Tritan Shehu immediately responded by stating on Voice of America that "The Albanian extreme left suffers from phobias. Not long ago it was phobia over the Americans and Germans; now it is the Italians."

To an Old Friend...

"Albanian migrants must be treated differently from other migrants," Gianfranco Fini, who is considered in Italy to be "one of the most severe politicians toward noncommunity members," announced at his meeting yesterday with Sabri Godo, chairman of the Republican Party. Fini had arrived in Tirana the day before yesterday, and was repaying Godo's visit with a meeting at Republican Party headquarters.

For Godo, "the visit was very positive and we will continue the talks this morning." The Republican leader had talked about very important problems, such as Albanian emigration to Italy, and the reply "was what I expected." The National Alliance leade r himself promised that his party "will give its help toward solving this problem." Asked after this meeting why he was not also contacting left-wing parties, Fini said that "they are still communists."

PSSh Deputy Chairman Criticizes Berisha

AU2609173095 Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 23 Sep 95 pp 1-3

[Unattributed report on news conference by Socialist Party Deputy Chairmen Servet Pellumbi and Namik Dokle in Tirana on 21 September: "We Are Not Involved nor Will We Leave Politics Because of Berisha's Laws"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Socialist Party [PSSh] presidency organized a news conference on the political situation in Albania and the PSSh stand.

At the start, PSSh Deputy Chairman Servet Pellumbi said that the Albanian political scene has recently been dominated by three problems:

First, the visit of the president to the United States, on which there are two stands: Berisha's euphoric stand and the realistic stand of the opposition.

Second, the independence of courts, which was sacrificed again for the sole reason of keeping PSSh leader Fatos Nano in prison and attacking every sign of independence in the legal system.

Third, the passing by the Democratic Party [PD] and its parliamentary group of the so-called genocide bill, which is a model antilaw, a model of political revenge against those who think differently, and splits the Albanians precisely the problems of former Yugoslavia, with which that of Kosova is also linked, are being discussed.

We think that such a law does not serve democracy, the Albanians, or the Albanian cause, but only a "third party." Therefore, we will denounce it in the legislature and will not obey it because we have a constitutional law on human rights, with which it is incompatible.

We organized this news conference to express the PS stand regarding these three questions that are closely linked to one another. [passage omitted]

[ZERI I POPULLIT] You called Berisha's statement in Washington about putting the Albanian military bases at NATO's disposal as an "irresponsible declaration." What is your stand on NATO and cooperation with it?

[Pellumbi] The PS stand on military bases is very clear. We consider the security of our country is linked closely to collective euro-atlantic security. Therefore, we have supported and have voted unanimously for the Partnership for Peace and voted unanimously for the memorandum for military relations between our

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

that the PD parliamentary group will suffer the greatest losses.

[ZERI I POPULLIT] Do you have any plans to condemn the dictatorship?

[Pellumbi] [Passage omitted] In his latest news conference, Berisha accused us of having a phobia about the West. This accusation comes from the man who linked us with Jidda; therefore, people cannot believe such an accusation. No real democrats will believe that the European democratic forces and the U.S. Administration, President Clinton, known for their high democratic culture, will swallow this.

Once he said that Shkodra does not like socialists. Now he believes a senator who says that the United States does not like socialists. At his news conference, he said: "The West in general does not like socialists and serious institutions do not even consider them." The serious institutions not only consider and help the PSSh, but they are also ready to cooperate with it: the European Parliament, the EU, the Council of Europe, the Interparliamentary Union, and many other serious institutions such as the U.S. Republican Institute and the U.S. Democratic Institute, whose representatives we met recently. All of these have no prejudices like Berisha. Therefore, in the electoral campaign, he must be a little more realistic, because, the way he is acting, he is polarizing the electorate and it is likely that in the coming elections, we will get more votes than he expects.

[ZERI I POPULLIT] The bill against genocide does not include the collaborators of fascism, former criminals, and the spies of foreign intelligence services. How do you see this "oversight"?

It is a fact that this bill does not include those who received "Torch of Democracy" medals, who boast on state television that they killed Mirdita [area in the North Eastern part of the country] girls, and who perpetrated massacres such as that on 4 February [1944]. This proves that the law is not against genocide. It is only a trump card to be used in the struggle against the PS and the other opposition parties, against all those who think differently. This once again shows the undemocratic and unconstitutional character of this bill.

[ZERI I POPULLIT] How do you explain Berisha's nervousness since his return from the United States?

[Pellumbi] I think that Berisha's nervousness is the result of his psychosis that he is "the greatest democrat in the world." In the United States, he understood that he is not the greatest democrat in the world. His attention was drawn to the many violations of democracy, the violation of the human rights of the opposition, and especially PS Chairman Fatos Nano, the rights of the Greek minority, and the rights of journalists, and the violation of the rights of citizens by the police, 53 percent of whom, according to what the rector of Boston University said to an Albanian-American newspaper, are ordinary criminals. Berisha understood that the United States knows who Berisha is and what the other political forces in Albania are like. I agree with Mr. Berisha, who considered Mr. Holbrooke "the Kissinger of the Balkans." This Kissinger knows Albanian politics very well. In his meetings with the Albanian parliamentary parties that took place in Tirana, after listening to all parties, including the PSSh, he stated: "I am pleased to report to the State Department that all the Albanian political forces I contacted stand for democracy."

That is why Mr. Berisha is so nervous after his return from the United States, because things did not turn out the way he wanted. Perhaps he thought that by receiving the degree of Boston University, at last, he would "hand over" Arsidi's medal, but Boston University said that he was not ready for its degree. This is the reason why, upon his return, Berisha organized a news conference, conducted by the former press chief in the Central Committee of the Workers Party, at which questions were asked, whose answers to which Berisha had prepared before hand. He is a great prophet and foresees what the correspondents will ask him.

[ZERI I POPULLIT] What do you think of Berisha's stand on Kosova, before, during, and after his visit to the United States?

[Pellumbi] [Passage omitted] In the contacts we have had with Mr. Rugova, Mr. Femi Agani, and other Kosova politicans, we have listened to their options, which have also been expressed in the international press: "Kosova must be an independent and neutral state, equally open to all other neighboring countries." We have accepted this option as very realistic. There is no further transparency on this question from Mr. Berisha. Transparency would be better. Is this the final step or is it a step to be followed by another step? From Albanian circles in New York, we learn that there is dissatisfaction there, because Berisha, at least, should be better prepared on the question. This is a national question and, as it was on the agenda of Berisha's talks, it should have been discussed with the parties in Kosova, the parties in Albania, and the Albanian legislature, and thus he would have been more realistic with his U.S. interlocutors and they would have understood better what worries Albania and the Albanian cause.

[ZERI I POPULLIT] If Nano's case had not been sent to the Cassation plenum, how would you consider its activity?

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

[Pellumbi] [Passage omitted] If it had not been for Nano's case, there would have been no Brozi or Cassation Court cases. All these have been concocted by the government and Berisha to hinder the solution of Nano's case. Two amendments to the Penal Code and the procedural penal code were passed on 28 July. This was an overt deception of the European Council, because you know that the European Council analyzed both codes before Albania was admitted as a member. They were changed to make Nano's release as difficult as possible.

Trial dates were changed from 26 July to September because Qazim Gjoni was too slow in sending the files to the Cassation Court and, at the request of General Prosecutor Dragoshi, the trial was postponed again. [passage omitted]

[ZERI I POPULLIT] Many former Sigurimi members think that you will return them to their former posts when you come to power. What answer can you give them?

[Pellumbi] The PS will keep all those who have not violated laws. As for former Sigurimi officers, you must know that, today, the ShIK [National Intelligence Service] is run by people who once had the same duties as Krenar Haderi of the Cassation Court. [passage omitted]

[ZERI I POPULLIT] What do you think of some Greek minority schools that did not open?

[Pellumbi] The propaganda of the PD and the president at the news conference presented the Boston incident as something connected to the Greek minority in Albania and something organized by extremists of the Greek lobby in the United States. I think this is not the truth, because Berisha was refused the honorory degree for several reasons. First, because of the violation of human rights, for keeping the opposition leader in prison, the police siege of the Cassation Court, and the problem of minority schools. As you see there are four important questions. [passage omitted]

We praise the visit of the Albanian president to the United States. We praise it as the visit of Albania to the greatest and most powerful country, the country of U.S. democracy. We have wished for such a visit to happen, and we are proud that the U.S. Administration and President Clinton received the president of Albania as the president of a small country that aspires to democracy and is making steps forward.

But we think that it is neither to the benefit of democracy in Albania nor of Berisha himself to have such a euphoric vision of the visit. If we read between the lines of the White House statement and if we consider what happened in Boston and the articles in the U.S. newspapers, the concern expressed by the U.S. Administration over the problems that democracy in Albania is meeting, I think that we do not need Berisha' euphoria, but realistic sense to estimate the friendship of the United States and not misuse it for the coming electoral campaign. If Berisha thinks that this visit gives him a kind of "blank cheque" for the 1996 electoral campaign, I think that this would be a misuse of the hospitality and friendship offered by the White House, President Clinton, and the American people.

The attempts to label us "anti-American" have defined political goals, to say to the people: "Only I am to be received there as president and PD chairman. Therefore, as it is only the PD that is received by the White House, you must vote for the PD, because the PS is not welcome there." We have denounced the tracts against the United States that appeared in several regions in the south when the president was in the White House. They tried to make us the culprits. No doubt, some day, some "Reichstag" incident will be perpetrated to implicate the PS. Any attempt to divide the people between pro-American and "anti-American" is fraught with very dangerous consequences for our country, the situation in the region, and the national cause, which, even at the end of this century, has many puzzles to be solved. As for the minority schools, we maintain what we expressed in the parliament: It is a question to be regulated by law in compliance with the known international standards. If someone, angry because of a certain award, will violate the laws and the international provisions on minority rights, then he will be branded as someone who knowingly tramples democracy and human rights and freedoms. We will denounce such an act.

Opposition Says Genocide Law Is Berisha's Weapon

AU2809094795 Tirana KOHA JONE in Albanian 26 Sep 95 p 3

[Article by E. Barci: "Berisha May Eliminate Elections"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "As it is an anticonstitutional act, it will be one of the first acts that the coming legislature will abrogate," said the Socialist Party [SP] deputy leader Namik Dokle after the antigenocide bill was passed. The act passed last Friday [22 September] deprives the communist nomenklatura and people who held office between December 1990 and 31 March 1991 of the right to be elected to leading posts. After the approval of this act, three opposition party leaders are automatically barred from being elected: Fatos Nano, Skender Gjinushi [Social Democrat], and the Agrarian Party Chairman Lufter Xhuveli.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

The day the bill was under discussion in the legislature, one of the Socialist deputies asked ironically whether the lists of the coming candidates would be first approved by Berisha and Gazidede [head of security service]. Imami of the Democratic Alliance [AD] thinks that this is not a laughing matter, because this is what Berisha is aiming at. "We think that there will be no free elections and there might be bloodshed," says the AD leader. For Imami the law can be interpreted: "It is clearly seen that we all will be destroyed on the threshold of elections. With this law Berisha can strike out of the list of deputies whoever he likes. The true number of those who are eliminated will come out a few days before the elections."

Imami's idea and that of other politicans is that through this law, a few days prior to the coming elections, Berisha and the government may denounce as Sigurimi [Secret police] collaborators anyone they wish. Prime Minister Meksi has already demonstrated such a policy in the parliament, when after a debate with one of the opposition deputies, pointing at him, he said: "Your file is too thick."

"With this law Berisha may do many things. It appears his clan is becoming expert in political mafia-type tricks. We will not fall into his scheme, because the parties have neither SHIK [security service] nor Ministry of Interior [as published]," says the SP deputy chairman Dokle. Imami thinks that this law has no solution, saying that "the Constitutional Court is fascist."

Dokle has another idea. According to the Socialists, the best solution is time. "We will see only to the free vote of the people, that is where we base our victory. The experience of last 6 November, when the people protected the ballots themselves, shows a lot. To win the next elections with 2 million voters, Berisha needs 2 million secret police. He does not have that many." According to Dokle none of those "excluded" will be excluded from politics. Dokle says that, as soon as the law is abrogated, they may become ministers, prime ministers, ambassadors, and high officials.

Berisha's disciples are more and more connecting Berisha's and the PD's acts concerning Brozi's dismissal with Berisha's latest visit to Washington and the guarantees he might have received there. The opposition politicians think differently. "U.S. politics does not get involved in such bastard activities. It is Berisha who, by making use of his visit to the United States, is playing a psychological trick" says Dokle. Imami shares almost the same opinion. He reasons, "As there are no more Rayerson-type declarations from Washington, the U.S. policy is clear." The problem is what the electorate thinks of this. According to Dokle, "the psychological shock can disorient people who are little interested in politics. To Berisha's misfortune, Albanians deal with politics all day."

PSD Urges Berisha Not To Sign Genocide Law

AU2709153295 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1900 GMT 26 Sep 95

[Report by Armir Shkurti]

[FBIS Translated Text] Right after Berisha's return from the United States, the political situation in Albania has deteriorated. Social Democratic Party [PSD] Chairman Skender Gjinushi attributes this to the dismissal of Brozi from the Court of Cassation and the approval of the Law on Genocide.

According to Gjinushi, with the Law on Genocide, parliament has been turned into a special court that prosecutes and convicts within two pages. Can you think that a parliament that deprives its own deputies of the right to be elected will be able to protect the citizens' rights? Gjinushi argues, considering this moment to be the beginning of a dictatorship, similar to the year 1946 in Albania.

As the Law on Genocide runs counter to Albanian law and international charters, the PSD has urged the president not to sign it. Indeed, from being an intellectual of the first group that sought pluralism, he will become an eliminator of the multiparty system.

This time, Mr. Gjinushi has more confidence in sense of responsibility of the Constitutional Court. This body cannot accept the abolition of the right to be elected simply because of one's biography. For the Social Democrats, however, the Constitutional Court does not have a good reputation. PSD leader Gjinushi listed the facts, from the decision for a referendum to Brozi's dismissal. He even accused the Constitutional Court of being a direct participant in the power struggle against the Court of Cassation, and of issuing politicized decisions.

Gjinushi points out that there are losses in the Democratic Party [PD] and every aggravation of the situation leads to other leaks on the PD's part. The ruling party's losses will be sealed in the new elections, the PSD leader declared. For this reason, he stated, it is asked that ties among other parties be strengthened. To reinforce the Albanian center, the PSD has acted together with the Democratic Alliance and has had satisfactory meetings with the Human Rights Union Party. According to Gjinushi, all opposition forces are interested in defending the rule-of-law state and having a normal campaign, so that no single party dominates later in parliament and government. Together with the fight against corruption,

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

the issue of property should be regulated and a real European integrating foreign policy implemented.

If the PD attempts to manipulate the next elections, the need will arise to set up a coalition block, Gjinushi concluded.

PD Denounces Socialists' 'Anti-Western Platform'

AU2709121995 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1900 GMT 27 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] A spokesman for the Democratic Party [PD] states that, recently, several extremists at the head of the Socialist Party [PSSh] have openly displayed their anti-Western platform, thus attacking both Albania's cooperation with the North Atlantic Alliance and other Western institutions, and the leaders of important European institutions, distinguished personalities, and great friends of Albania. This campaign also includes the attack in the past two days that these extremists undertook against Mr. Gerd Langguth, a distinguished friend of the Albanian nation and the chairman of the German Konrad Adenauer Foundation, for the sole reason that this personality of German politics and friend of Chancellor Helmut Kohl warned the Albanians, in good faith, of the real danger to Albania from the return of old forces to power.

On this occasion, we would like to remind the PSSh that Albania's integration into the Western world is not only to the PD's interest, but is a vital interest of the entire Albanian nation and that it is not the denouncing of the great democratic forces and distinguished friends of Albania, but a deep reformation and departure from the communist past, Marxism, Stalinism, and Enverism that is the only way to play a constructive role in the development of democracy in Albania.

Socialists: Brozi's Dismissal Session 'Unlawful'

AU2809083795

[FBIS Editorial Report] Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian on 27 September carries on page 4 a 700-word commentary by E. Brace on "Scandal in the Legislature: the Session on Brozi's Dismissal is Unlawful."

Erion Brace says, "The socialists will complain to the Constitutional Court about the dismissal of the Cassation Court chairman. The event which shook Albania, but also the chancellories in Europe and the United States, will soon pass through the legal filter." After describing the lightening procedures used to dismiss Brozi, the commentary says that "after a meeting a few days before with President Berisha, about 69 deputies of the Democratic Party came to the legislature. This number is the object of the parliamentary scandal that makes Brozi's dismissal doubly unlawful." The commentary says that speaker of parliament Arbnori declared the session open "on the basis of 73 signs on the corresponding tables of the deputies in the hall. Deputies Shkelqim Cani of the Socialist Party, Arben Imami of the Democratic Alliance, Gramoz Pashko of the Democratic Alliance, and Azem Hajdari of the Democratic Party, who had not been in the parliament that day, were considered present. In fact, only 69 deputies were present that day.

"According to regulations, the session is declared open only when 50 percent plus one of the deputies are present. Everything that started at 6:27 pm was unlawful, so everything that followed was also unlawful."

The commentary says in conclusion that after about 40 minutes Brozi was dismissed. "An end was put to what had started in July 1995 when Brozi demanded Nano's innocence, who has now been imprisoned by the Berisha regime for two years."

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Minister Protests Inclusion on Schengen List

AU2709152695 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1000 GMT 27 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Following his return from Brussels, Justice Minister Mladen Chervenyakov said: Yesterday's decision by the Council of Ministers of the European Union to include Bulgaria on the negative list of the Schengen Treaty is unjust, to say the least. The decision conflicts with Bulgaria's status as an associate member of the EU, he added. We made efforts to block the decision by diplomatic means, he said, but it became clear that it was determined in advance. Minister Chervenyakov said: There is no truth in the claims that Bulgaria is a risk country, an international staging post for illegal immigration, because, for the first time, our country is not included in the top 10 countries in this respect.

[Begin Chervenyakov recording] We reacted in the only way possible, that is, by issuing a very strong declaration in which we explained our position and insisted that the statement be read at the full session and not during the other meetings or at the official luncheon, as was suggested, because we wanted it to receive a wide hearing and be well understood. The statement undoubtedly made an impression, because it is not a frequent practice at these meetings and discussions to express disagreement with one or another decision of the Council of Ministers.

The reply by the Spanish chairman of the session contained words that have been said on numerous occasions at a higher government level and during the visits of other heads of states to Bulgaria, namely, that all prerequisites exist for removing Bulgaria from this negative list, and the hope was voiced that after 1 January 1996, when the EU Council of Ministers will adopt decisions by a majority, not by consensus as has been the case so far, it will be possible to seek a favorable solution to this problem. [end Chervenyakov recording]

Videnov Comments on Energy Accords With Russia

AU2509131495 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 20 Sep 95 p 9

[Interview with Prime Minister Zhan Videnov by Vesela Vaneva and some unidentified journalists on board an aircraft en route from Moscow to Sofia on 18 September: "Agreement on Burgas-Alexandroupolis Pipeline Will Be Signed by November"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [TRUD] Mr. Videnov, is it true that you reached an agreement in Moscow on a barter deal involving the supply of natural gas to Bulgaria?

[Videnov] Obviously, we will not be able to base the supply of natural gas on a 100-percent barter basis. This is a huge volume of goods, which Bulgaria cannot always guarantee. However, we will obviously be able to reach an intergovernmental agreement on this issue before the end of the year. It will not be like the Yamburg agreement, but it will be something similar and will involve fixed and guaranteed annual quantities of gas for Bulgaria and the manner of payment. At this stage both the Russian Government and Gasprom have shown interest in our grain, meat, canned meat, popular remedies, and construction and tourism services.

[TRUD] Is it clear from whom we will be purchasing the natural gas?

[Videnov] In the foreseeable future this will be Gasprom, which has the Russian monopoly on the supply of gas. Several companies in Bulgaria are dealing with this issue. In principle, the Russian-Bulgarian Topenergy Association could also join the agreement. This would allow both governments to help a lot, because they could attract investment and settle the manner of payment, including barter deals and prices.

[TRUD] The idea of restoring the Warsaw Pact has been mentioned recently.

[Videnov] The Russian Government did not say a word on this subject. No ministry of ours or the embassy in Moscow have any information about this subject. I have the feeling that this is speculation. However, what the Russian state did ask for—and this is a longstanding Russian demand—was to begin talks on establishing a free trade zone. In principle, this is useful for Bulgaria, but we agreed to await the completion of the GATT-World Trade Organization talks toward the end of the year.

[TRUD] According to preliminary information, the National Gas Company will be a likely shareholder in Topenergy.

[Videnov] No. It appears that the basic interest of the Russian partners continues to be the inclusion of active participants who could contribute a large investment capital without problems or delay. We could not convince them that Bulgargas is a sufficiently suitable participant from this point of view. We will most probably seek a resolution of this issue through the banks. This means large private and state banks, able to finance the project.

[TRUD] How will you guarantee the decisive role of the state as a participant?

[Videnov] We will guarantee this on the basis of the charter. We did not go into such detail. There are

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

blocking quotas in this area. Parity is incorporated in the charter itself. The Bulgarian and Russian sides can only participate in the project on an equal basis: 50:50. The state enterprises could have 34 percent, 25 percent, or 10 percent, but the overall total of each state cannot surpass 50 percent. Within this percentage we will seek a formula that will correspond to Bulgaria's interests and mainly to preserving the stable supply of natural gas with suitable prices and manner of payment. Therefore, nothing will remain fixed in time or form. There will probably already be changes by the end of the year.

[TRUD] What about changes in the Topenergy management?

[Videnov] Such changes will depend on the composition of the company's management. The companies that participate in the shareholding capital must predominate in the management. This issue is clear to us and the Russian side accepts it.

[TRUD] Have you already agreed on where the agreement among Bulgaria, Russia, and Greece on the Burgas-Alexandroupolis oil pipeline will be signed?

[Videnov] According to an announcement by the Russian side—I stress that this is an announcement—this should take place in Sofia. I would be very happy if such a historic event does indeed take place in Sofia.

[TRUD] In October?

[Videnov] If possible, but no later than November.

[TRUD] Are only private banks in question for Topenergy, or also private associations?

[Videnov] Both private and state. The Russian state asked for and insisted on investing fresh capital at the first stage of the enterprise. We are talking here about large amounts, tens of millions, even $100-200 million.

[TRUD] Did you talks about specific companies and banks?

[Videnov] No. This will be decided at the Topenergy general assembly.

[TRUD] When?

[Videnov] I think that the general assembly will be convened by the end of the year. Representatives of the general assembly, Angel Popov and Rem Vyakhirev, attended the meetings in Moscow. They will draw their conclusions and make their recommendations. I suppose that Gasprom will coordinate them with the Russian Government. Bulgargas will coordinate it with us as owners.

[TRUD] Did you reach a new agreement on nuclear energy?

[Videnov] Yes. But this was not a basic topic. The Russian side categorically supported our position that, with all the improvements made, the reactors in Kozloduy could function at least until 2004. The Russian side thinks that those reactors could function not for 25 but for 35 years, provided that there is the appropriate maintenance, better equipment, improvements, and additional control systems. The Russians do not understand the pressure on Bulgaria to close the Kozloduy reactors. As far as the Belene nuclear power station is concerned, obviously, parliament will have the final say on this matter. We cannot pressurize parliament to deal with the issue prior to presenting the final draft on the country's power strategy, where it will become clear whether the country needs additional nuclear capacities. As you know, we will be presenting the strategy by the end of October.

[TRUD] What about the used fuel of the first four reactors of the Kozloduy nuclear power station? Prior to your visit, the Russian Duma was allowing us to return the used fuel to Russia.

[Videnov] We have the categorical support of the Russian side and intensive contacts with Ukraine and Moldova will follow. We have committed ourselves to involving Romania in the agreement; we will sign an intergovernmental agreement on the transportation of fresh fuel to Bulgaria and the used fuel back to Russia. If you remember, this is an issue that we were not ready to resolve in May, but now we are committing ourselves to resolving it at the next meeting of the joint commission. We will insist on Russia assuming the commitment on the used fuel even at a later stage. The storage facilities that Bulgaria has cannot be used any longer. Their potential has been exhausted. Simultaneously, Russia is unconditionally interested in the functioning of Bulgaria's nuclear capacities. After all, almost two thirds of the equipment, the spare parts, and the expert, engineering, and control activities are of Russian origin.

Commissions Discuss G-7 Note on Kozloduy Safety

AU2709192695 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 27 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The National Assembly Commissions on Power Supply and on the Environment are conducting a joint meeting at which the note of the G-7 countries is being discussed. As you remember, in this note, the G-7 countries insisted on closing the first reactor of the Kozloduy nuclear power station.

In order to learn all aspects of the problem, the deputies heard reports from representatives of the Committee on Power Supply, Kozloduy director Kozma Kuzmanov,

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

and Yanko Yanev, chairman of the Committee on the Peaceful Use of Atomic Energy.

According to information disclosed at the meeting, the tests of the first reactor structure's metal show that it can be safely activated.

After the open meeting, which lasted one hour, the deputies decided to continue the meeting without the presence of journalists. We hope to be able to inform you later about developments at the meeting.

In the meantime, we have learned from unofficial sources that Yanko Dobrev, director of the National Electricity Company has resigned.

View Kozloduy as 'Political'

AU2709193295 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1800 GMT 27 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The joint meeting of the National Assembly Commissions on Power Supply and on Environment has ended. The meeting dealt with the problem prompted by the G-7 note, which insisted on closing the first reactor of the Kozloduy nuclear power station.

According to Plamen Denchev, chairman of the National Assembly Commission on Power Supply, an objective analysis of the situation was made at the meeting. An attempt was made to find a solution, and eventually to prepare a position that corresponds to Bulgaria's interests, if this becomes necessary, because the National Assembly is not directly engaged in this problem. Mr. Denchev further said that the problem is not technical but rather political.

As a parliament, we have fulfilled our commitments to nuclear safety, Plamen Denchev stated, noting the normative documents adopted by the National Assembly on guaranteeing nuclear safety.

He added that on this foundation the government could work out its position on the problem.

It is the position of the deputies that talks with the International Atomic Energy Agency must be resumed and a comprehensive assessment must be made, not only of the first reactor, but of the entire Kozloduy nuclear power station. It was especially pointed out that, according to Bulgaria's international commitments and the Nuclear Safety Convention ratified by parliament, it is the Committee on the Peaceful Use of Atomic Energy as a controlling body that has the final say over reactivating Kozloduy's first reactor.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Parliament Ratifies 10-Year Treaty With Russia

AU2709214795 Paris AFP in English 1726 GMT 27 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Prague, Sept 27 (AFP)—The Czech parliament ratified Wednesday [27 September] a ten-year treaty on stronger ties with Russia, officially laying to rest decades of fractious relations between Prague and Moscow.

The friendship and cooperation treaty, signed by Russian President Boris Yeltsin and his Czech counterpart Vaclav Havel and ratified by the Russian parliament last year, "puts an end to the totalitarian past linked to the unacceptable use of force against Czechoslovakia in 1968."

The treaty binds Russia and the Czech Republic to respect each others' sovereignty and resolve contentious issues by peaceful methods alone.

The last time the interests of Moscow and Prague clashed head-on—over the reforms of the so-called Prague Spring in 1968—Red Army tanks poured into the then Soviet satellite to crush any notions of a more liberal form of socialism.

Law Extended Banning Ex-Communists From Top Posts

AU2709214695 Paris AFP in English 1752 GMT 27 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Prague, Sept 27 (AFP)—The Czech parliament voted Wednesday [27 September] to extend by five years a law preventing one-time senior Communist officials and secret police from holding top political and civil service posts.

The extension of the law to the year 2000, supported by all the parties in Prague's centre-right coalition, will allow the state "to boost its demands of integrity from from its civil servants," a deputy from Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus' Civil Democratic Party (ODS) said.

The law was originally adopted for five years in September 1991, to a clamour of disapproval from leftist parties.

So far, 8,000 people have been affected by the law following positive vetting procedures carried out by the Czech Republic's interior ministry.

Czechs Move To Make Koruna Convertible Currency

MS2809105295 London FINANCIAL TIMES in English 28 Sep 95 p 3

[Article by Vincent Boland: "Czechs Convert to Convertibility"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Czech parliament's approval on Tuesday of a new foreign exchange act making the koruna widely convertible is both a leap forward and a step back in time.

The act, which takes effect on Sunday, introduces partial liberalisation for capital account and full convertibility for current account transactions in the Czech koruna, the "hardest" of central Europe's "soft" currencies, and marks the country's return to a liberal foreign exchange regime last enjoyed between 1922 and 1938, when the former Czechoslovakia was an economic powerhouse in Europe.

The new foreign exchange act conforms to Article 8 of the International Monetary Fund's guidelines on convertibility. It should also clear the way for Czech membership of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, which is expected by December.

"After nearly 60 years we are back in the club of convertible currencies," said Mr Josef Tosovsky, governor of the Czech National Bank [CNB]. Mr Ivan Kocarnik, finance minister, said the decision means the koruna would again become "a recognised and accepted currency."

The new act lifts a Kc100,000 [Czech koruna] (2,400 pounds) limit on the amount of foreign currency Czech citizens can buy and allows for the purchase of real estate abroad. It also enables companies to accept credit from non-resident banks and eases restrictions on direct investment.

The Czech Republic thus becomes the first emerging market in central Europe to partly liberalise capital account transactions. "The impact (of the act) isn't huge; its importance is in the signal it sends," said Mr Ralph Lazar of Baring Securities in London.

One of the remaining restrictions on the capital account is a ban on investing in foreign stock markets to prevent an outflow of capital from Czech equity. Economists doubt, however, whether such an outflow would occur if the restriction were lifted.

Mr Tosovsky said full capital account convertibility remained the CNB's goal by the end of the decade.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

The act does not bring any immediate change to the central bank's managed exchange rate policy, which has meant a stable exchange rate since 1991. The koruna will remain fixed to a two-currency basket that consists of a 65 per weighting to the DM [German mark] and 35 per cent to the U.S. dollar, against which it fluctuates by 0.5 per cent either side of parity.

Analysts expect that any change to the exchange rate will not be made before the first half of next year. Mr Tosovsky said there was no urgent need for a change: "We are not under pressure to change the regime or the level (of the exchange rate)."

The new act is likely to increase competitive pressures on industry because the koruna is expected to rise, while making the country more attractive to foreign companies because of more liberal foreign exchange laws.

It will also put pressure on Czech banks to offer more competitive lending terms as well as hedging and derivatives products, now that companies are free to borrow abroad.

"There will be greater demand for more complex products; but can the domestic banks provide them," said an executive at a western bank in Prague.

The new act coincided with the biggest monthly trade deficit in over a year. The August deficit stood at Kc11bn, pushing the total deficit since January to Kc63.7bn from Kc52.7bn in the seven months to July. The central bank does not expect further acceleration and forecasts a total deficit of under $3.6bn for 1995 compared with $436m in 1994.

Economists have blamed the deficit on the underlying lack of competitiveness of the Czech economy. Mr Tosovsky said the size of the deficit was expected and reflected rising imports of capital goods. At the same time huge inflows of foreign capital have pushed total foreign reserves in the banking system to $14bn (8.9m pounds), higher than the Czech Republic's gross debt of $13.7bn.

Mr Tosovsky says future exchange rate policy would be aimed at lifting remaining curbs by the time of membership with the aim of joining the "hard core" EU currencies. "We are doing everything to prepare the country for (EU) membership." Mr Vaclav Klaus, prime minister, has said the government would apply for membership in January.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Schenk: Perry's Comments Should Not Be Dramatized

AU2709134295 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 22 Sep 95 p 3

[Article by Leopold Moravcik: "Slovakia Cannot Be Ignored"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] In reply to a question on whether, in the wake of the recent critical remarks made by U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry about Slovakia and the current domestic political crisis, no change can be expected in views on the Slovak Republic's incorporation into the Alliance, Foreign Minister Schenk said that the statement made by the U.S. defense secretary should not be dramatized because there are no major differences between the countries of Central Europe. He added that the government does not consider the issue of admission into NATO to be a matter of political prestige. "It is not vital for us to be the most beautiful, the best, and the first. This definitely does not mean, however, that we could accept the postulations that some of the countries of Central Europe should be excluded from this process. We believe that, in the decisionmaking on enlarging the Alliance, all of the criteria that come into consideration, including the very important geopolitical and geostrategic aspects, will be weighed in detail and very objectively."

The minister also referred to the recent Russian criticism of NATO enlargement and said that the main recipient of these sharp comments was, first and foremost, the Russian public before the planned parliamentary elections. With regard to the most recent developments in Bosnia, he said that the military intervention against Bosnian Serb positions had forced the sides in the conflict to speed up their peace talks. He emphasized, however, that the world community's peacekeeping forces cannot be allowed to become one of the sides in this conflict.

Commentary Views Outcome of Perry Visit

AU2709151195 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 22 Sep 95 p 19

[Commentary by Alena Borovickova: "The Czechs and NATO"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The visit by U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry to the Czech Republic left one of the main questions without a clear answer. That question is the exact year of the Czech Republic's entry into NATO. He did, admittedly, praise the Czechs for their democracy and their endeavor to have good relations with all of their neighbors, and he emphasized that the Czech Republic is, along with Poland, among the East European states at the top of the list of candidates for admission into NATO. However, he indicated that this will not be so soon. It is necessary, incidentally, to understand that this process will be very slow.

It is known that the United States and the leadership of the North Atlantic Alliance also pay thorough heed to the opinion of Russia. And, in the Czech Republic, Perry made no secret of the fact that his great idol is George Marshall, whose plan for uniting Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals he described in his debates with Czech politicians as his major objective.

So, at the moment, Prague must just content itself with further assistance from the United States in gaining admission into NATO. This consists of the possible sale of the F-18 multipurpose combat aircraft and of the data on and price lists for the F-16 fighter aircraft that, according to the Americans, are extremely necessary for modernizing the Czech Army. Although the entire business will not be at all cheap (many billions of korunas will be involved), it seems that Perry convinced Defense Minister Holan, President Havel, and Czech Parliament Chairman Uhde of this "inevitability" very quickly. That is, Holan should give up the idea of modernizing the Russian MiG-21 fighters as quickly as possible and concentrate on to whom his ministry will assign the modernization of the older F-16's that the United States wants to sell to the Czechs.

The Americans, however, are not merely clearing their stockpiles, as the Czech opposition accuses them of doing. They would like to invest some $10 million in the Czech Republic. According to them, part of the money will go into "training within the framework of the Partnership for Peace program" and part into the purchase of "new equipment and toward teaching English." All in all, this is a small step closer to admission to NATO....

Meciar Interview Marks 1,000 Days of Independence

LD2709170395 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 27 Sep 95

[Studio interview with Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar by Jarmila Tosecka, to mark 1,000 days since the founding of the Slovak Republic; date not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Tosecka] The 1,000 days of the independent Slovak Republic have generated the polarization of the entire political scene and the whole of our society. This period, which

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

from the historical view point is a short one, has resulted in the present difficulties in relations between the president, the parliament, and the government.

How can this polarization, the tension in society be eliminated—on the part of all of the participants, of course?

[Meciar] [Passage omitted] As far as present relations among constitutional officials are concerned, we can see that this is complicated but that it is also quite simple.

The parliament passed a no-confidence vote in the president and is not cooperating with him. The government voiced no confidence in the president and is not cooperating with him. It is detaching itself from why it happened since it had concrete causes. Naturally, tension on this scene can continue, but what do we want? To put parliament into disarray again, to disorganize the government so that the president could implement what? He has no positive program, and it is not within his competence to implement a positive program. I am certainly distancing myself from the accusation that this is a Meciar-Kovac dispute. I did not and I do not want to be president. This is not the main question.

But a situation has arisen in which the president has a negative relationship with the parties of the government coalition. He makes the work of the government in the international field difficult. Statements have been issued—and citizens do not even know about them—that greatly harm our basic interests. Such a relationship should not exist. What is important in politics is that, when one feels something as a personal injury but one is in a state post, one's own feelings must be subordinated to the interests of the state. So we have this problem. It should be solved in a democratic fashion, through parliament or citizens. If we succeed in consolidating our internal problems, the growth of Slovakia toward success is guaranteed. And I believe in it. [passage omitted]

Envoy Accuses Hungarian of 'Besmirching' Slovakia

LD2709151195 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 27 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe is continuing its fourth session in Strasbourg. Jarmila Tosecka, our editor, has asked Dusan Slobodnik, the head of the Slovak parliamentary delegation and chairman of the foreign committee of the Slovak parliament, to comment on the topics discussed at the session. [passage omitted]

[Begin recording] [Tosecka] Any problems at the session so far?

[Slobodnik] Cardinal Angelo Sodano from the Vatican, secretary of state—something like the prime minister—of the Vatican, gave a very interesting speech about the situation. The practice at these sessions is to ask questions after each speech. Mr. Jeszenszky [Hungarian foreign minister] from Hungary was among those who asked a question after Cardinal Sodano's address. Nobody else is allowed to interfere, and, therefore, we were unable to say anything.

Mr. Jezsenszky said that Hungarian Catholics living in Slovakia are disadvantaged because there is a shortage of Hungarian-speaking priests in Slovakia. He demanded a Hungarian bishop. He did not mention that, by papal decree, on 31 December 1977 Slovakia became an independent church province.

I found Mr. Jezsenszky's assessment of the situation of the Catholics and Christians in the south of Slovakia very insulting because the exact opposite is true. Mass is not celebrated in Slovak in about 370 out of 971 villages in southern Slovakia—yet a significant proportion of the population living in these villages is Slovak. Cardinal Sodano's reply was evasive, without any specific reference to Jeszenszky's accusations.

Mr. Jeszenszky is notorious in the Council of Europe for besmirching Slovakia. We talked to the representatives of the Hungarian Republic about this, but only after the discussion. I think this is bad. If they dare behave like this before the ratification of the treaty, what other claims are they going to make? [passage omitted] [end recording]

Car Belonging to Kovac Jr.'s Lawyer Set on Fire

AU2709171695 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 22 Sep 95 p 1

[Report by "(sdl)": "The Lawyer's Car Has Been Set on Fire"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—Late on the night of 19 September, a so far unknown culprit poured gasoline over the Mercedes 350 D belonging to Michal Kovac Jr.'s lawyer, Dr. Jan Havlat, and set it on fire. The injured party told us yesterday that, were it not for the rain, his car would have been completely ablaze. Only the paint was removed. He found two burned out firecrackers behind the windshield wipers. He has reported the incident to the police.

Modernization of Nuclear Power Station Discussed

LD2709194595 Berlin DDP/ADN in German 1826 GMT 27 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava (DDP/ADN)—An international meeting of companies interested in becom-

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

ing involved in the modernization of the Slovak nuclear power station at Mochovce started in Bratislava today. The meeting, likely to last two days, is being attended by representatives of Siemens, Framatom, EdF International, Atomenergoexport, Zarubjeshenergostroj, Skoda Praha, as well as the Slovak companies Hydrostav, Energeticke Zavody, Energoprojekt, and the Nuclear Energy Research Institute. The meeting was called by the nuclear power station operator Slovenske Elektrarny (Slovak Power Stations) and the government's energy commissioner, Marian Sip.

According to information from Bratislava, the aim of the meeting is to clarify the participants' interest in the construction and funding of the power station as well as to discuss the mechanism for allocating state loan guarantees. Bayernwerk AG will not be attending the talks, it was said. The Munich-based company has already withdrawn its tender. The chief reason given for this was Bratislava's refusal to shut down the aging Jaslovske Bohunice power station once Mochovce comes on stream.

Politician Dissatisfied With Mochovce Skoda Plan

AU2709153995 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 22 Sep 95 p 1

[CTK report: "Bavaria Is Dissatisfied"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Munich—The leader of the deputies' group of the ruling Christian Social Union (CSU) in the Bavarian land parliament, Alois Glueck, yesterday cast doubt on the claim that Western safety standards could be attained in a Slovak nuclear power plant [Mochovce] through supplies from Skoda Prague worth 595 million German marks.

"This strategy is encumbering Slovakia's relationship with Bavaria," said the influential Munich politician with regard to Bratislava's intention. The German Siemens company, based in Munich, was one of the main contenders for this order. The CSU of Minister-President Edmund Stoiber has already drawn the first consequences in the Bavarian land parliament; Alois Glueck has canceled in advance the visit by CSU deputies to Slovakia planned for May 1996.

People in Bavaria find it hard to understand why this German land is financially supporting Slovakia, where "such decisions are made," said the Bavarian politician.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Army Ready To Assist U.S. in FRY

LD2709205795 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 1830 GMT 27 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Hungary is ready to provide technical assistance to the U.S. troops participating in the Yugoslav [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia—FRY] settlement. Hungarian soldiers, however, will not undertake any direct role, not even peacekeeping, in the settlement, Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti told General John Shalikashvili, head of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff.

[Begin Keleti recording] No Hungarian soldier will go to that territory to participate in any peacekeeping or other missions aimed to guarantee peace in that region. We will, however, meet the obligations that we have so far undertaken. [end recording]

[Unidentified correspondent] The Hungarian defense minister and other army leaders made it clear that Hungary could do no more than that due to its geographical situation.

Shalikashvili and his Hungarian negotiating partners discussed NATO's planned expansion and the Partnership for Peace [PFP] scheme. The time has come to raise the PFP to a new level of quality.

[Shalikashvili in English, fading into Hungarian report] As regards the details, we have to guarantee a continuous quality improvement in the NATO-PFP cooperation. What I have seen so far in your country guarantees this.

[Correspondent] The head of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff was also received by Prime Minister Gyula Horn and President Arpad Goncz in the afternoon.

By the way, today the relevant committee of the Washington Senate approved the renomination of Shalikashvili to the highest American army post.

Ministry 'Intensively Studying' Romania's Proposals

AU2709132895 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 27 Sep 95 pp 1, 3

[Correspondent's report: "The Proposals Reflect the Romanian Positions—There Is No Mention of Consulates"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Hungarian Foreign Ministry is intensively studying the documents connected with the historical reconciliation initiated by Romanian President Ion Iliescu, Foreign Ministry Spokesman Gabor Szentivanyi said at his regular news conference held on 26 September. The content of these documents will not be made public until the ministry experts are finished studying them but, in Gabor Szentivanyi's view, at first reading the documents mostly reflect the position of the Romanian side, and the proposals do not mention the opening of new consulates for example, an issue often mentioned by the Hungarian side. Gabor Szentivanyi pointed out that, according to Hungary, it is possible to improve the bilateral relations also without signing a basic treaty.

Answering a journalist's question, Gabor Szentivanyi said that there had been no progress on the basic treaty issue, because the Hungarian side insists on raising Recommendation No. 1201 of the Council of Europe to the level of a legal document, something that Bucharest has been firmly rejecting so far. Gabor Szentivanyi also confirmed that a delegation of Hungarian experts would travel to Bucharest on 28 and 29 September to study the Romanian educational law.

Despite the reservations of Laszlo Tokes, honorary chairman of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [UDMR] and RMDSZ Chairman Bela Marko regarding the concrete issues, the Hungarian Government regards it as necessary to continue the dialogue and to advance it in a positive direction, Gabor Szentivanyi pointed out. He added that the Foreign Ministry sent the Hungarian objections regarding the aforementioned educational law to international forums.

Hungary's losses deriving from the economic embargo on Yugoslavia are close to $2 billion. Therefore, the Foreign Ministry calls for guarantees that Hungary would also participate in rebuilding former Yugoslavia after establishing peace in the region. For this, the Hungarian Government continues to offer Budapest as the venue for the international Yugoslav reconstruction conference, Gabor Szentivanyi pointed out.

Finance Minister Promises End to 'Shock Therapy'

LD2709131795 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1200 GMT 27 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] An end to shock therapy in Hungary—this is what Finance Minister Lajos Bokros promises. Speaking at a conference of car traders, Bokros promised a predictable economic environment and a consistent economic policy that maintains a balance but at the same time encourages growth in the coming years.

In his opinion, 4 to 5 percent economic growth could be achieved in 1997-98. Bokros confirmed that no change in the exchange rate policy is planned next year, and no large forint devaluation should be expected. The customs surcharge will not be increased, indeed it will be gradually reduced in 1997.

The Finance Ministry does not plan changes to the system of taxation either, but it expects a further 3.5 to

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

4 percent decrease in real incomes by 1996, the minister added.

Coalition 'Crisis' Seen as 'No-Win Situation'

AU2709154495 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 27 Sep 95 p 3

[Editorial by Gabor Miklos: "Deep-Freezing"]

[FBIS Translated Text] While the followers and opponents of the coalition are jointly burying the Socialist-Free Democrat government alliance, the coalition is still alive. Imre Szekeres said the other day that they are "deep-freezing" the conflicts. But these are frozen mines. Quite a mixed metaphor. The prevailing situation: a continued crisis that neither side favors but is unable to extricate himself from.

The public does not like this situation. I get letters and phone calls, and good acquaintances of mine stop me on the street and accuse the newspaper of harming the atmosphere and making the situation more difficult. Opinion poll results also show that the citizens are turning their backs on the quarreling partners. The two sides are in serious trouble because of this. Some observers now say that the confrontation is not caused by the subjects of debates, but by the system that they worked out in order to solve the debates. According to knowledgeable observers, the methodology of problem-solving separates the two partner parties more than their cultural and ideological community. The Socialist Party politicians are experienced state administrators, and they seem to favor official-institutional-regulation solutions. On the other hand, the Free Democrats simultaneously conduct formal political bargains and background work. They openly confront people while they succeed in building a strong internal front. The Socialists, however, cannot boast a similar party unity.

The risk is considerable. if no agreement is reached and the liberals leave the government, this will harm Hungary's image in the foreign press. Imagine the headlines in the U.S., German, and Swiss newspapers! If the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] were forced out of the government, this would shake the Socialist faction considerably and would also make the majority unstable: Only about two dozen Socialist deputies must be missing or struggling with a conscience crisis at a given moment.

It is foolish to think that the SZDSZ might overcome this separation. This would also cripple them, because their voters would turn their backs on them, just like on the other party. In addition, forced into the opposition, the SZDSZ would lose its opportunity to finally prove their ability to govern. This is difficult to do as it is. Obviously, the SZDSZ also knows very well that, by leaving the government, it will be difficult to preserve the various power positions and positions on various boards of directors. And the parties need the economic and power background. Perhaps this is even more important than the intellectual hinterland. The current delays and freezing show that the two parties' politicians are well aware of the fact that separation is at least as dangerous for both of them as maintaining the current situation. They have the opportunity to:

1. renegotiate the coalition agreement and work out a program adequate to the changed social and economic situation, and

2. maintain the current situation, the "freezing" of mines, a series of new crises, and the two parties will destroy each other's strength. There are no advanced elections, there is no improvement in Hungary's situation, and the two parties are mutually rendering themselves and each other helpless.

We are probably in a no-win situation now.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Izetbegovic Interviewed on New York Accord

LD2809101395 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1900 GMT 27 Sep 95

[President Alija Izetbegovic studio interview by an unidentified correspondent; date not given; from the "Daily News" program—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Correspondent] Mr. President, another round of peace talks on the basis of the U.S. initiative has ended. What is your assessment?

[Izetbegovic] Well, to put it in sports terminology, one can assess the first round as a draw. We won the second round. That is my assessment. Otherwise, the statement—the translation of the statement and the points in it—is rather bad, it seems to me, so I do not know how much of it has been understood. I will try, later on, to explain what it is about in layman's terms. But let me say that there was some mistaken information that last night something was signed, but nothing was signed. Nothing was signed last night, nothing is being signed as yet. There will be signatures once the complete package is finalized. Something was agreed upon last night, with the proviso that nothing is agreed upon unless everything is agreed upon. Consequently, nothing was signed last night. This information...

[Correspondent, interrupting] There was similar information in the wake of the Geneva talks. [words indistinct] the text of the whole [word indistinct], it is really extensive, although it seems there are several clauses of great significance. What have these agreements achieved in practical terms?

[Izetbegovic] Well, this is the continuation of the principle of the work from Geneva. I could say that this is about two major issues on which agreement was reached last night. The first group of issues refers to institutions, the future institutions of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, that is, Bosnia-Herzegovina as a whole, as a state, the ways in which these institution will be brought into being; this includes the question of elections, too. As far as the institutions are concerned, Bosnia-Herzegovina will have a parliament, it will have a presidency, and a government, which I think has not been mentioned here. It is mentioned in the statement, but I cannot see it in our commentaries. Parliament and the presidency are being mentioned, whereas a government is not being mentioned. Hence, it will have a government.

The second issue—how the institutions will materialize. They will materialize, as the statement puts it in the points which have been released, by way of free democratic elections. These are the two things—mentioned were the conditions for elections, i.e., freedom of movement has to be secured prior to this, restoration of human rights, people who want to return to their homes should be enabled to do so, those who do not want to should receive compensation, etc.

This boils down to the fact that the distorted demographic makeup should be repaired prior to elections, as a condition for elections, across the entire territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This means the return of refugees. Conditions should also be ensured, as they say, social conditions, according to this translation, the bottom line is—these are political conditions so free elections can be held, including freedom of the press, freedom of political actions, etc., as conditions for holding elections.

As far as these disputes are concerned about how to make it possible to hold elections, we conducted a very difficult diplomatic struggle over this issue. Hence, our people should note that these institutions have been established of this future state. A constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina is, of course, also being mentioned, something that was not explicitly in evidence in earlier documents. In this way, the whole state organization has been defined and laid down.

[Correspondent] The issue of free democratic elections was one of the key ones, one of those which we criticized three days ago when the whole world public was surprised to hear the sensational report that the legal Bosnia-Herzegovina government could not attend the negotiations as some preconditions had not been met. It seems that this report of a possible boycott played one of the key roles.

[Izetbegovic] It is a matter of this: the U.S. negotiators went to Belgrade with our document, which had been to some extent agreed upon, to reach agreement with Milosevic. They stayed in Belgrade seven or eight hours and after their departure from Belgrade, we were informed that they were carrying with them a completely different document; and instead of stopping over in Sarajevo to reach agreement on the document, they headed straight for the United States; and when we learned this and what was in the new document—this was at the time of the "Daily News" bulletin, maybe half an hour before it, it was three nights ago—we acted very quickly and announced that we would not be going to the United States.

The negotiators—I think they were half way to the United States—they had passed over Ireland—and when this news broke—I do not know, within 15 or 20 minutes—President Clinton ordered that his team return to Bosnia and Sarajevo to negotiate. They returned, returning via Ireland, where they had a short break, and then they came here and then they started this—in some ways, the most difficult round of talks, and they

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

lasted almost without interruption for some 40 hours. So their return and our cancellation of the meeting was the consequence of changes to a document which had been agreed upon; and what happened yesterday, the arguing yesterday which ended perhaps 15 minutes before the meeting in New York was due to begin, was all about—perhaps it will seem a bit strange—only one word, because there was agreement on all of the text except on the problems of elections. That word is a very important one since we insisted on guarantees that the so-called direct parliamentary elections be held. (?Milutinovic) kept rejecting it, the American side [words indistinct], and we saw that he had some objections to free and democratic elections as defined in the document [passage indistinct] the U.S. side said very clearly that it supports the integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina and that it would oppose any breakup of it. As you know, his is what President Clinton said last night. This is a very important issue and perhaps the document adopted there should be taken as a whole together with the Contact Group statements and statements of [word indistinct].

The U.S. side said very clearly that it supports the integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina and [passage indistinct].

[Correspondent] Perhaps we should refer to the latest statement by French Foreign Minister de Charette. He said that it would be slower if the talks were longer, but that the peace settlement would be more comprehensive.

[Izetbegovic] I fully agree with that. I would also add that the most fundamental thing is to secure guarantees for the realization, for the implementation, of what has been agreed upon. We are devoting special attention to this. We are insisting that the implementation is ensured, which will happen, as you have probably heard, with the arrival of NATO and some other forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

I assume there will be some (?50,000) of them, about half of them being U.S. soldiers. There are certain problems with this. The U.S. Congress must approve their departure. Some doubt whether it will work. I believe President Clinton will probably be able to convince the Congress to do it in the interests of America, of course, as this administration is very concerned about peace here in Bosnia-Herzegovina, so I think this will happen, but it is a question of where these forces will be deployed.

According to what we have been led to believe, the forces will be deployed throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina and they will be the factor to ensure the implementation of what has been signed—the return of people to their homes, freedom of the press, etc. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe commission should only establish that this has been implemented. If that is not implemented, we have not got much to lose. Here is why we do not risk a lot: the current state institutions of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina are continuing to discharge their duties until new institutions have been set up on the basis of these elections.

[Correspondent] How much pressure was put by the American side on the legitimate Bosnia-Herzegovina government, and was there pressure at all during negotiations?

[Izetbegovic] I would not say that there was direct pressure, I can only speak about some sort of conditioning [words indistinct]. The entire negotiating process is characterized by pressure. We are all under much pressure when negotiating. It would be sufficient to tell you that there were between 20 and 30 phone conversations on the Sarajevo-New York-Washington line. That was some sort of pressure. But we also exerted pressure by saying at one moment that we were not coming to New York at all. That was our kind of pressure. Everything is a bit characterized by pressure. However, I can say that there was no direct pressure.

[Correspondent] We have already heard that the Americans are again coming to Sarajevo. Mr. Holbrooke is supposed to be coming tomorrow [28 September] for a new round of talks and, according to some reports, they will be seeking to establish a cease-fire in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Is something like that acceptable to the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government?

[Izetbegovic] I believe that Holbrooke is coming the day after tomorrow. That is what I assume. Most probably he is coming to request that a cease-fire be established so that more normal conditions can exist for our negotiations. It is true that circumstances would be more normal were there no fighting. However, it is also true that we cannot accept a cease-fire under any conditions.

We have specified some very reasonable conditions. It is very reasonable to demand that before this the situation in Sarajevo be normalized [word indistinct], and by this we understand that there should be a normalization of gas, electricity, and water supplies to the city; that the Kiseljak-Sarajevo road be opened for civilian traffic, too—at present it is open only for UN, UNHCR, and UNPROFOR convoys; and further, that a safe road for Gorazde be opened. There is a very difficult humanitarian situation in Gorazde with the lack of food, medicines, and other things.

Under these conditions, naturally, we [words indistinct] cease-fire [words indistinct]. As regards the situation in the area of Banja Luka, we have set out our condition

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

that the circumstances which are enabling the continuation of ethnic cleansing be removed [words indistinct] an end to ethnic cleansing. This, in our view, can be solved in Banja Luka in the following way [words indistinct] this means that Karadzic's paramilitary units should leave Banja Luka, and we would take on the duty to make Banja Luka safe.

[Correspondent] It would be good, if you agree of course, if perhaps we could make use of your appearance as a guest on the "Daily News" program to have you tell us something more about an interview that Croatian President Franjo Tudjman gave to the French paper LE FIGARO during his visit to Paris a few days ago. His statements have really stirred the public and over the past few days, the papers have been full of comments on all this. Would you agree to say something on this?

[Izetbegovic] No problem. I [words indistinct].

[Correspondent] Are you surprised at statements made by Croatian President Franjo Tudjman in which he in a way evokes a time when our relations were not that (?brilliant)?

[Izetbegovic] To be honest, I am not surprised. I can say that I am a bit worried, or that I regret these statements. But I am not surprised. For instance, if Mr. Chirac or Mr. Kohl said something like that, I would be surprised, because I know their position about who is who in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Correspondent] Just to remind our viewers, if they did not have a chance to hear details of that interview: We are just paraphrasing some statements made by President Tudjman: for example, that the Federation was created because Europe and the international community could not allow the creation of a Muslim state in Europe, that Croatia was tasked with carrying out Europeanization of the Bosnian Muslims, that the infamous map that President Tudjman allegedly drew on a menu during his visit to London several months ago—that it reflects reality and that it is actually a map that was published by a French publisher in Brussels.

Let us start with this map. How true is it that it reflects the real state of affairs?

[Izetbegovic] I would like to say that it reflects the real state of affairs in Bosnia-Herzegovina to the extent that what is a visible reality is 200,000 armed soldiers in our Army—this is a major factor. The major factor is the Bosniak people, whose political awareness has been raised, they know who they are.

President Tudjman used to say that Muslims are Croats, but that they are unaware of that fact; I kept convincing him right from the beginning, even before he came to power, that this is not true. He alleged that the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Union] would win over 56 percent of the vote in Bosnia-Herzegovina elections; I told him it would win 17 to 18 percent. Precisely this happened [words indistinct]. According to some reports, one percent of the Muslims—those who consider themselves Croats—voted for the HDZ. Others did not vote for the HDZ, even though they did not have anything against the HDZ, but they did not consider themselves Croats. These are the realities.

Reality is also the general support that Bosnia-Herzegovina enjoys in the world as the victim of aggression, and as a proud and dignified victim of aggression—not only a victim, but also a state and people that managed to defend themselves despite having found themselves practically squeezed between two sides at one point. The people remained standing on their feet and our people [word indistinct]. These are realities, the recognition that our struggle enjoys in the international arena.

When I go to France, England, America, I do not risk being asked: Why did you destroy churches, bridges. I have not got problems of that sort. On the contrary, I am warmly welcomed everywhere, not as Alija Izetbegovic—I am still what I have been for the past 65 years—today they treat me as president of a country which has justified the title of a civilized state. These are the realities.

Let me tell you one more thing: the reality is that at least 1 billion people always stand behind Bosnia-Herzegovina—this is a reality that everyone should bear in mind; we have 1 billion people in the East and at least 1 billion people in the West who support us. I think that what will happen very soon is that there will be just two real lobbies in the world; in addition to the Jewish lobby, there will be one for the Bosnian Muslims. I think that nobody will dare touch us in the future; otherwise they would risk huge national interests. These are the realities.

[Correspondent] How would you comment on statements that Croatia has been tasked with the Europeanization of Bosniaks and that the Federation was created because Europe and the world could not allow the creation of a Muslim state in Europe?

[Izetbegovic] President Tudjman knows all too well that Europe was pushing us to create a Muslim state. The Stoltenberg plan wanted precisely that. We rejected it. They offered us that sort of state. However, the Bosniak people has linked its future to an integral Bosnia. It wants to achieve an integral and secular Bosnia. It is pursuing that path persistently. They offered us the

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Muslim state, they tried to persuade us to accept it. President Tudjman knows this better than anybody else. We rejected it.

With regard to Europeanization, we are a European state, a European people. I do not lay an emphasis on it. I only state it as a mere geographical fact. That is only a fact. If I went to Africa and said that I am African, nobody would believe me when they look at me. That is a mere geographical fact. I do not think it right to divide the world into Europeans and the remaining part of the world. This is offensive to the rest of the world. I know that many nations and people in the world are offended by such a categorization.

Finally, Europeans are also Karadzic and Mladic and the general who fired shells on the Mostar bridge—he is also a European. It does not mean anything. People should be divided into being civilized and barbarous. I think this is the only correct division, not a division into Europeans and others.

[Correspondent] [words indistinct] meeting with German Ambassador Johannes Preisinger. Did you have talks on the Federation or some of these statements made by President Tudjman?

[Izetbegovic] We spoke about the Federation, about Germany's support to the Federation, about a temporary French-German working group for aid to Bosnia-Herzegovina, that other countries will be invited to join it. I think that an invitation will be [words indistinct]. This is also one of the factors that ought to be borne in mind when we speak about Bosnia-Herzegovina. Recently, as a result of our consistent observance of human rights even under the conditions of war—the fact is that [word indistinct] level of democracy that exists [words indistinct] civilized critics point to some things that have been happening here; still this is a time of war, we have even won [words indistinct] whose position in the international arena has never been totally clear.

I visited Britain the other day. I was warmly welcomed in Britain. I heard some statements very clearly that I had been wanting to hear for a long time. They show that the most persistent neutral players, if I can call them so, are gradually siding with Bosnia-Herzegovina, beginning to support it. I will remind you of a statement made by John Major—an unequivocally clear statement: We support an undivided Sarajevo as the capital city [words indistinct].

We enjoy support from Germany, France [words indistinct], America for a long time, unreserved support from the Muslim world. Therefore, we are not pessimistic about our future.

[Correspondent] One more question in connection with Croatian President Franjo Tudjman's interview to LE FIGARO. Among other things, he said that the Bosnia-Herzegovina leadership includes a number of pragmatic people. What does it mean to be pragmatic, according to this statement?

[Izetbegovic] I do not know precisely, but I assume it means what the word itself means. It must refer to people who can see, but pretend not to see; can hear, but pretend not to hear [words indistinct]. I think that it refers to that. In the interests of our people and Bosnia-Herzegovina, in the interests of our future, we sometimes pretend not to see things that we see, not to hear things that we hear, that we have forgotten certain things that we are never going to forget; we are trying to look to the future [words indistinct]. I think these are pragmatic people, principled people who do not wish to moan, but in the interests of some higher goals [words indistinct] when it comes to the interests of our people and this country in particular [words indistinct].

[Correspondent] And one more question in conclusion [words indistinct] probably deserve much more time, our newscast is limited [words indistinct]. One more question which concerns relations between Bosniaks and Croats. It refers to some problems that have surfaced recently in the newly liberated areas of western Bosnia. I think that the most important problem is the liberation of Jajce and the fact that Bosniaks have not yet been allowed to return to Jajce [words indistinct]. Today, you had talks with Federation President Kresimir Zubak. Can you tell us something about that?

[Izetbegovic] Yes, I think I can give you a piece of good news in this respect: namely, he promised that Bosniaks will be able to return soon. Jajce was closed for a period of time for military reasons. He said that Jajce will be open very soon for the return of all refugees [words indistinct].

[Correspondent] Thank you very much, Mr. President.

Silajdzic Details Concessions Made to Belgrade

AU2709201995 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 27 Sep 95

[Studio-announcer report including statement by Bosnia-Herzegovina Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic on 27 September; place not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bosnia-Herzegovina Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic assessed positively the results of yesterday's agreement in New York. However, he particularly stressed the statement by U.S. President Bill Clinton that the United States would stand firmly behind a unified and integral Bosnia-Herzegovina.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

[Silajdzic] We suggested and expected such a statement, since we had been asked to make many concessions. In the name of peace, we offered to make those concessions and I hope that they will be the last [word indistinct]. What is important is that the United States will oppose any partition of Bosnia, any secession from Bosnia, and this of course clearly implies that it will oppose any attempts by our neighbors to encourage secession.

On the other hand, the agreement reached yesterday was an important step, not a great step but an important one, in the direction of peace. Bosnia-Herzegovina continues its legal existence, as the Geneva agreement said. We have practically elaborated on that with this paper to a certain extent and that is why there has been a delay, a misunderstanding. This is an issue of two political wills, a clash of two political wills within the U.S. mediating initiative. The Belgrade regime wants a weak state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as weak as possible. It wants a membrane around Bosnia-Herzegovina that can easily be pierced. On the other hand there is our political will—and this is the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, this is about us—and we want a superstructure, a strong central government, strong enough central institutions that would lead to the reintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina and not to its disintegration. I think that this is what the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina is based on. Bosnia-Herzegovina will continue to have its Constitution [words indistinct], parliament, presidency, and government, and all those attributes, the minimum of attributes that a state should have.

On the other hand, the greatest problems were caused by the expression of direct vote. In English this is called a popular vote [words indistinct]. This seems to have baffled some circles in Belgrade, but I do not see what they have to fear in Bosnia as far as the popular vote is concerned, when they have the same system in Serbia. [Words indistinct] all as a result of the lack of democracy. That is why we think it is very important—second only to the prevention of secession attempts—it is very important to introduce such a system in which one man will have one vote and will be able to vote for his representatives directly. We will no longer have some sort of delegated democracy. We insisted on that. However, the resistance by Belgrade led to a concession—this is true—and what was accepted was the phrase free and democratic elections. When it comes to free and democratic elections, we have some experience with that in eastern Europe and everything eventually ends up with 99 percent of the vote in favor of the state or the regime. We know what these free and democratic elections look like and we know that free and democratic elections do not necessarily have to be popular vote ones, which is why we insisted on a popular vote. However, what we feared most happened, which was that the Serb terrorists managed to find a way to halt the planned process.

I have just heard that they have dropped cluster bombs—this happened half and hour ago—on Travnik and have killed three people and wounded 35. They have found the only way to stop the peace process and it is absolutely incredible that NATO lets them do that.

Silajdzic: Offensive 'On' Until Serbs Sign Plan

AU2709192595 Mainz ZDF Television Network in German 1800 GMT 27 Sep 95

[Report on interview with Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic by Ignaz Lozo; place and date not given—recorded; Silajdzic speaks in English with superimposed German translation]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Lozo] Prime Minister Silajdzic is not prepared to stop the military operation. The Serbs are the only ones not to have signed the peace plan so far, and for that reason, government forces must continue to try to liberate all the occupied territories, he said. Asked what his government would consider doing if the Karadzic Serbs refused to return the Serbian occupied areas of Sarajevo, he said:

[Silajdzic] Then we shall have to go on fighting. There will be no divided Sarajevo, and the international community is on our side in this regard.

[Lozo] Thus, the all-clear has not been sounded yet, even if a cautious start has been made on clearing away debris for the first time in three years.

Comments on Travnik Bombing

LD2709222895 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 27 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] On the occasion of today's chetnik bombing of Travnik, Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic has issued the following statement to Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina:

[Begin Silajdzic recording] So what we feared has happened: The Serb terrorists, it seems, are discovering the best way to halt this peace process—killing civilians. Two, according to some reports three, people have been killed by cluster bombs in Travnik today, and over 20—according to some reports over 30—were injured. So, to repeat, this is probably the best way—and the Serb terrorists are obviously seeking it—to halt this peace process.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

It is our view that NATO is not reacting to this situation. If anything can halt this peace process then it is certainly this situation in which civilians in Bosnia continue to be killed. I believe that this is an unacceptable situation for us to continue the peace process while civilians in Bosnia-Herzegovina continue to be killed by Serb terrorists. [end recording]

Pogarcic Says Talks 'Fundamental Breakthrough'

AU2709164195 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 27 Sep 95

[Statement by Vladislav Pogarcic, deputy foreign minister of the Republic and Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, to Sarajevo Radio in New York on 26 September—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Pogarcic] The meeting defined further principles of the future organization of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the sense that they confirmed again its territorial unity and international integrity, and the necessity of organizing Bosnia-Herzegovina as an internationally recognized state within its integral borders [words indistinct]. The fundamental breakthrough in comparison to the principles agreed in Geneva is the clearly, precisely, and firmly determined principles on which the delegation of the Republic and Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina insisted, and which concern the organization of future elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina. These will be democratic and free elections, which will not allow for any kind of delegating of the leading political functions on the level of the future organization of the central authorities in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Instead a free democratic campaign will provide for the election of the political [words indistinct], which will directly vote for future authentic democratic authorities. [passage omitted]

Envoy to Croatia Explains Conditions for Peace

AU2709132695 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 26 Sep 95 p 7

[Interview with Kasim Trnka, Bosnia-Herzegovina ambassador to Croatia, by Azra Kaurin; place and date not given: "Conditions for New York"]

[FBIS Translated Text] One of Bosnia-Herzegovina's busiest diplomats is certainly Professor Kasim Trnka, Bosnia-Herzegovina ambassador to Croatia. As a prominent legal expert he has often been involved in work connected with the fate of Bosnia-Herzegovina. He has participated in the drafting of all the more important international agreements on Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Kaurin] How do you assess the current political situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Trnka] The action of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, HVO, [Croatian Defense Council], and Croatian Army, on the basis of the Split Declaration, has created a new ambiance for the peace process in which significant changes in the balance of forces on the ground have occurred. If one adds to this the role of the United States and other members of the Contact Group, then one can see that the steps toward peace have become more realistic than ever. The next steps are "Geneva 2" in New York. The preparations for this meeting were conducted on several tracks. First of all we have been working on improving the constitutional amendments agreed in Geneva. On the other hand we are resolving some issues between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. The talks with Milosevic, as the leader of the Serb delegation, have been conducted throughout this time.

Pale Does Not Want Peace

[Kaurin] What is happening with military operations? Have they stopped?

[Trnka] Military operations had been conducted successfully but have been slowed down. There is pressure in various quarters in the world to stop these operations, mainly in order to stop a large number of people from moving, which could cause disturbances and major humanitarian difficulties. The Serb side has reacted negatively to the proposal that Banja Luka be declared a demilitarized area. They did not even accept the peace option, but have undertaken military operations. They shelled Zenica. The current Serb team intends to continue the war. Peace can now be achieved only by changing the current team in Pale. By filing charges against these people in the Hague, the international community has shown what it thinks about these people. We now think that Milosevic, who leads this unified Serb delegation, will have difficulty achieving unity within the delegation. Or he will have to remove the Pale leaders. This is primarily his problem, as he is responsible for the war.

Agreement by Three Presidents

[Kaurin] What can be expected from the meeting in New York?

[Trnka] U.S. Undersecretary of State Richard Holbrooke told us that the meeting in New York will offer something new. We expect this to be within the framework of the constitutional arrangements that were discussed in Geneva. One must solve the problem of preserving the territorial integrity and the international status of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and bring the constitutional arrangement in line with the peace process. It will be necessary to specify the way in which the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Serb entity will

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

be connected, while preserving the territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina. One of the issues will be how to solve problems until the first democratic elections are held, then possible joint functions of the Federation and the Serb entity within the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as relations with the neighboring countries of Croatia and Serbia.

Our delegation has insisted that the legitimacy of the existing organs be preserved, and that at the same time the Federation be enabled to realize fully and efficiently its functions as stipulated by the Constitution and the Washington Agreement. After all, this was the subject of the recent agreement reached by Presidents Tudjman, Izetbegovic, and Zubak. They agreed to start work immediately on the methods of linkage, that is, the integration of the functions of the Federation and the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, while preserving the legal status of the institutions of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Kaurin]) Can this be accomplished?

[Trnka] Mr. Kresimir Zubak has already offered one way to solve this issue. I believe that in the next few days the top officials of the Republic and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina will get together and discuss his proposal in order to reach an agreement on the earliest possible integration of the functions of the Republic and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. We are talking about functions and not institutions.

Toppling of Karadzic Has Begun

[Kaurin] Banja Luka has recently been in the focus of attention. Have you managed to find possible negotiators from the ranks of the Serb people in that town?

[Trnka] Considering that Karadzic has reacted so quickly, it is obvious that he is trying to obstruct all potential candidates for such negotiations. Without pressure from Milosevic or without the presence of international observers on the ground, it is difficult to believe that Karadzic will allow any negotiations. I personally think that the process of toppling Karadzic has already begun.

[Kaurin] Turning Banja Luka into a UN protected area is said to be one of the possible solutions for Banja Luka. What do you say about that?

[Trnka] Our government insists that no new humanitarian problems be created. It also insists that the military centers of the Serb aggressor be eliminated from that area. Banja Luka should be a demilitarized town. We are prepared to allow international observers to be a guarantor that the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina will not undertake offensives against that town. There is no reason to make Banja Luka some kind of protected area and deploy peace forces. If NATO soldiers come here, they can assume that role in Banja Luka.

No One Wants Refugees Any Longer

[Kaurin] The refugees from Velika Kladusa who are on the territory of the Republic of Croatia are still refusing to go back home. How can this problem be solved?

[Trnka] So far we have taken a number of measures that are producing certain but not satisfactory results. The Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia must intensify their joint efforts. In this respect, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Turkey have agreed on a course of action. We have repeated the appeal for a mission of goodwill of these three countries that would restore confidence and encourage refugees to return to Velika Kladusa. A joint police force could indeed make a great contribution to this. The police force would work according to the regulations of the Republic and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This would be good police cooperation among Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Turkey. We hope this would restore confidence among the refugees from Velika Kladusa. As far as I know, no country is interested any longer in accepting refugees. It appears, especially in the case of Croatia, that there are no possibilities for that. Also, there is no reason to accept them when they are only some 20 km away from their homes.

[Box, p 7]

What Is Bosnia-Herzegovina Demanding?

[Kaurin] To what extent have Bosnia-Herzegovina's negotiating positions become stronger after the recent military successes? Is the Contact Group's plan still valid?

[Trnka] The recent success of our forces represent a major and real contribution to peace. The military position of the forces, which are defending themselves, and of the aggressor have now become even. This is a real precondition for constructive peace. The Contact Group's plan remains valid. Some corrections will have to be made to the map. The Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina insists on several points, and without them it will not accept the peace plan. Without the final lifting of the siege around Sarajevo, the reopening of the roads, restoring the power supply, and ensuring free movement without Serb checks, without all this the Sarajevo blockade will not be lifted. We demand the demilitarization of Banja Luka, a land corridor to Gorazde, and access to the port in Brcko. Other issues can be negotiated as there are real possibilities for that.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

[Box, p 7]

There Are No Deals With Serbs

[Kaurin] Whenever Serbs lose on the battlefield there is speculation in the foreign media that some kind of deal has been made with the Serbs. Some still believe that the Serbs are invincible on the battlefield.

[Trnka] Deals with the Serbs are out of the question. One could perhaps speak of unilateral tactics by the Serbs, but not about any deals.

[Kaurin] At the time when we were scoring successes on the battlefield, some foreign media tried to present allegedly new clashes between the Bosniaks and Croats. What are relations like between the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia?

[Trnka] The very fact that Presidents Izetbegovic and Tudjman have met five times in the last month and half illustrates best that relations are on the upward swing. Of course, some open issues can exist in such relations. After all, that is why they are meeting to resolve these issues. During their recent meetings the two presidents reached specific agreements that will contribute to better coordination of military actions that are in the mutual interest of our governments. I have already spoken about unifying the functions of the Federation and the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. They have agreed on the ways to maintain close military cooperation, including a sovereign decision of the organs of the Republic and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, when military operations stop, to ask the military forces of Croatia to withdraw from the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In addition to all this, they agreed on operational cooperation. I think that this is in line with international law and the interests of both countries. The principle of the right of the refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes has been reaffirmed and I think that the two countries will work hard in that direction and that they will have enough work to do.

Lazovic Sees 'Serious Prospects' for Peace

AU2709173495 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 27 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly Chairman Miro Lazovic addressed the Assembly of the Council of Europe held in Strasbourg. Here are a few excerpts from his address:

Whether most of the territory of the former Yugoslavia will be a stable military and political region or not depends on the solution to Bosnia-Herzegovina. I believe that today we are perhaps for the first time faced with serious prospects for establishing peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The Geneva ministerial meeting agreed the basic principles for the continuation of the political negotiations. The Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly has endorsed in principle the Geneva agreement, stressing our commitment to peace and the fact that peace is in the interest of all the people and citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina. We have again demonstrated our readiness for political negotiations by accepting a political solution as the desired one in the final and just peace process. [passage omitted]

LBO Calls For Sacirbegovic Resignation

AU2709172995 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 27 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Liberal Bosniak Organization [LBO] has issued a statement in connection with the agreement on Bosnia-Herzegovina endorsed in New York:

The agreement reached is the continuation of the dissolution of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Two days ago Alija Izetbegovic stated that the Geneva agreement on the principles of reaching peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina was a long step in the wrong direction. Therefore, he himself recognized that such a concept was ruinous, which should imply the resignation of the foreign minister and the entire negotiating team, and the search for a new formula for peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the LBO believes.

The agreement in New York is a formal legalization of the ethnic concept and the partition [words indistinct], which can be seen [word indistinct]. The future institutions will be blocked, and they will be practically unable to function as they will immediately be blocked. The entire authority of the republic is reduced to foreign policy, which is insufficient and says clearly Bosnia-Herzegovina is not a republic or a state, but a territory dissolved into three and formally two separate authorities, that are not delineated by anything, says the LBO statement in connection with the New York agreement on Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Foreign Ministers Discuss EU Reconstruction Aid

LD2709212095 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2054 GMT 27 Sep 95

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] New York, Sept. 27 (TANJUG)—The foreign ministers of Yugoslavia, Croatia and the Sarajevo Muslim government conferred here on Wednesday with their counterpart from Spain, the current E.U. chair-country, on the reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

The starting idea at the meeting between Milan Milutinovic, Mate Granic, Muhamed Sacirbegovic and Javier Solana who chairs the European Council of Ministers, is that reconstruction programs be made on time so that their realization could begin immediately after a peace agreement is signed, E.U. Foreign Policy Commissioner Hans Van Den Broeke said.

Preparations, which are already under way, are proceeding on three levels, it was heard at the meeting.

The first covers material reconstruction of the infrastructure, towns and cities, roads, bridges and other objects.

In the second sector, attention will be paid to the question of refugees, their return to their homes, the reconstruction of their homes, compensation and similar matters.

The third issue pertains to the coordination of all these activities within the E.U. which should be the principal factor in the reconstruction and renewal program.

Milutinovic said care should be taken to avoid a politicization of the entire process, because if that way is taken, it can not only slow down the mentioned programs, but even provoke new disagreements and discord among those who will use that aid.

Milutinovic also warned that the problem of refugees and displaced persons must be resolved immediately and without delay, because there can be no postponements of that issue.

General Delic Interviewed on Army Successes

LD2709155495 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 26 Sep 95

[Interview with Army General Rasim Delic, commander of the General Staff of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, by correspondent Arijana Saracevic on 26 September; place not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Saracevic] The latest successes achieved by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, the current military situation, and international meetings are the topics of our interview this evening with Army General Rasim Delic, commander of the general staff of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army. Gen, Delic, as I said, shall we start with the latest successes: over 4,000 sq. kms of Bosnia-Herzegovina has been liberated. Can we have your comment on it?

[Delic] These are results that I expected and whether to this or a lesser extent is a point for discussion. However, they are the result of comprehensive work in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, the growth of its combat readiness, and successes that we have been consistently achieving since June 1994, when we said that we had achieved a balance with the Serb aggressor and that we had started taking the initiative.

These successes are the result of this initiative and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army's readiness to liberate areas. This Bosnia-Herzegovina Army activity that started in June with battles around Sarajevo, in the wider region of Sarajevo, has maximally stressed the Serb aggressor; they have used all their potential to preserve the continuity of defense; we simply needed to launch an attack and achieve results in any area and what they had been guarding with their last reserves of strength collapsed like a house of cards.

I would like to remind the listeners of a short statement of mine from a couple of months ago, when I said that our moment was approaching and that we needed to be patient and dedicated. We have been both patient and dedicated and the ensuing success is the result of hard work, planning, and adequate preparations for carrying out combat operations; this is not an ad hoc success; it is a success that is a result of coordination and cooperation between corps. Let me remind you that from 10 September to this day, combat operations have been coordinated and carried out by the 2d and 3d Corps on the Mt. Ozren part of the front, and the 5th and 7th Corps in central, that is, western Bosnia in cooperation with Croatian Defense Council units and the participation of units from other corps, which are carrying out combat operations outside their respective theaters of operations.

[Saracevic] These successes came about after the Split Agreement?

[Delic] Yes, it is certain that the Split Agreement made a significant contribution to this—when we agreed that we would operate in coordination with the HVO [Croatian Defense Council] and the Croatian Army. The first result of this was the lifting of the blockade of Bihac by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and then we achieved the liberation of the complete area of the so-called Serb Autonomous Region of Krajina in Croatia.

And now, as you have seen, a great result of this cooperation has been the liberation of a large area by the Army, and also by the Croatian Army, and the HVO. When we add up what has been captured by one side and the other—this comes to about 10 percent of the territory of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina which has been liberated in the last fortnight.

[Saracevic] In the preparations for these talks you told me that you traveled from Tuzla to Visoko in two hours. Previously it took the whole night to complete this journey.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

[Delic] Certainly, the road which has been liberated following fighting around the Vozuca pocket ensured that one could get from Tuzla via Banovici, Vozuca, Zavidovici, Zepce to Visoko in less than two hours. This is sufficient indication of the extent of the savings there will be for the economy and for all those who travel around Bosnia-Herzegovina, especially now and in winter, in terms of savings of fuel and tires. And this is not to mention other benefits. These all relate just to this part of the battlefield in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

It is sufficient to say that we liberated a large area of forest, and that we ensured that two of the largest timber industry plants in Bosnia-Herzegovina, (?Natron) from Maglaj and Pilaj from Zavidovici, could begin to function normally. We liberated a force equivalent to three or four brigades, mainly from these areas, so that we will be in a position to free up workers, too, who will be able to begin to work in these factories. This simply has such great value that it is difficult to assess it.

[Saracevic] On the other hand, [words indistinct] exists. They are returning to their homes. On Ozren alone conditions have been created for the return of about 7,000 people, and for the return of about 13,000 people to Donji Vakuf.

[Delic] I am pleased that over the past few days I have passed through liberated territory and seen smoke coming out of the chimneys of houses in newly liberated areas, that people are returning, that they are carrying their goods, their possessions, on tractors, trucks and bicycles and are moving house. Sometimes I wonder if we will have sufficient people to return, in view of the fact that a large part of our people are outside Bosnia-Herzegovina, so in this respect, too, everything should be done to ensure that these people return because we have plenty of housing now which should be resided in lest it fall into decay, without inhabitants.

[Saracevic] [Word indistinct] this housing has been preserved [word indistinct]

[Delic] Most of the housing is being preserved but there can be no rapid reaction by the municipal authorities and units of the Internal Affairs Ministry on the ground which might prevent the (?degradation) of this housing and preserve it in the state in which it was found. Carrying out our combat operations, we prevented the houses from being looted and set on fire. The Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, for example on Mt. Ozren, is 31 km from Vozuca.

What is situated deep in the free territory is not in the combat zone, it is far from the combat zone. This should be the task for other institutions and state bodies. Therefore, I would like to say here that they have to react more promptly. I am surprised why the road about which we have spoken, which ensures that the trip between Zenica and Tuzla lasts two hours, has not yet been fully cleared. That is somebody's task and they have to do it.

[Saracevic] Within this context I would like to ask you something that is not as popular as the things that we have just mentioned. Ever since Jajce fell this has been a taboo. Jajce is finally free from the Serb aggressor, but still Bosniaks cannot go back to Jajce.

[Delic] This is a problem that has to be resolved at the political level. At a recent meeting in Zagreb with the relevant bodies of Croatia and the so-called Herzeg-Bosnia we discussed Jajce among other things. In principle we agreed one of the points, on which I believe Dr. Kasim Trnka provided an explanation the other night, and it is that all people should return to newly liberated areas, irrespective of which army liberated those areas. By this we created—with the American presence—political conditions for people to be able to return to their homes.

This morning I read an interview with Dr. Jadranko Prlic in VECERNJE NOVOSTI who said that everyone would return to their homes, that it was true that at present Jajce is the combat zone and that it is not yet completely safe for living. But unilateral invitations to only one nation to return to Jajce should certainly be prevented, because we know that Jajce was a town populated by Serbs, Croats, and Muslims who constituted a relative majority in Jajce.

[Saracevic] Relations with the HVO are very useful. Many have said that you and Gen Bobetko, as early as in your March meetings in Travnik in Zagreb, had a vision of the current developments.

[Delic] The meetings with Gen Bobetko were the basis for our cooperation with the Croatian Army. We planned several operations to be carried out jointly by the Croatian Army, the HVO, and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army. Some of the operations have been completed, successfully as you can see. We still have a few aces up our sleeves but whether we are going to go further will depend on political decisions adopted by the Croatian and Bosnian authorities, the peace process, etc. In any case we have plans for further operations.

[Saracevic] This following question is a bit immodest. We are becoming accustomed to the liberation of towns, large areas. How will the current lull affect, or rather will the forces of the 5th and 7th Corps link up?

[Delic] There is no lull. The four corps we mentioned are carrying out military operations and some units

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

of the other two corps are also taking part. We have been achieving military results on a daily basis. They, however, are not always comparable to those achieved 10 days ago. However, every day we liberate a number of villages and a 100 or more square kilometers. We are simply becoming insatiable in this respect. Earlier we were satisfied when we were able to defend ourselves. Later on we were happy when we could capture a position or two like Zmajevac, Husar, or Vijenac. Now it is not enough for us to liberate 150 or 200 square kilometers every day unless a town is among our spoils. Tomorrow, appetites may grow again. One should be realistic. The Serb aggressor has consolidated itself, received reinforcements from Serbia and Montenegro. We have been approaching more densely populated areas, where our advance has been slowing down and their defense lines are consolidated.

However, we are constantly achieving results. Let me tell you that the 5th Corps is in Manjaca today and theoretically speaking—just in case they accuse me (of shelling)—Banja Luka is already within our artillery range. Of course I am speaking of long-range artillery but it is of vital importance that it is within the range of our artillery. Just a few days ago this would have been an unrealistic dream. This is ample evidence of our continuing advances. Of course, we are always prepared for possible counterattacks. We should be aware that the war consists of many battles and it is important to score more victories and to win in the last battle.

[Saracevic] During the last victories you had a number of significant international contacts in Iran and Malaysia and this caused different reactions among the public.

[Delic] Unfortunately, there have been different reactions. I have been told that someone has written that while the Army was fighting here, I was in Malaysia.

It should be said that these operations were planned for a long time, that I was personally involved in drawing up all the maps, that the operations were mounted on 9 September, in other words the day I left for Malaysia, but were still carried out under my direct supervision since we have a system of leading and commanding which continues to function even if the person in charge is not there, on the spot. I was in permanent contact and laid the foundations for everything to function.

[Saracevic] On the other hand, you have had genuinely significant successes in Malaysia.

[Delic] It should be said that the conference in Kuala Lumpur was the most important conference so far to have analyzed the military situation in Bosnia since the beginning of the war. Never before in the history of the Islamic world has there been so many people gathered in one place who in their countries are in direct control of the Army and defense. During the first two to three days, the conference was attended by army commanders of the Islamic countries, of the Islamic countries which are members of the contact group and which provide forces for the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] in Bosnia as well as from some other observer countries. These were joined by the defense ministers later. It would have made no sense and it was never considered as a possibility as far as the hosts and other participants were concerned that I should not attend the conference at which commanders of armies from other countries were going to discuss the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

So, despite my desire not to leave Bosnia, it was simply impossible for me to stay. I can say that, due to the efforts of everyone in our delegation, with me at its head, that, in the first part and later when Foreign Minister Sacirbegovic joined, remarkable progress was made which, I think, is already having effects on the Bosnian Army and that the conference and my presence there were the biggest investment as far as our Army and the coming period are concerned.

I am telling you this to point out that those who have so far supported us and who have helped us will continue to provide even more help, that those who had their doubts have dispelled their dilemmas and that many who were, shall we say neutral, are gradually coming over to our side. This provides enough argument for you to see that the conference was an opportunity not to be missed. In any case, I went there with an order to gain as much benefit as possible for both the Army and the Bosnian state in the light of the important documents adopted there and which will be crucial for the Bosnian state in the current peace process and in the efforts to resolve the current situation in Bosnia.

[Saracevic] On the other hand, you are frequently in contact with U.S. Army representatives. Two days ago and yesterday you met with General Sewall. The public has not been informed about the details of the meeting.

[Delic] Yes, in my previous answer I forgot to say that I visited Iran. It is a great honor to be able to visit that friendly state and particularly because our entire delegation was received by the highest Iranian officials. We were received by Khamenei, Rafsanjani, and Foreign Minister Velayati. We knew that we enjoyed great support there but we really were not aware that every Iranian knew about Bosnia and felt compassion towards us in the knowledge of what we had to go through in Bosnia. It is my duty to pay tribute to our hosts and express gratitude for what Iran is doing for us.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

As far as meetings with U.S. General Sewall and American delegates are concerned, we have contacts on a daily basis over certain issues. During the NATO air strikes, I was in constant contact with Admiral Owen from the Pentagon and we exchanged reports regarding the results of NATO air strikes and the behavior of the Bosnian Army. I believe that this contributed to the fact that we were not accused of abusing the airstrikes and that NATO achieved its goals. The meeting with Gen Sewall who put in charge by the U.S. Administration to work on a concept of a future army of the Bosniak-Croat federation was just one of our many contacts. This time we discussed the situation on the ground, our cooperation and coordination with the Croatian Army and the HVO as well as problems we had with them and the ways of resolving them. As far as this issue is concerned, everything is based on our latest meeting in Zagreb where we also met US representatives Hoolbroke, Galbraith, and Gen Clarke. The other issue we discussed was the army of the federation. This is in our interest but only within the framework of the resolution of all other problems in the implementation of the federation. The effects of the implementation of the federation must be felt by ordinary people, in their towns and villages. People should be able to return to their homes, their property and their legal status should be secure. Then it will be easy to set up and secure the functioning of a single army. Of course, we will still have different opinions regarding the shape of that army. My view, based on history and international experience, is that only one army, not two, can exist in a state.

This will remain our standpoint and there are ways to resolve problems caused by all this talk of possible supremacy in that federal army.

[Saracevic] Foreign analysts have started saying that the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina has finally ended. What do you think about it? Or rather, should we talk about the status of Sarajevo? There are many people who think that the war will end only when the issue of Sarajevo is solved.

[Delic] The war will end only when there is peace, a just peace, in every corner of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, when people are allowed to return to their homes, or rather when the peace process, the current or some other one, results in the gift of peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina. As far as the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina is concerned, the war still goes on.

Can I remind you that in World War II the war officially ended in 1945 but that chetnik remnants were still being hunted as late as 1956 by the then secret service. As you can see, there will be great deal to do for both the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina and everyone involved in the war. I would rather advise people to stick to their everyday wartime chores and warn them that despite the euphoria, which as a rule accompanies every peace initiative, they should not start thinking in terms of peace. In the past, in our recent past, we paid dearly for such attitudes. On those occasions we lost initiative, we lost territories, our fighters' morale declined because they expected us to produce goods in a day or two—this is a difficult process and I do not expect it to be completed soon. I am therefore here warning not only my fighters—for they are easy to warn that the war is still going on because they are in the middle of it—but everyone else with the message to take care since the war is still going on here.

I would like to take this opportunity to appeal to our people abroad, to those who expect the war to end and to come back to Bosnia-Herzegovina, to come back immediately to make their contribution to the war so that their descendants can have the memory of them taking part in all this. I cannot imagine how these people are feeling when they sit drinking somewhere in Europe and speak with nostalgia about the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but are not directly involved in it. I would not swap for anything in the world my experience of the last three years. I think that whoever has been deprived of that experience will have no reason to live.

The situation in Sarajevo must be viewed in this context. Last night and the day before I told Gen. Sewall that what NATO did was not done as planned or envisaged. Some heavy artillery might have been removed from around Sarajevo but a total blockade is still in place. Sarajevo cannot be said to be an unblocked or liberated city until life in it begins to function fully. This means all roads unblocked; free movement of people; guarantees that all other utilities, including electricity, water, telephone, gas, goods, commercial, and not just humanitarian, will be restored; to put it simply, until the people are safe in thinking that they can walk the streets of the town freely. Snipers are still at work in Sarajevo. In other words, Sarajevo is still blocked and I think that this will hamper the peace process because the blockade and the peace process are incompatible.

I am convinced that our politicians will insist on a solution for Sarajevo because at this moment it is the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina that is in some way blocked as a result of all that NATO has done. However, we are ready and will continue to be ready to do our part of the job, but I wish to reiterate that the Army cannot conduct the war on its own. We must all be ready to make our contribution, even in Sarajevo. So far we have not done this, we have not all been behind the Army in its onslaught. We are not doing it now either.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

I had an opportunity the other day to see that in one municipality—I am not going to mention its name, I am sure they will recognize themselves—nothing was done to normalize life in their part of the liberated territory. There were still dead animals in front of houses, rubbish, clothes and equipment could be seen littering roads. This can cause epidemics, illnesses. They must cooperate. The Army is there to liberate but the rest is up to local authorities. In some parts, certain state bodies have failed to coordinate their actions with the Army. This includes logistical support, providing equipment, and tackling social and status issues. Something has been done admittedly but not as much as the Army deserves.

In any case, our fighters deserve much more compared with many who are much better off in the present situation. I would like to say that, because of both our present struggle and the future of the fighters who have given the most to this country, to this struggle, to freedom and peace, every fighter must be aware and clear in his mind what he expects from peace. It would not be good if, as President Izetbegovic said recently, when peace sets in—he was quoting a passage from, I think, a Serb trilogy—that everything turns upside down so that deserters and profiteers come first and the fighters last.

[Delic] Unfortunately our soldiers are not the primary concern now and I am afraid of what tomorrow may bring. Therefore, we must sober up while we can.

[Saracevic] I must ask you, only a few days ago we could not even dream that the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army would enter a chetnik stronghold such as Prijedor. Can the Army lift the siege of Sarajevo?

[Delic] Yes, providing that the conditions I mentioned previously are met. These conditions have never been met so far. There are several conditions: First, the Army has to have the military equipment needed for such a task, second, it must have logistical support and third, a political climate must be created for such an operation. The Army can do it. However, I will say it again: Some think that the war is over, but unfortunately, it has never even started for others.

[Saracevic] Everyone is talking about demobilization nowadays. Do you think that this is the appropriate moment?

[Delic] Whoever planned the demobilization was not a good analyst. In all liberation wars armies were built up throughout the liberation war. [sentence as heard] The size of our Army could be cut if we were to get more military equipment. You must be aware that our soldiers are being killed and wounded every day, some become invalids. We must replace them with fresh soldiers [words indistinct].

However we can always find a way to carry out a partial demobilization in certain areas in order to help the economy. For example, our Kakanj and Zavidovici brigades are not near the front any more. Therefore, we can now let some of our soldiers work in Krivaja, Natron of Maglaj, as well as in the Kakanj mines. However we must enable our Army to function. I think that it is unprincipled and hasty to now put forward unilateral demands for an immediate demobilization of 50,000 men. If someone wants to go through with this it is a blow for our Army and our concept of defense. In my opinion at this stage we must still focus on defending and liberating the country. The economy must work hard to follow our Army's struggle for liberation.

The time for the revival of our economy is bound to come. Many things can be resolved but it must be done together with the Army and the process of liberation of the country. However , other conditions have to be met: above all the ex-territorial deployment of our soldiers. This means that we should deploy soldiers from the more densely populated areas to those areas that do not have the necessary potential and which also need to restart their economy. We cannot make unilateral demands on the one hand and, on the other, avoid fulfilling ex-territorial obligations normal in all armies of the world throughout history. This means that a soldier from Tuzla can be redeployed in Mostar as part of normal procedure.

In order to achieve this all state bodies must be willing and determined to address the problems. It is not only the Army's duty to address these problems. Others are also obliged to do this.

Therefore I think that demobilization is not a good term; a better term would be additional mobilization. We have to carry out further mobilization to defend this country and create better conditions for all those people from our state leadership who are dealing with the peace process. The better the Army's position and the better the results are, then so much better is their position in the peace process. I think that in the latest activities we h. 'e created more favorable conditions and better standing in the peace process for our state leadership. Why should we not pursue it further?

[Saracevic] It was six months ago when you gave the last interview to Bosnia-Herzegovina Radio and TV. On that occasion you somehow heralded these successes—the current defense lines. What sort of winter is awaiting the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army soldiers?

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

[Delic] [Words indistinct] creation of good logistic conditions for the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army. Therefore, I would again wish to call on all those responsible to create conditions for the Army to spend the coming winter in a more normal way than happened last year, or two years ago, to provide winter clothes, footwear, accommodation, food, a sufficient number of spare parts, motor vehicles to make it easy for us to reach the most distant facilities.

When it comes to our combat actions, we will not hibernate. The Army will continue to be active.

[Saracevic] Thank you for this interview.

Delic Comments on Latest 'Liberation Successes'

AU2709211795 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 27 Sep 95

[Report by Azra Sipovic Dubini from Fojnica, where Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency Vice President Ejup Ganic held talks with General Rasim Delic, Bosnia-Herzegovina Army chief of General Staff, on 27 September—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Dubini] General Delic has been informing Dr. Ganic about the latest liberation successes by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the current situation on the fronts. They also discussed the further strengthening of the Army in all the aspects of its operations.

Gen. Delic conveyed to Dr. Ganic best wishes from the Bosnia-Herzegovina General Staff and the members of the Army, expressing satisfaction with his quick recovery and his return to his duty.

Gen. Delic then added:

[Delic] I can only say that I am happy to see the Presidency member and vice president of the Federation, the man who, after President Izetbegovic, best understands this war and our Army. I see that he is back at work and I have been very happy to update him on everything that has been happening on the fronts, what the Army has been doing, so that I can help him as a member of the state delegation who has been involved in all the negotiations to help reach peace sooner rather than later.

In any case, my greatest wish is to see him back working for this country as he has so far. I hope that will happen very quickly. I conveyed to him best wishes from the members of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, that he should rejoin us as soon as possible.

Changes in Bosnian Army Top Leadership

95BA0363A Split FERAL TRIBUNE in Serbo-Croatian 28 Aug 95 pp 21-22

[Article by Zlatko Dizdarevic: "An Army Full of Dead Generals"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Nearly all summer there was loud talk about the great removal of the blockade from Sarajevo, but nothing came of it, for military reasons on the one hand, and various other political or criminal reasons on the other. Then there began to be whispering about big changes in the top Army leadership, as much to settle accounts for failure to remove the blockade as because of "adaptation to new political and military realities." The big change, however, actually did occur. In recent days, dawn has come to a Sarajevo blanketed in cold morning fog, which more eloquently than anything else has been saying that yet another, fourth, and perhaps last, winter is coming in the siege, and no one is whispering about anything anymore. The cold creeps in around your legs and your heart, and everyone devises a solution for himself, a solution which mainly comes down to: "Every man for himself, any way he can and any way he can manage."

The government bureaucracy at the city level continues to tighten the noose around the necks of those who have devoted their hopes and their love to the city in which they have remained all the time, in spite of the ancient joke about smart Muja making a call from London to stupid Suljo in Sarajevo. There is no electricity, water, or gas, there is no respect or love, but there is less and less movement, coffeehouses, theaters, and television, nice words, even good memories, and more and more grim-faced, self-important, angry, and greedy primitives. Frowning people who have suddenly become ethnically aware are now in fashion.

Small Fry in the Business of the Century

The short-lived joy brought to us by the Croatian Army in Operation "Storm" and the short-lived hope that all that would sweep like a wave even here, all the way to freedom, have now passed, and all people can do is once again listen to reports that this or that little hill has been taken and that two antiaircraft machine guns, one submachine gun, and several rifles have been captured. Tens of thousands of people who were mobilized are still up in the hills at the approaches to Sarajevo, but no one knows what is brewing beyond those hills. There are more and more people convinced that Sarajevo remains a hostage to the occupier and domestic traitors for a final settlement of accounts in the business of the century.

In this kind of cheerless atmosphere, in a city which has been hovering continuously over a cuckoo's nest for 40

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

months, an article published in OSLOBODJENJE, in a box on the front page of the 16 August issue, put an end to all that whispering about changes in the top Army leadership and for the umpteenth time drained off the last drops of optimism. There have been various calculations related to those changes, but most of them can be classified as reason for some kind of satisfaction. Some people say that this is "radical surgery," others say it is merely "cosmetic," and still others say the "Croats are being accommodated," and a fourth group that the Army "is again being professionalized" after disastrous experiences with the "party-oriented Army." In any case, some facts are clear: The bill has to be paid for the now lengthy absence of any significant victory in liberating any town or extensive region. No one, of course, is going to say this in the military reports behind the scene, which are concerned with glorification of morale and the inexhaustible motivation to continue the war, so it is not even hinted at. No one alive is going to say anything about changes which are meant to strengthen cooperation with the HV [Croatian Army] and HVO [Croatian Defense Council] nor about the obvious need for fundamental reorganization in the ranks of the Army. The facts, however, are sufficiently eloquent in and of themselves. Let us take them in order. Replacement of that many generals is more than sufficiently eloquent for someone who is no kind of analyst.

Erasing Unpleasant Memories

Gen. Vahid Karavelic is no longer commander of the 1st Corps (Sarajevo). His place is being taken by Brigadier Nedzad Ajnadzic, who is extremely well-known to the fighting men, who esteem and respect him. Karavelic has gone to the General Staff as chief of the Department for Operational Planning. Those with a long memory recall that Karavelic was the detonator in that operation of "reorganization" of the well-known "King Tvrtko" Unit of the HVO in Sarajevo. While many people did not hold that against him at the time, there are many who did so later, and this was given as the reason for the failures to remove the blockade of the capital. Gen. Ramiz Suvalic has also gone to the Defense Ministry from the General Staff, because the judgment is that it is better for him in the "ministry" than in the "staff." The malicious say that it is also better for everyone else.

Gen. Ramiz Drekovic, predecessor of the now legendary Gen. Dudakovic in Bihac, has left the post of corps commander of the 4th (Mostar). Drekovic waged war against units of the HVO at the time of the conflicts in central Bosnia and around Mostar, and it is obvious that all memory of those conflicts needs to be erased as soon as possible. The general has meanwhile been appointed to the important post of chief of the Army's Department of Morale, and it is said that he does not really concur with the mild and justificative statements in the General Staff attempting to relativize the failure to remove the blockade of Sarajevo during the summer.

The removal considered most important, however, in the great "felling of generals" has to do with Gen. Drekovic's predecessor as head of the Department for Morale. Gen. Fikret Muslimovic, the "Army's strongman," who is said to have been very influential in turning the Army toward the leading political party, has left. There are quite a few people who even today do not believe that this removal could have occurred, especially because Muslimovic has gone to a post which is "higher than retirement"; he has become advisor for military affairs in the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina. There are quite a few people who quietly suggest that this departure is perhaps part of the package of conditions which Silajdzic submitted to Izetbegovic when he withdrew his resignation.

Dudakovic the Only One Promoted

Even Gen. Arif Pasalic, first commander of the Mostar Corps and angry enemy of Jadranko Prlic and the others from "those" times, is packing his bags and setting off on a long trip. He has been appointed military attache in Bonn. Ceremonially and seriously. After Pasalic and Drekovic, the Corps in Mostar is being taken over by Brigadier Mustafa Polutak, again a popular professional. By decision of the Presidency, the list of those departing, this time for permanent retirement, includes Generals Fetahagic (up to now chief of the General Staff), Jakic, and Suljevic. There were no new promotions to gold braid except that Dudakovic was promoted to division general and thus given a rank that distinguishes him from the rest and brings him a step closer to Commander Delic. Significant.

A public which is difficult to deceive after all the fiddling, lies, and deceptions to which it has been subjected in past years did not fail to see that no mention was made in the changes of certain names which are of the greatest interest, such as Dudakovic, Divjak, Alagic, Siber, etc. The topic was all the more interesting because there was a great deal of whispering about some of these generals back in the time of whispering. Today, after all that has happened, many people say of Dudakovic what is not far from the truth: In the last three years, he has not had much contact with the specific political party and military environment in Sarajevo, so that he has not been infected with various conceptions and theories which do not have much to do with being an effective commander. He has respected the principles of modern military science, he has surrounded himself with professionals, he has not concerned himself excessively

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

with entrenchment, and he has been victorious. The malicious say that it is still better for him to be a bit isolated. As for Alagic, the also popular commander of the 7th Central Bosnian Corps, who captured Vlasic and many other very important chetnik strongholds, it is an open secret that he is taking the post of chief of the Army's General Staff. A score, that is, for professionalism and the military calling. It is said that in the ranks of his own corps, whose perfect logistics bring a sigh from all fighting men in the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, he has already developed a replacement "still angrier than he is himself."

When the Generals Are Amateurs

Finally, the story about Brigade Gen. Jovan Divjak, quite certainly one of the most popular commanders as far as the ordinary people are concerned, and one of the most undesirable to a segment of the military establishment, should have ended with retirement. We have learned that this decision of the sponsors was vetoed by the Presidium, that is, by five of its members who often do not "obey" Alija: Kljujic, Komsic, Pejanovic, Ljujic-Mijatovic, and Durakovic. Gen. Stjepan Siber is also remaining in active service on the basis of the same intervention, although he has long been military attache in Switzerland. Recently, a group of soldiers in the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, ordinary foot soldiers, also suggested to the author of these lines the following topic for reflection: "With professional officers, our commanders and planners, we have always had a greater chance of surviving and some chance of winning. With the conceited ignoramuses and amateurs the politicians have begun to appoint to head up units, our chances of surviving are slim, and the chances of winning are nil...."

It is not hard to figure out why the population is deriving a certain satisfaction, especially those people who have a gun in their hands, following the big purge or "functional reorganization" in the Army, as it is nicely put by those who write official communiques. When things are examined today from the standpoint of that satisfaction, even winter is not all that close, there are a great many leaves on the trees, but the diplomats offering peace at the negotiating table are simply unable to finish the job. Stated in military terms, "large regroupings of forces have been noted on many fronts."

Karadzic Briefs Rybkin, Duma Delegation on Talks

LD2709180895 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1555 GMT 27 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 27 Sep (SRNA)—Bosnian Serb President Radovan Karadzic has briefed Russian State Duma leader Ivan Rybkin and his aides about the course of the peace process for Bosnia-Herzegovina.

At their meeting in Belgrade yesterday evening, Karadzic informed Russian parliamentarians about the situation in the Serb Republic in the wake of NATO air strikes, attacks by multinational forces, and Croat-Muslim aggression against western parts of the Serb Republic.

The Karadzic-Rybkin talks also considered bilateral relations between the Serb Republic and Russia.

Buha Explains Purpose of Visit to Moscow

AU2609134295 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 25 Sep 95 p 2

[Interview with Aleksa Buha, foreign minister of the "Serb Republic," by Branko Stosic "especially" for NASA BORBA, in Moscow; date not given: "I Did Not Request Arms"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The visit by Serb Republic Foreign Minister Aleksa Buha to Moscow was covered in a veil of secrecy. The local newspapers and television carried only brief reports saying more about what he had allegedly said prior to the visit than about his meetings during the four-day visit.

The head of the diplomatic service of the government from Pale did not want to exploit the publicity about his visit made by ITAR-TASS. He did not respond to any of the 200 telephone calls asking him for statements or interviews. Perhaps he did not do so because he did not want to explain what was correct and what was not in the report of the Russian state television, or perhaps he could not answer the inevitable question on Russian weapons for Serbs without saying untruths.

Here is what Aleksa Buha said for NASA BORBA during an interview for our correspondent in the Metropol Hotel in Moscow prior to his departure:

[Buha] I have never said that I was coming to Moscow to ask for arms, nor have I been authorized to make such requests. True, proceeding from the well-known statement by President Boris [Yeltsin] that Russia, if NATO continues bombing raids, and since many other countries are openly or secretly supplying the Croats and the Muslims with arms, is prepared to extend Serbs not only humanitarian aid but also "hotter aid," I said that if the need for this arises, if attacks from the air and the ground continue, if the combined offensive does not stop, we would be forced to seek military aid. I have even said that we would have to seek military allies. However, I have not asked for weapons this time.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

[Stosic] What was then the reason for your visit to Moscow?

[Buha] The main reason was to seek another kind of help, Russia's greater political involvement to prevent the collapse of the incipient peace process. We take the view that things have started moving in a good direction with the adoption of the basic principles on Bosnia, but that the peace process is seriously threatened, stopped by the Muslim and Croat bombardments, and not only by their offensive. We simply wanted Moscow to take a more active part and prevent a new misfortune, to prevent an unfortunate outcome.

[Stosic] Did you present any specific requests?

[Buha] We asked for, or rather, we drew their attention to several aspects. First, we asked them to support our call for an agreement on a lasting cease-fire, which we consider a precondition for a successful peace process. Fortunately, Russia takes the same view, and Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov (who received Buha on the first day of his visit to Moscow) spoke about it in the same spirit at the Contact Group's meeting in Geneva.

Match for Washington Agreement

[Stosic] In addition to claiming that you intend to request arms, ITAR-TASS claimed that you were going to demand that Russia be a guarantor. What guarantees do you expect from Moscow?

[Buha] We are talking about one word that has been the cause of this long war. This word is equality. We demand, and this is something we have been stressing all this time, the same rights that the Muslims and Croats have, the rights enjoyed by their federation, which was given all the powers of a state of Bosnia-Herzegovina at the beginning. The adoption of the basic principles in Geneva acknowledges the equality of both entities, as they say. Both of them, including the Serb Republic, can exist and live according to their own constitution. However, these principles have been agreed on but have not been signed.

We would like to have a document that would formalize this equality of our entity, something like the Washington agreement on the setting up of the Muslim-Croat Federation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. We envisage this as a Moscow declaration. The idea is that President Yeltsin is a witness or a guarantor, whatever you like, as President Clinton was a witness at the signing of the agreement in Washington.

[Stosic] How did your collocutors react to this?

[Buha] I can say with understanding. Both Mr. Ivanov and Mr. Baturin, as well as General Lebed, all of them listened to me carefully, and I would say with respect. However, I cannot say what the chances are of our wishes being met.

NATO Would Be Like an Occupier

[Stosic] Like Russia, you are also against the plans to replace UN peacekeeping forces with NATO. Did you discuss this topic, too?

[Buha] I presented our view that the presence of NATO on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, especially on the territory of the Serb Republic, would be like some kind of occupation. We are against it, as we proceed from the fact that no foreign troops are needed to keep peace if the peace agreement is just and if all the sides agree and promise that they will abide by it and implement it honestly. In that case we think the presence of foreign observers and clear and firm guarantees from the international community that it would punish the side that does not observe or violates the agreement would suffice.

[Stosic] Do you believe that observers could "save" peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina? But regardless of that, what would your stand be if this is not accepted?

[Buha] This is a question of further talks and negotiations. One of the possibilities is that NATO troops keep peace in the territory of the Muslim-Croat Federation, and the Russian troops in the territory of the Serb Republic. This is not unrealistic because if multinational forces are to be formed to keep peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Russia, the way things stand at present, will not place its forces under NATO command, which means that they can participate separately, but perform the same function.

[Stosic] It is claimed that you have asked for humanitarian aid to be sent directly and not via Belgrade?

[Buha] This is correct, but not because we have some special reasons to "bypass" Belgrade, but simply because direct delivery is more efficient and faster for both the donor and the recipient. Our special reason is that we want to be directly linked to the world through Banja Luka airport.

Main Condition Is Lifting Sanctions

The head of the diplomatic service of the Serb Republic says that during his talks in Moscow he had also presented his firm stand that Pale will make the signing of the final peace conditional on the lifting of the sanctions.

(Buha] I briefed the hosts that we will insist during the negotiations about an agreement on the peace plan that the international community set itself an obligation to lift the sanctions against Yugoslavia. Our stand is that

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

even if we agree on everything we will not sign anything until the sanctions are lifted.

[Stosic] Why do you insist on such a risky condition when Belgrade, as a direct negotiator, is in a better position to achieve this?

[Buha] We consider this to be our obligation to Yugoslavia as the sanctions have been imposed because of the alleged participation of the Yugoslav People's Army in the war on our side, and because we have seen many times that the international community is continuously producing new conditions.

[Stosic] You met with General Lebed. What was the purpose of the meeting when he is not holding any state post? He is no longer an active soldier, nor a deputy.

[Buha] He is a candidate for the new state Duma. In addition, he is one of the most prominent figures in Russia and as a general he has expressed what we consider relevant opinions on many occasions. I invited him to visit us, but this is not possible at present. However, he said that if he were elected a deputy he would certainly come.

Pejanovic, German Envoy Agree on Unified State

AU2709173395 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 27 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Mirko Pejanovic, member of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency and chairman of the Serb Civic Council [SGV], received today German Ambassador Johannes Preisinger. They discussed the current situation and options for a peaceful solution that would provide the conditions for the reintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the reintegration of the Serb people that are now under Karadzic's control in a unified economic and political system of the common state of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

There was some discussion of [words indistinct] and the role of the SGV.

During the talks we found that we agreed to a large degree on the organization of Bosnia-Herzegovina. We both agreed on the demand that Bosnia-Herzegovina must remain a unified state, Preisinger said.

Pejanovic stressed the significant involvement of the German Government, its diplomacy, and Mr. Preisinger in searching for a just peace solution and [words indistinct] of Bosnia-Herzegovina in agreement with the views of the legal authorities of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Serb Officials Comment on Bosnian Peace Accord

Koljevic: Accord 'Important'

LD2809125595 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1156 GMT 28 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Cleveland, 28 Sep (SRNA)—Nikola Koljevic, vice president of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic, told SRNA last night that only an agreement in principle was reached in New York, but that "nothing has been agreed on until formal agreement between the warring sides in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina is reached."

"The agreement reached is nevertheless important for the Serb Republic, because by legal provisions the possibility of domination and out-voting by the Muslim-Croat majority over the Serbs both in the collective presidency and the parliament has been removed for the first time," the Serb Republic vice president said.

Speaking about the level of independence for the Serb Republic, Koljevic said that its state independence is guaranteed by the fact that a Serb assembly, Serb government, Serb army, and police will exist.

"The Serb Republic's relations with Serbia and Montenegro will be directly linked with the relations that the Croat-Muslim federation will have with Croatia, on the basis of the Washington agreement," Koljevic said.

Toholj: Brings End to War

LD2709180995 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1555 GMT 27 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Banja Luka, 27 Sep (SRNA)—Miroslav Toholj, minister of information in the government of the Bosnian Serb Republic, stated last night in Banja Luka that the peace negotiations on the former Bosnia-Herzegovina "are a way of bringing about the complete ending of the war, because this is what the big powers want."

Commenting on last night's tripartite agreement in New York between the Yugoslav, Croatian, and Muslim sides, Toholj stressed that "a long-term process began prior to the recognition of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina and that it will end in the independence of the Bosnian Serb Republic and its unification with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia."

"This is the process of the ethnic division of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is the essence of this situation and the talks that are going on, and what happened in New York last night, are a way of bringing the war to an end," the information minister of the Serb Republic added. [passage omitted]

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Foreign Minister Views International Relations

AU2709143995 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 24 Sep 95 p 7

[Interview with Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic by Ante Gugo; place and date not given: "The Operations in Western Bosnia Have Been Stopped Following a Request by the United States"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Gugo] What was the main reason for your recent visit to the United States?

[Granic] Croatia has good and friendly relations with the United States, which include contacts at various levels. Since the signing of the Washington agreement, there have been as many as three meetings between Presidents Tudjman and Clinton. My recent visit to the United States was arranged six weeks ago, and I can say that this was the right time for it, since we could discuss the events after Operation "Storm" that led to the U.S. peace initiative. Apart from that, my visit followed the major successes the HVO [Croatian Defense Council] and the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina on the front lines in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and during the most sensitive stage of the above-mentioned U.S. peace initiative. I had talks in Washington with the highest ranking officials of the U.S. Government, including Mr. Christopher and Mr. Lake, as well as with congressmen and senators, including Mr. Dole. One positive result of these meetings organized after the Geneva agreement is that Croatia is considered an important partner for the achievement of peace in this part of Europe, since there is a wish to discuss possible solutions with us.

[Gugo] Will the United States insist firmly on the Contact Group plan and on the ratio of 51 to 49 for the partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina, or will new, more realistic solutions be looked for, since the situation on the battlefield has changed?

[Granic] The U.S. peace initiative will, in any case, stick to the Geneva agreement and to the already existing Contact Group plan. The fact, however, that U.S. negotiators will start from these positions does not exclude the possibility that new circumstances are also being considered.

[Gugo] For many people, Operation "Storm" was a surprise. There were statements that the liberation of the occupied territories was carried out with the approval of the United States. To what extent and at what level of mutual understanding was the possible partnership between Croatia and the United States?

[Granic] We did not get the green light from anybody for Operation "Storm," including the United States. Our assessments and diplomatic preparations showed, however, that it was a proper moment for President Tudjman to make the decision without upsetting anybody too much. Our assessments proved to be quite correct, and later events showed that the decision about the beginning of the actions was passed at the right moment. There was full coordination between the army, police, and diplomacy. Our units completed their tasks in a very disciplined way, they were completely superior and very dignified, and the reactions of the world were within what we had expected.

Dangerous Waiting

[Gugo] How was the proper moment selected?

[Granic] The fall of Zepa and Srebrenica, the tragedies of tens of thousands of refugees, mass murders, and 6,000 to 7,000 missing persons made the Croatian and Bosnian Serbs start a joint assault on Bihac in a completely euphoric atmosphere, in order to occupy the town and expel the Croats and Muslims from it. Had this happened, Croatia would have been shaken from the political point of view as well as from the point of view of safety and strategy. This would have made any kind of military action for the liberation of the then-occupied territories considerably more difficult. The Serbs were prepared to attack Gorazde, which finally led to the very sharp NATO declaration adopted in Brussels. The drawback of that document was that it did not contain any firm guarantees that Bihac would not fall. In the situation of the complete military and political mobilization of both the Croatian and Bosnian Serbs, the UNCRO [UN Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia] was unable to implement the UN Security Council resolutions, especially Resolutions 981 and 990, so it was quite clear to us that we could not wait. On the contrary, it was very dangerous to wait, since our vital strategic interests were at stake. Apart from that, the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina was facing collapse. Our diplomatic response to the situation was the Split Declaration, which enabled the Republic of Croatia to legally help the HVO and Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Everything started with the actions for Grahovo and Glamoc and with the creation of conditions for Operation "Storm." Then the right decision was passed—and it was passed at the right moment. Everything happened more quickly than we expected, so I told CNN on the first day of the action that everything would be over in seven days. On the following day, I had to correct my statement and say that everything would be over within 24 hours.

[Gugo] All these things are clear from our point of view, just as it was clear before that we should not have endured the occupation, and still some international powers were not inclined toward us. They criticized every decisive step we made. How is it possible

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

that there was no such criticism, or that it was at least considerably milder, during and after Operation "Storm"?

[Granic] The reaction of the international community was determined by the moment at which the decision was taken, the speed with which the action was carried out, and by its diplomatic preparation. The action itself was very pure, and there were few victims. There is no country in the world, a friend, a partner, or an important international institution, that we did not contact during the first days of the action to explain our attitudes and reasons. The employees of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs gave more than 100 interviews to various international media during the first four days. This number does not include the employees of diplomatic and consular offices.

Chirac Decisive

[Gugo] Did Mitterrand's departure from the international political scene lead to a decrease in tension between the western European powers and the United States, thus making our efforts for the achievement of a final solution to the problem of the occupied Croatian territories less painstaking?

[Granic] Even before, Mr. Juppe, a former minister and the current prime minister, showed much more understanding for Croatian problems than President Mitterrand. President Chirac showed exceptional understanding for the events in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, so that, by introducing the Rapid Reaction Force, he let the Serbs know that they would be paid back for any attack on civilians or UN personnel. His diplomatic activity has been characterized by decisiveness and seriousness, which could be seen in several decisive warnings he addressed to Milosevic. This policy enabled an easier acceptance of the U.S. peace initiative. The change of the official French policy toward Croatia can best be seen in the light of the latest events and my visit to Paris, where I had talks with the president and the foreign minister, as well as in light of Sarinic's visit, which ended with important economic agreements. All this will be soon crowned with President Tudjman's official visit to Paris.

[Gugo] During Operation "Storm," the British official circles were very reserved, and they became agitated about the recent events in western Bosnia. Can you explain the different behavior of the British diplomacy in the cases of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Granic] During the last two or three years, British diplomacy has supported a predominantly humanitarian approach in Bosnia-Herzegovina, with the help of the UN Protection Force, trying to reach an agreement between the parties to the conflict and a peaceful final solution. The reality has, however, shown that a just solution can only be reached through a decisive military action, which forces the aggressor to negotiate seriously. We are interested in the presence of Great Britain in the region. We have to bear in mind, however, that U.S. diplomacy has, on several occasions, already responded very decisively and on time. The signing of the Washington Agreement was the best possible start to the U.S. diplomacy offensive. I think that the differences in the behavior you speak about result from the British understanding of the situation. The intensified engagement of British diplomacy in Bosnia-Herzegovina was a consequence of the necessity to talk and negotiate, whereas the situation in Croatia is quite clear. We have assessed Mr. Rifkind's visit to Zagreb as positive, and especially his confirmation that eastern Slavonija, Baranja, and western Srijem are part of the Republic of Croatia, so whether this region should be reintegrated or not need not be discussed, but only how and how quickly.

Contacts With EU

[Gugo] Russia showed the same engagement in both cases. Regarding the situation in Croatia, their official circles even demanded that the Croatian forces should return to the positions they held before "Storm." Is this not open support for the aggressor, Serbia in this case?

[Granic] Such statements, which came mostly from the Russian parliament, were primarily intended for the Russian domestic policy purposes. There is a fierce struggle between two approaches to policy there, and we have understanding for that. We are presently mostly interested in the Russian work in the UN Security Council and the Contact Group, and we consider it positive, especially in light of Geneva Agreements.

[Gugo] Recent statements by official Italian circles have expressed no satisfaction with the latest events in Croatia, let alone Bosnia-Herzegovina. Whereas Bonn thinks that Serbia should also be punished after the war through reduced help for the reconstruction of the country, proposals from Rome suggest that equal help should be offered to both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia, the victim and the aggressor. Would you like to comment on this?

[Granic] Croatia wants to develop good and friendly relations with Italy. In any case, we want to reach an agreement about the protection of minorities. We are also interested in a more intensive economic cooperation. I would like to point out that we do not agree with the policy of equidistance, because it is well known who is the aggressor and who is the victim in this war. We support the normalization of relations with Serbia,

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

but only after a solution to the reintegration of eastern Slavonija, Baranja, and western Srijem has been reached. We are sure that future economic help, which is part of the U.S. plan, will primarily be directed toward the victims of the aggression. Croatia wants to develop good relations with all EU members, without linking itself more strongly to any of them in particular, but we cannot accept attitudes about equal responsibility.

[Gugo] Some time ago, Carl Bildt lost his orientation in differentiating between the aggressor and the victim....

[Granic] In Croatia, we have already said everything about Mr. Carl Bildt. I would not like to add anything else.

[Gugo] With whom and how will the European Union resume the negotiating process? Will the negotiations on the organization of the European Union be resumed at all?

[Granic] The future of Croatia lies in European integration and the achievement of European standards. Croatia is a central European and Mediterranean country that wants to find its place in Europe. We still have very intensive contacts with the European Union and other institutions too.

Comments From Austria

[Gugo] Is it realistic to expect that the reintegration of the remaining occupied territories will be achieved in a peaceful way?

[Granic] For our part, we shall do everything in order to reach a peaceful reintegration. The present Croatian position, as well as Milosevic's position, are the best guarantees that this will happen in a peaceful way. The general situation in the region, and our negotiating positions speak in favor of a solution according to which the mutual recognition of all countries on the territory of the former Yugoslavia would be achieved. We shall try to avoid further victims and speed up the process of Croatian integration into European institutions. We have clearly told all international factors that we want a peaceful end to this process, but the plan for its implementation has its time limits. We do not want to wait endlessly. We want to solve the problem of the remaining occupied territories within the present negotiating process, and we shall not be ready to start any new negotiating process if this one, which is limited in time, fails.

[Gugo] After your visit to Vienna, Austrian Chancellor Vranitzky made much more moderate statements about Croatia. What happened during your visit to Austria?

[Granic] Austria is one of our big friends. It helped us very a lot during the process of Croatia's international recognition. Our strategic and economic interests are not different, and our cooperation is improving constantly in these fields. During, and especially after Operation "Storm," certain comments were made that had an unpleasant echo in the world. I met with the highest ranking Austrian officials, and we discussed some very important issues. I explained the facts regarding our action for the liberation of the occupied territories. We also discussed the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the U.S. peace initiative, the course of the action, and some of its other aspects. These were very constructive talks that helped them understand Croatian attitudes. The two presidents should soon meet in Zagreb, which will certainly deepen the closeness of the two countries.

[Gugo] Why was the very successful offensive in western Bosnia stopped?

[Granic] The pressure of the international community, especially of the United States, became very strong. The Republic and Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia were required to stop their military actions. Significant strategic goals were achieved that improved our negotiating positions. In the United States and in the EU, it is considered that these new positions will speed up the negotiating process and improve its results.

Blurred Picture

[Gugo] One day before our conversation, talks between high-ranking state delegations of Croatia, the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina were held in Zagreb in the presence of U.S. diplomats. What was the topic of these talks? Was a future partition of the territory within the Federation discussed?

[Granic] This was not discussed, but all important elements regarding the structure of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a state were discussed within the U.S. plan and the Washington Agreements. Future steps to be taken with the goal of strengthening the Federation, as well as the future relations between the Republic and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, were agreed upon. It was agreed that the talks between the Croatian and the Bosnian side on the newly liberated territories and their apportionment into cantons should resume according to the model of the Vienna Agreements.

[Gugo] In order not to give the impression that everything is ideal—there is probably something that burdens Croatia's international position at present.

[Granic] Certain things that happened after Operation "Storm" are not favorable for us. The action itself developed in a way we can be proud of. We were congratulated for the brilliant military victory. Unfortunately,

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

some events after the action have somewhat blurred this good picture. We are trying to explain to the international factors that the emotional charge among the 120,000 refugees who returned after four or five years to see their houses and found them burnt down is very big. This does not justify certain uncivilized actions, however, and we have to do our best to enable the official authorities in the newly liberated territories to start functioning. If this does not happen soon, the pressure of the international community will be so strong that it will be very difficult to materialize the Croatian integration into European institutions, without which Croatia will not be able to make progress.

[Gugo] A new election is approaching. You are part of personnel calculations too. What will you do after the election?

[Granic] The same job, I hope.

Abdic Supporters Refuse To Return to Bosnia

AU2809074395 Paris AFP in English 0312 GMT 28 Sep 95

[by Sonia Bakaric]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kuplensko, Croatia, Sept 28 (AFP)—Thousands of refugees loyal to dissident Bosnian Moslem leader Fikret Abdic are preparing to spend the winter in Croatia after fleeing an advance by Bosnian and Croatian government forces.

Between 25,000, according to the International Commission of the Red Cross, and 50,000, by their own account, were camped this week along a five-kilometre (three mile) stretch of road here near the Bosnian border.

They swore they would not return to the town of Velika Kladusa in western Bosnia which they fled when government troops broke out of the Bihac pocket earlier this month, as long as Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic stayed in power.

The Croatian authorities have made it clear that they are not wanted, but in the woods by their improvised camp men in uniform were cutting down trees to be dragged away for firewood by broken-down horses.

Women were gathering dried grass by a stream and children were picking up corn (maize) stalks for roofing cow sheds or pushing wheelbarrows full of empty containers to the water tanks provided by the United Nations.

Many of the children have lost limbs to landmines, and a large number are orphans.

Abdic's military aides have appropriated houses to live in, while their leader himself is living on Croatia's Adriatic coast. The rest of his followers have to endure harsh conditions in muddy camps surrounded by barbed wire.

A doctor, Vesna Hadzic, said more than 5,000 children lived in the Kuplensko camp alone, 3,000 of them aged less than one year. "Every day we see around 100 sick children, suffering mainly from respiratory infections, diarrhoea and skin diseases," she said.

The men served in Abdic's militia fighting alongside Bosnian Serb forces who came close to defeating the Sarajevo government's 5th Army Corps in fighting last spring before the tide of the war turned.

One in a wheelchair, who had lost both legs, still expressed confidence that they would return and recapture Kladusa and the Bihac area.

Meanwhile on both sides of the road little shops had been set up, selling goods ranging from cigarettes to fly-blown meat, from grapes to socks.

Ten kilometres (six miles) away across the border, in Velika Kladusa itself, hundreds of women who had stayed put queued in brilliant sunshine outside a courthouse flying both the Bosnian and Croatian flags to obtain permits to visit their relatives at Kuplensko.

The new rulers of the town are relying on them to persuade the refugees to return home.

"I want to convince my sisters to come back," said Mina Mujic, who had return to Kladusa after two weeks at Kuplensko. "They could not stand the winter in a camp."

But a woman loyal to Sarajevo said that while the women would be allowed back unharmed, the men would be imprisoned or even killed. She said that Bosnian government troops were holding some of Abdic's fighters in a warehouse, where entry was forbidden.

Joint Police Force To Supervise Refugees' Return

LD2709202395 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 27 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Mate Granic, deputy prime minister and minister for foreign affairs, has held talks with ministers of Turkey and Bosnia-Herzegovina about the peace process, a series of new constitutional principles for the future Bosnia-Herzegovina, and its economic restoration. The progress made in New York was welcomed. A meeting in Istanbul was agreed on. Refugees from Kladusa and Cazin were also discussed.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

[Begin recording] [Granic] We talked about a very important issue of shared interest both for Croatia and the Republic and Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina; namely, how to return refugees from Cazin and Kladusa to their homes. These are, of course, those refugees, some 20,000 of them, who are staying in Croatia at the moment. We agreed that they should be given the best guarantees by sending joint police forces from the Republic and Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Turkey, and Croatia.

Next week a meeting will be held in Zagreb at the level of deputy internal affairs ministers. They will agree on all details concerning the arrival of these forces, which will be a guarantee of return.

[Bosnian Foreign Minister Muhamed Sacirbegovic] It is clear that the strategic interests of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia point to increased and closer cooperation at the political, economic, and military levels. [end recording]

Minister Granic also held talks with Irish Foreign Minister Dick Spring on the situation in the region and respect for human and minority rights. [passage omitted]

[Begin Granic recording] The most important thing is that Holbrooke confirmed that the problem of reintegrating eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and west Srijem would be included as part of an overall peace package. This means that the problem of reintegration will be closed in the course of the overall peace process. He also confirmed the strategic partnership of the United States and Croatia. [end recording]

Eastern Croatia is seen as part of the same package which includes the whole peace initiative. Contacts have also been established under U.S. mediation between Zagreb and Belgrade.

[[Begin Granic recording] As for the meeting with Minister Milutinovic, we talked about the problem of eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and west Srijem and mechanisms for solving this problem within the negotiating process and in the presence of U.S. representatives. [end recording] [passage omitted]

Rebic: No Deportation of Refugees Planned

LD2809131195 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1200 GMT 28 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] In Zagreb today Dr. Adalbert Rebic, minister in charge of displaced persons and refugees, spoke about sending refugees back to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Jadranka Kosor reports:

[Kosor] The return will be safe, the people will not be expected to return to areas where fighting is still going on and everything will be organized in agreement with the Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities. The decision by the government's office for displaced persons and refugees to send refugees back to Bosnia-Herzegovina is in line with an agreement between Croatian President Dr. Franjo Tudjman and Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Dr. Rebic said.

He said that not a single refugee has been sent back to the neighboring state on the basis of his decision. He described as wrong statements by some top officials of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees who, he said, misunderstood the decision by the government's office for displaced persons and refugees.

The following persons will be entitled to retain refugee status in the Republic of Croatia: those coming from the occupied areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina and from areas where fighting still goes on; minors; sick persons not likely to receive medical care in their state; and full-time students doing degree courses at Croatian universities. The government's office will pay for transportation to their destinations and the main principle applied will be: all refugees have the right to return to their homes, Minister Rebic said. Refugees who refuse to return to safe areas will lose their refugee status in Croatia but our authorities will not deport them, the head of the government's office for displaced persons and refugees said.

He went on to note that by the end of November Germany will return to Croatia all the Croatian refugees currently in that country.

Serb Official Views Options in Eastern Slavonia

AU2809102395 Belgrade POLITIKA EKSPRESS in Serbo-Croatian 23 Sep 95 p 5

[Interview with Goran Hadzic, president of the Serb Coordination Committee for eastern Slavonia, by Simonida Simonovic in Borovo Naselje; date not given: "Temptations of No-Man's-Land"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Borovo Naselje—Shortly before the fourth anniversary of the liberation of Vukovar and of the whole of eastern Slavonia, this land is once again overcast with clouds of fear and uncertainty. A state of war and a curfew were introduced a month ago, men are in uniform, deployed in their positions, and women are once again carrying the biggest burden of survival—children, work, plans for the winter, fear for their husbands and brothers on the front. Towns are deserted, even during the day. Everything painfully reminds one of 1991 when the war started. The difference is that all the horrors have already been seen, and that the people have had enough of dying, burials, exodus, and uncertainty.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

[Simonovic] Certain preliminary peace negotiations—a sort of pulse-feeling—have in a way already started, because the international community's intention is to include the issue of eastern Slavonia in the "package" to be signed at the next peace conference on Yugoslavia. What is the best, and what the worst offer in this game, and what are the people here prepared to?

Fixations of Negotiators

Goran Hadzic, president of the Coordinating Committee for eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srem—a body that in a way fills the gap between the defeated government from Knin and the stunned municipalities here, tells us:

[Hadzic] There is no such thing as the best offer. But, in the coming negotiations, we have to be wise and realistic. It is not wise to get killed, but to remain and to survive. The fixation of foreign negotiators is that we can by no means dare to become Serbia. Therefore, if it is necessary in this moment, we can also be called a "blue zone"....or even, no-man's-land....only under the condition that we are given guarantees of international protection, and enough time for better political circumstances in international relations.

These are big temptations. Things are clear to us and to the people. In all its decisions, the world treats us as a part of the internationally recognized Croatia, although for practical purposes we are Serbia. We have Serb authorities, because, of course, we can have no trust in the Croatian authorities. That is why we ask to be separated from them.

In former Croatia 20 percent were Serbs, and after the fall of Knin only 4.6 percent. They are now riding on a conquering wave, which simply would not have happened if the Knin leadership had not become the victim of formalities, and if they had not, because of their internal quarrels, gambled the territory away. The same goes for Karadzic, who has now realized what we were trying to convince him of two years ago. How much smaller the price would have been! That should be a lesson for us—we should not quarrel because of formalities, because the objective is not to have ten thousand of us killed, while the rest of us watch it happpening.

[Simonovic] Although the negotiating delegation has still not been formed (because, unfortunately, in such a difficult moment this part of the Republic of Serbian Krajina is not immune to discord and to personal disputes which can sometimes be fatal), it seems that leading people agree on the minimum, below which you are not prepared to go?

Three Options

[Hadzic] The essence of our demands is: Three to five years under international protection, in the course of which all democratic institutions could be established and all those who wish to live here (including Croats) be allowed to return. In that period, the legislative and executive power (army and police) would be consolidated, and the monetary system established. We would wait as long as necessary to conduct a referendum, at which the people would finally make the decision.

[Simonovic] Such a scenario has been supported by the British Ambassador Hewitt, and rejected by the American Galbraith. To which degree will their opinions influence the negotiations?

[Hadzic] The arrival of the ambassador from Zagreb was a bad idea from the very beginning. But, once they allowed Galbraith to come, there is no way back; that is almost as if we had already admitted we were Croatia! There are a million traps in that, and therefore we cannot be represented by inexperienced people or complete political dilettantes in the negotiations, because that would only be doing a favor to the Croats. Apart from our own interests, we also have to take care of Serbia's interests. Not in an uncivilized or crude way, but slowly, wisely, and in a tactfully....no matter how long it may last. [end of interview]

Let us recall that the American vision of "peaceful reintegration" is much more unpleasant and faster: It starts on the day the UN mandate in Croatia expires, meaning 30 October, and it lasts one year. What would in fact happen in that "active transitional period," as Galbraith calls it, would be the introduction of Croatian rule—first the police, with the structure proportional to that of the population before the war, then the school system, post communications, infrastructure....By accepting such a variant, the Croatian customs office could be on the border of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in one year at the latest. That is how the process would be initiated, and according to one of the ideas, it would be possible for the population to have dual citizenship. Although the ties would be parallel—both with Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the same extent, the army would be Croatian.

The third option, as we have been convinced in contacts with the population there, is not shunned by anybody: Sling a gun over your shoulder, and start from the beginning again. That option, people say, is as possible as the previous two. Many have had more than enough of the psychosis, and they are only waiting for "that November," when everything should be solved....no matter what happens next. Yet, it is clear that the

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

leaders of eastern Slavonia cannot make such a decision independently and without taking the opinion of the motherland into account, because otherwise they might become responsible for another slaughter of Serbs.

Expert Dismisses Piran Bay Border Proposal

AU2709100595 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 26 Sep 96 pp 16-17

[Interview with Hrvoje Kacic, president of the Croatian State Commission for Borders, by Drazen Curic; place and date not given: "Return To Our Own"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Curic] Now we come to our border with Slovenia. There have been various commentaries following the meeting of the two prime ministers in Maribor. What were the talks actually like?

[Kacic] This is difficult to say right now. The land border is 670-km long, and it brings numerous unresolved issues with it. It is all about the coordination of the land border.

[Curic] So, what are the controversial points? Sveta Gera?

[Kacic] There are several, however, none that would entail settlements. Sveta Gera, too, is a territory without settlements.

[Curic] The sovereignty in that area is currently in the hands of the Slovenes?

[Kacic] No. The fact is, however, that, by their presence in the barracks there, they are violating the sovereignty of Croatia, which is undisputed precisely in that area.

New Course of Dragonja

[Curic] Where is the border in Piran Bay?

[Kacic] The continuation of the land border into Piran Bay is no longer controversial.

[Curic] Where does the border line run?

[Kacic] It runs, and it has run in the majority of documents, along St. Odorik canal, which means, via the new delta of the Dragonja River into Piran Bay. However, the new course of the Dragonja River at present runs more to the south than its old course, because the Slovenes changed its natural course in the former Yugoslavia, thus shortchanging Croatia.

[Curic] Does this mean that the Croatian side has left the difference of about 2 km to the Slovenes?

[Kacic] No, however, we have must honor the situation as it was on 25 June 1991.

[Curic] Will the sea border run next to Savudrija, as Ljubljana DELO wrote?

[Kacic] The drawing of the sea border is, at the moment, a real bone of contention in the relations between Croatia and Slovenia. Speaking about the results of the Maribor meeting, regarding the sea border, my assessment is that the views of the state delegations have diverged rather than grew closer. We hope that the Slovene side will try to explain some of its proposals, because I believe that one cannot expect Croatia to react positively to the proposals that we had said adamantly before stood no chance of being accepted. We must state clearly that the question of the border cannot have any influence on the electoral campaign in Croatia. I am convinced that one should not anticipate that the new government or the new Sabor could take a considerably different stance on the border issue. Our western neighbors must realize that the sea border will not run right next to the Savudrija peninsula. Until we reach an agreement, the sea border will run 1.3 nautical miles. which is more than 2 km, from the Savudrija peninsula. This is stipulated by the 1982 international convention on sea rights, whose provisions must be honored by Slovenia and Croatia alike.

No Military Buildup Directed Against Slovenia

AU2809091195 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 27 Sep 95 p 5

[Article by military analyst Fran Visnar: "Does Powerful Croatia Jeopardize Neighboring Slovenia?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Relations with Slovenia occupy one of the very important places in Croatian foreign policy. One must admit that since 1991 they have registered slow rises and easy declines, but the general trend has been positive. Recently, communications between Zagreb and Ljubljana have been intensified, with the continuously emphasized wish of Croatian state policy to solve the present disagreements (Piran Bay, Sveta Gera, Ljubljanska Bank, and so on) in the long term and to both sides' mutual satisfaction. Of course, in the negotiations, for instance concerning Piran Bay, Croatian diplomacy sticks to principled stands, but is simultaneously prepared to be flexible and to adjust itself to reasonable proposals by the Slovenes, having several different scenarios of favorable demarcation in reserve.

However, in the Slovenian public from time to time, one can hear different tones, which always repeat the same, very loud refrains, regardless of whether they are uttered by Franc Bucar, Janez Jansa, or Zmago Jelincic: "military buildup of Croatia endangers Slovenian interests," "let us be firm with the Croats and let us not give up our demands regarding the borders,"

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

"undemocratic tendencies predominate in Croatia," and similar.

Who Is Planning War?

And it is interesting, whenever such thinking appears on the part of the Slovenes, the "logistical support" arrives from Belgrade, too. The most recent has been sent by the Serbian opposition daily NASA BORBA which, among other things, claims that the Croats have been seriously elaborating six different scenarios in which the military option (conflict with Slovenia) has been planned in detail. It is unnecessary to say that this is not true. The Croatian Army, its General Staff, and the specialized services, administrations, and departments in the whole Ministry of Defense really thoroughly plan everything that has to do with Croatia's defense by collecting intelligence on the military strength of our neighbors, too (which is a routine job in all the armies in the world).

However, in all this, there are two approaches. The basic criterion is whether a country has a friendly or hostile stand toward Croatia. Slovenia still enjoys the treatment of a friendly state, which is also proven by the very cordial and professionally useful meetings of the ministers of defense of the two countries, Gojko Susak and Jelko Kacin.

That level also comprises the elements of military cooperation, exchange of fresh intelligence, as well as the appraisals about the development of the political and military situation in the region. Official Zagreb has always considered that Croatia's back in the northwest must be protected, and that it can only be achieved by developing and improving relations with Slovenia. Saber rattling, sporadic shooting, and various military tensions along the Croatian-Slovene border would perfectly suit the Serbs, of course, and therefore Belgrade will keep on sending, officially or unofficially, from the regime or from the opposition, warnings about the "Croatian danger" into Slovenian ears.

Twelve New Scenarios?!

Regarding the new military scenarios, one must also assert here that they exist, that there are not six of them, but as many as double that number. However, all of them are being prepared (for any case) not for a war against Slovenia, but they have three main and clear directions.

One direction unstoppably goes toward the complete liberation of eastern Croatia. The second deals with the military options in Bosnia-Herzegovina in case the current peace arrangements fail. The third considers the course and the consequences of a possible limited or total war with Serbia and Montenegro. Therefore, there is no need for Croatia to deploy and amass more significant military units along the "soft" Croatian-Slovenian border, because its police carries out the tasks very well.

And why wouldn't the police carry out its tasks very well, when Zagreb thinks that the relations between Slovenia and Zagreb have been developing in direction of what exists between Spain and Portugal, or the United States and Canada.

Legal Expert Views Changes to Electoral Law

AU2709122095 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 24 Sep 95 pp 12-13

[Interview with Smiljko Sokol, "one of the authors of the present electoral law" and Zagreb Law School professor, by Branko Podgornik; place and date not given: "The 1999 Election: A Fully Proportional System"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Smiljko Sokol, one of the authors of the present electoral law and a professor at Zagreb Law School, says that this is not a new law, but practically the electoral law from 1992, which has undergone some changes in the meantime. The electoral system has remained the same; it is a mixed system, proportional and majority.

[Podgornik] What has changed in the meantime?

[Sokol] The relation between the proportional and the majority electoral system to the advantage of the proportional system has changed. In the election held on 2 August 1992, 50 percent of the representatives were elected by a relative majority, and 50 percent proportionally on the basis of state lists, with the state of Croatia as one electoral district.

The share of the proportional system has now increased by more than 50 percent. In the election for the Chamber of Representatives to be held on 29 October 1995, more than three quarters of the representatives, 92 of them, will be elected according to the proportional system.

[Podgornik] Has it not been said up to now that 80 representatives will be elected according to the proportional system?

[Sokol] Many people are wrong when they say that only 80 representatives are elected according to the proportional system on the basis of state lists. Twelve more representatives will be elected on the basis of special lists—these are Croatian citizens who do not have residence in the Republic of Croatia. Apart from that, 28 representatives will be elected in 28 electoral districts. In each of them, the candidate who will win the most votes will be elected. This means that less

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

than one quarter of the representatives will be elected according to the relative majority system.

[Podgornik] The number of the representatives of national minorities and the way in which they will be elected is still vague. How will they be elected?

[Sokol] Seven representatives of national minorities are elected on the basis of the general right to vote. They are elected in special electoral districts only by those Croatian citizens who declare themselves members of a certain national minority. They are not elected on the basis of the list, but by a relative majority. Three representatives of the Serb national minority will be elected. Apart from that, one representative is elected by the Hungarians, one by the Italians, one by the Czechs and Slovaks together, and one by the Ruthenians, Ukrainians, Germans, and Austrians together.

[Podgornik] According to the Constitution, national minorities seem to be entitled to one more representative. Many people are confused by this. How will this representative be elected?

[Sokol] He will not be elected in special electoral districts, as the seven I mentioned above, but within the "regular" election, either on the basis of the state list, the special list, or in those electoral districts in which one representative is elected. If this representative fails to be elected in the "regular" election for the 120 representatives of the Chamber of Representatives, an additional stipulation of the election law will be applied: The candidate from any national minority who was on a state list but has not been elected will be considered as elected. In other words, the candidate from the state list that won the most votes will be considered elected. In that case, the number of the representatives to the Chamber of Representatives will increase from 127 to 128.

Prohibition Limits

[Podgornik] What is the next change in the electoral system?

[Sokol] The next change is relatively small, but it is very interesting for political parties. It is the increase in the threshold from 3 to 5 percent. Higher thresholds have been introduced for both state and special lists. When two parties enter a coalition, the threshold is 8 percent, and in case of three and more parties, it is 11 percent. This change has been introduced according to the solution in the Czech Republic. There are similar solutions in Poland, Slovakia, and other states.

[Podgornik] Why has the share of the proportional system been increased? Why have high thresholds been introduced?

[Sokol] The increase in the share of the proportional system has been required by Croatian politicians and experts, even by opposition parties, but not only by them. They required that—according to the electoral system in developed European democracies—either the pure proportional system be introduced, or the share of the proportional system within the mixed system increased. The proportional system is doubtlessly the most just, because only this system grants an approximate correlation between the percentage of votes given for a list, party, or coalition and the percentage of the representatives in the parliament.

The pure proportional system encourages, however, the diffusion of the multiparty system. It encourages the survival and establishment of new minor parties that, in the pure proportional system without a threshold, need not form coalitions. This leads to the instability of the multiparty and political system, especially to the instability of the government; also the work of the parliament is affected, since there are no firm and stable major parties. Therefore various forms of the mixed system are increasingly used, not only in new, but also in developed democracies.

There is almost no state with a pure proportional system without a threshold. It is usually between 2 and 10 percent. In Turkey it is, for example, 10 percent. It is usually 5 percent, as is the case in Germany. Almost all new democracies in central and eastern Europe that use either the pure proportional or a mixed system, such as Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Rumania, Russia, and Lithuania, have a 5-percent threshold.

The threshold is a correction. It prevents the smallest parties from entering parliament. If a party cannot win more than 5 percent, one can hardly assume that it will become politically strong enough in the future to win a majority or form the majority in a coalition with other parties. Another goal of the threshold is to encourage political parties to merge according to their programs, ideas, or interests to form basic party groups comparable to those in all developed democracies. In Great Britain, the United States, and Canada, there are usually two parties that can count on a significant representation in parliament. In other developed democracies, there are three or four parliamentary parties, or five to seven at the most. The changes in our electoral law are in line with these tendencies.

Coalitions, Lost Votes

[Podgornik] How do you assess the reproaches that the increase in the threshold prevents party mergers?

[Sokol] I am surprised by such reproaches, since it is exactly the other way round. It encourages political

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

parties to merge. I have to point out that coalitions are one thing and merging into parties another. The prohibition limits do not encourage coalitions of small parties, but they almost force minor parties to merge into one.

In developed democracies with proportional electoral systems, coalitions almost do not exist. This has no mathematical effect. A party that wants to surpass the 5-percent limit has no reason to enter a coalition with another party that counts on the same thing, since two parties together can get even fewer votes than each separately.

[Podgornik] It seems that coalitions are necessary for parties only in the part of the election that follows the majority system?

[Sokol] In the relative majority system, the candidate who wins the most votes is elected. I think that the experiences from the world show that—although the relative majority system encourages coalitions—the mathematical effect of the addition of the votes that single candidates would have won is not achieved anywhere. When coalitions are formed, there is always a loss of votes, of at least 2 or 3 percent.

Multiparty Commissions

[Podgornik] According to the old law, electoral commissions were nonparty. Multiparty commissions have been introduced now. Why?

[Sokol] Opposition parties and some experts required that multiparty electoral commissions and voting boards be introduced. This is a very important new element in the coming election. It is not mentioned by many people, however, since it cannot be criticized. I would like to remind you that this was one of the basic requirements set by the opposition parties. It has been fulfilled now.

[Podgornik] You said in an interview in February 1993 that the next election would be according to the proportional systemto a much higher degree, and that the pure proportional system might be introduced too. According to which system will the 1999 election be held if we assume that this is a scheduled election?

[Sokol] I personally think that we can expecte that the next election for the Chamber of Representatives in the fall of 1999 will be held according to the pure proportional system. This is the logical trend of the development since spring 1990. It started with the absolute majority system. In 1992, we introduced the 50:50 percent mixed system, and in the election for the Chamber of Counties in 1993 the pure proportional system was introduced. For the Chamber of Representatives, we have now introduced the mixed election system with a strong domination of the proportional system. If this trend continues, we can expect to have the pure proportional system in the next election.

The increase in the share of the proportional system is in line with the democratization of the electoral system in Croatia. Through the recent changes to the electoral law, the Croatian electoral system is approaching the electoral systems in developed European democracies.

SNS Considers Coming Elections Illegal

LD2709195795 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 27 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Serb National Party [SNS] is of the opinion that parliamentary elections in Croatia are based on a changed demographic structure and therefore, in their view, they are not legitimate and acceptable. In this connection, the party leadership heralded the redefining of the party program at a news conference today. Majda Ivkovic has a report:

[Ivkovic] Irrespective of the fact whether the party will take part in the elections or not, the SNS leadership does not recognize their legitimacy, because in their view the elections will not reflect the demographic structure of Croatia from before the war.

Voluntary departure of the Serb population from Croatia has left the party without some voters; by redefining their program the party will try to win some new voters. The party wishes to include in its work other national minorities, Albanians for instance, but looking after the interest of the Serb people in Croatia remains the main party task.

Party Chairan Milan Djukic has singled out several issues that he believes are decisive for the political destiny of the Serbs living in Croatia:

[Begin Djukic recording] This is primarily the issue of human rights and liberties, the issue of the return of displaced people and refugees to their homes, the issue of protection of their property, and the issue of functioning of Croatia's state institutions whose main task ought to be protection of the above-mentioned. [end recording]

[Ivkovic] Voluntary departure of some Serbs from Croatia has raised one more electoral question in the Serb National Party—whether Croatia wishes to have a state with the Serbs. The three MP posts on offer to the Serbs is not a satisfactory reply; the SNS wants to be given nine MP posts.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

High-Ranking Military Delegation Visits Britain

AU2709153895 Skopje MIC in English 26 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] A high-ranking delegation of the Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] Defense Ministry, led by Minister Blagoj Handziski is on an official visit to the Defense Ministry of the Kingdom of Great Britain from yesterday. At the meeting with the press, organized directly before leaving for London, Minister Handziski explained that the visit came as a result of the overall relations and cooperation between the two countries, established immediately after Macedonia's proclamation of independence, and intensified after the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1993.

The primary goal of the visit is signing a memorandum on understanding, defense contacts and cooperation, which, in effect, will be the first such document signed with a member-state of the EU. According to Handziski, the document will be based on a couple of basic principles in order to stimulate and encourage the cooperation and spirit of partnership between the two countries, to expand the mutual defense contacts and to agree on concrete forms of cooperation in the future two-year period. This way, conditions for Macedonia's imminent membership in the "Partnership for Peace" initiative are created, i.e., Macedonia can become a full member of this initiative in two to three weeks. Also, according to Handziski, the New York agreement gives guarantees that Macedonia will become a member of the OSCE very soon, as well.

Signs Cooperation Memorandum

AU2809093995 Skopje MIC in English 27 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] and Great Britain signed a Memorandum on cooperation in the defense sphere in London yesterday, with enables this cooperation to be institutionalized, Minister Blagoj Handziski stated for Radio Skopje yesterday.

As Handziski emphasized, the Memorandum is based on a couple of principles, which support the spirit of partnership between the two countries and contribute to the stabilization of the relations and security in Europe, in general.

It foresees the preparation of a two-year concrete program for mutual cooperation. The Macedonian Army delegation has been invited to attend a seminar on military questions in England in November, while a high military expert is expected to come to Macedonia soon to agree on specific forms of cooperation.

Following the signing of the memorandum, Minister Handziski had a meeting with his British colleague Michael Portillo at which they discussed the situation in the region, with an emphasis on Macedonia, Minister Handziski explained in the statement for Radio Skopje.

NDP Opposes Council of Europe Membership

AU2809094095 Skopje MIC in English 27 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The People's Democratic Party (NDP) sent a letter yesterday to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe asking for a postponement of the acceptance to Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] in this institution. NDP, the parliamentary party of the Albanians in Macedonia, wants the Council of Europe "to condition Macedonia to resolve its inter-ethnic relations, that is, the constitutional-legal status of the Albanians, before making a decision about accepting this Republic. Namely, to legalize the high education in Albanian language, to establish the equality of all citizens in all segments of life, regardless of ethnic, religious and other affiliations."

NDP concludes in the letter: "FYROM wants to build itself up as a unitary state, and the Albanians in it are institutionally discriminated, with limited rights compared to the Macedonians, in all spheres of social life."

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Okonski Favors Participating With NATO in Bosnia

LD2709210395 Warsaw Third Program Radio Network in Polish 2000 GMT 27 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Poland wants to participate in the NATO peace force in Bosnia, Defense Minister Zbigniew Okonski said during his visit to NATO headquarters in Brussels.

Minister Okonski met with NATO Secretary General Willy Claes. The minister admitted that the alliance asked Poland to participate in the operation to maintain the probable peace in Bosnia, which is being prepared by NATO. Poland is prepared to participate in this mission, Minister Okonski declared. He stressed, however, that the final decision will lie with our government.

Asked about the issue of NATO enlargement in the context of the NATO headquarters report, the minister stressed that we are expecting an answer to the question of who would join the treaty and when in the second part of next year.

It transpires from the NATO document that, during peacetime, the alliance's Armed Forces would not be stationed on territories of new member states, nor would nuclear weapons be deployed there. Minister Okonski stresses that Poland does not want any special treatment, although the treaty's decision seems to him to be correct from the military and strategic points of view. He warned, however, that this issue should be discussed between Poland and NATO first, and without, I quote, any conditions being set by third countries.

Offers Troops

AU2709211395 Paris AFP in English 2052 GMT 27 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Brussels, Sept 27 (AFP)—Poland is prepared to contribute toward a NATO-led peacekeeping force to police accords reached in Bosnia, Polish Defence Minister Zbigniew Okonski said here Wednesday [27 September].

Speaking after talks with NATO Secretary-General Willy Claes, he said though that it was too early to say how many troops Warsaw could put under the western military alliance.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is gearing up to send a force to the former Yugoslav republic in case of a UN withdrawal, and it may include troops from countries which are not alliance members.

Poland had up to 1,100 soldiers in Croatia as part of the UN peacekeeping force.

NATO sources said the prospect of cooperating with the alliance in Bosnia could unleash a flood of offers from members of NATO's Partnership for Peace (PFP) programme, which is aimed mainly at former Warsaw Pact countries.

A diplomat said the chance of maneuvers in the Bosnian theatre would be too good to miss for PFP members who wanted full NATO membership.

Okonski said Poland did not expect to be invited into full NATO membership until at least the second half of next year.

"We expect an invitation to negotiate our entry in the second half of next year," he said, after Russian presidential elections slated for June. That poll is a key pointer to future East-West relations as Moscow is bitterly opposed to NATO expansion into eastern Europe.

NATO chiefs have just concluded an internal study in which they discuss the how and why of enlargement but do not specify who will be invited in and when, largely for fear of upsetting Moscow too much, diplomatic sources said.

Laws Increasingly in Accord With EU Regulations

95EP0190A Paris LES ECHOS in French 8-9 Sep 95 p 16

[Article by Anne Wachsmann and Guillaume Rougier-Brierre: "Poland Brings Its Laws Into Conformity With the European Union"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Harmonizing Polish law with Community law with a view to Poland's membership in the European Union is again on the agenda, especially since the summit meeting in Cannes last June.

One of the basic conditions for Poland's economic and social integration with the European Union is the harmonization of its principal legal provisions with Community legislation. The need for that closer correspondence was recognized in particular by the association agreement signed between Poland and the Community on 16 December 1991. Articles 68, 69, and 70 of that agreement present an exhaustive list of the sections of Polish law needing to be harmonized. Included, among others, are customs law, company law, labor law, and laws governing competition, protection of the environment, and intellectual property.

Harmonization of the areas in question has run into two obstacles. First, Poland's chronic political instability has prevented thoroughgoing legislative work. Second, the agreement has turned out to be too permissive. In most cases there are no deadlines and no established priorities

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

among the various areas concerned. Aware of those difficulties, the European Commission prepared a white paper (issued early in May) for the purpose, as the commissioner for Central European countries pointed out, of specifying "which laws must be implemented to respect the four freedoms within the Union: freedom of movement for individuals, capital, property, and services, as stipulated in the Maastricht Treaty on European Union." Despite the Commission's mixed feelings, the results of harmonization to date have in fact been relatively favorable, as illustrated by the following three examples.

Freedom of Establishment

In the past, Community firms wishing to become established in Poland were often faced with a legal environment that was unfamiliar to them. As was emphasized by the European Economic and Social Council in a recommendation regarding relations with Central and East European countries (91/C 339/12), that situation tended to harm small and medium-sized firms. Since 1991, therefore, Polish legislators have endeavored in particular to create a favorable framework for investment by giving Community nationals unrestricted access to Polish territory.

Poland has adopted the principle of freedom of establishment for Community firms and nondiscrimination against those firms in relation to Polish firms. Investors from the various countries of the European Union are therefore treated as domestic investors: the rules of ordinary law in the Commerce Code and the Civil Code are applicable to them. There are, however, a certain number of exceptions to that equality of treatment due to implementation of the 1991 law on companies with foreign participation and other special texts. For example, in such sectors as telecommunications, foreign investors are required to set up companies in which the majority of the capital is Polish and/or to obtain administrative authorizations prior to setting up a company.

Harmonization of Intellectual Property

In the field of intellectual property, Poland made two major commitments in the association agreement: to establish a level of protection similar to that in the European Union within a period of five years, and to accede to certain multilateral conventions such as the 1973 Munich convention on the issuance of European patents.

The law of 4 February 1994 on intellectual property ("Dziennik Ustaw" [Legal Gazette] No. 24 dated 23 February 1994) met those requirements to a very large extent. In particular, the law in question aligned the periods of protection for various copyrights (50 years) with those provided in Directive 93/93/CEE dated 29 October 1993. Above all, it introduced into positive law the Community notion of exhaustion of copyright (article 51 of the above-mentioned law), which is important for Poland's economic integration with the European economy: an asset protected by copyright may, once marketed in a country of the European Union, circulate without restriction in Polish territory.

Law on Competition

The legislators anticipated the requirement to harmonize Polish law on competition, which had its origin in the law dated 20 February 1990 relative to the fight against monopolistic practices ("Dziennik Ustaw" 1990 No. 14, several times amended). That recently amended law was designed to be an essential element in the transition to a market economy subject to the general principles of the law on competition. Materially speaking, therefore, Polish law is to some extent harmonized and operational.

Monitoring Anticompetitive Practices

Compliance with the 1990 law is required of "entities exercising a professional activity" with no distinction being made between state-owned and private firms. This is a basic point for effectively enforcing the rules of competition in an economic system in which many state-owned firms continue to manage industrial and commercial activities. There is condemnation in the classic manner of such anticompetitive practices as certain types of agreements between companies and a company's abuse of its dominant position. For example, a firm is presumed to be in a dominant position when its market share exceeds 40 percent, a yardstick differing slightly from that adopted in Community law, which is more concerned with determining whether a firm is able to operate in the market without regard for its competitors.

Those banned practices may, however, be authorized (except in the case of certain violations that are banned per se) if it is demonstrated that they are necessary for engaging in the economic activity in question and that they do not distort competition to an excessive degree. In that respect, Polish law takes an approach similar to that of European law, which allows for the exemption of certain agreements (article 85 of the EC treaty).

Monitoring Market Structure

The Polish law also makes it possible to monitor economic concentrations. The original text of the 1990 law covered only three situations (mergers, the establishment of new entities, and conversions of firms) and made no reference to thresholds in terms of turnover or market shares that would trigger the monitoring of

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

an operation. The result was partial and unsatisfactory monitoring of structural changes affecting the Polish market.

Defects were corrected by a new law which, in the spirit of the European "concentration" regulation, introduced ECU-denominated [European Currency Unit-denominated] thresholds for turnover and a new definition of the notion of concentration based on the concept of the takeover of a firm through the acquisition of assets or shares or any other means.

However, the harmonization of Polish law on competition is still incomplete. The powers of the Antimonopoly Office are sometimes inordinate (it can order the dissolution and split-up of firms in a dominant position), and its practices are insufficiently transparent. Much work remains to be done with regard to respect for the right to a defense before Poland achieves the degree of protection established by case law at the European Community's Court of Justice.

But in a field of law so closely linked to the establishment and smooth operation of a market economy, it would be unfair to question the intentions of Polish authorities, considering that the law on competition even in certain countries of the European Union is not always enforced correctly or does not provide satisfactory solutions.

Shalikashvili To Hold Talks on Control of Army

LD2809113295 Warsaw PAP in Polish 0929 GMT 28 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Warsaw, 28 Sep (PAP)—General John Shalikashvili, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the U.S. Army, arrived in Poland today. The Ministry of National Defense Press and Information Office announced that the general, who is the guest of General Tadeusz Wilecki, chief of the Polish Army General Staff, will hold talks in Warsaw on civilian control of the Army and other topics.

General Shalikashvili is to be received by President Lech Walesa this morning. This is his second visit to Poland. Previously, he visited Warsaw in January of last year. [passage omitted]

Ambassador to Russia Ends Six-Year Mission

LD2709210595 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1922 GMT 27 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Ambassador Stanislaw Ciosek, one of the longest serving Polish envoys abroad, has ended his six-year long diplomatic mission to Moscow. He was recalled by Minister of Foreign Affairs Wladyslaw Bartoszewski.

Ciosek refused to connect the reasons for his dismissal to a letter he had written to one of, as he put it, the personalities of political life, in which he was suggesting the extension of the incumbent president's term of office by an extra two years. This idea was denounced by all of the significant political forces in Poland, including the president himself.

He explained that in March he had agreed with Minister Wladyslaw Bartoszewski that he would end his mission after six years in Moscow. He added that this was a natural event, which should not arouse too many emotions.

Ciosek was nominated as Polish ambassador in November 1989 to the country then known as the USSR. [passage omitted]

Recalled at Walesa's Request

LD2709225095 Warsaw Third Program Radio Network in Polish 2200 GMT 27 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Stanislaw Ciosek, the ambassador of Poland to Russia, has been recalled by Minister of Foreign Affairs Wladyslaw Bartoszewski. [passage omitted]

The ambassador explained that his recall was the result of earlier decisions made together with the minister of foreign affairs. [passage omitted]

Ambassador Ciosek has not received any proposal of a post in Warsaw, but, as he explained, he is not interested in participating in public life. [passage omitted]

Ciosek did not tell journalists what date is to be found on the letter recalling him to Warsaw. He said that these are technical details.

Presidential press spokesman Marek Karpinski has stated that the decision on the recall of the ambassador was maded by Minister Bartoszewski at the resolution of Lech Walesa.

[Begin Karpinski recording] There is a certain limit of sorts, one that does not exist formally—that is, in Poland we do not have terms of office in the diplomatic service, but by custom, routinely, it is accepted that four years is the limit, beyond which a diplomat ceases to represent the country that sent him in relation to the country in which he fulfills his mission. So, even the best diplomats fulfilling their mission as well as they can must, after a certain time, be recalled. This is a kind of iron rule of diplomacy. [end recording]

In the evening during a meeting with members of the Association of Managers in Poland, the president, when asked by journalists about the recall of Ciosek, said:

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

[Begin recording] [Walesa] The point is not changes, just that the mandate is now expiring, quite simply from what I know the mandate is expiring, and simultaneously—remember please that this is a case that many people are nonetheless complaining about—that this is something that never ensues in the state, that an ambassador continues such a policy. [sentence as heard] All of this nonetheless impinges on these actions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

[Unidentified correspondent] But this was an ambassador who you, the president, defended?

[Walesa] No, ladies and gentlemen. It is one thing to privately like a person and something else to fulfill obligations. We cannot confuse these two things. [passage omitted] [end recording]

PSL Chairman's 'Behind-the-Scenes' Game

WS2709154695 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 27 Sep 95 p 5

[Article by Ewa K. Czaczkowska: "What Is Waldemar Pawlak After, for Himself or for the Party?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *"After the presidential elections we must rethink our participation in a coalition with the postcommunists. Various possible scenarios outlining further actions are being prepared at the moment," Polish Peasant Party [PSL] Chairman Waldemar Pawlak said on Monday in an interview for REUTERS. It was the first official statement made by the PSL chairman on this issue.*

It was no secret even before the peasants convention decided to nominate its chairman as the party's presidential candidate that one of the main elements of Waldemar Pawlak's campaign would be attacking the coalition partner and undermining the sense of continuing the accord with the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD]. The choice between Jozef Zych and Waldemar Pawlak as possible presidential candidates also meant a choice between two concepts enabling the peasants to stay in power. Zych guaranteed maintenance of the present coalition, whereas Pawlak proposed a new coalition, in which the office of the prime minister would be controlled by the peasants and assumed, for the third time, by Pawlak. As the results of the election showed, most members of the convention supported the first concept, but Sejm Speaker Zych decided not to seek the nomination and thus deprived them of the choice. They had to settle for Pawlak, which meant that they also agreed to his concept of keeping the peasants in power.

Thus, PSL deputies were not taken aback by the most recent statement their chairman made for REUTERS. Also, GAZETA WYBORCZA recently published an article about behind-the-scenes talks on the breaking up of the coalition after the presidential election. However, so far Chairman Pawlak has not held any initial talks on this with the PSL Club. "This is the chairman's personal opinion," Deputy Marian Krol assesses.

Pawlak's concept envisions breaking up the alliance with the SLD and leading to early parliamentary elections, after which a government headed by the PSL chairman would be formed. The intention of dissolving the Sejm—if there are legal grounds for such a step, such as inability to form a coalition cabinet—has been declared by both Lech Walesa and Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz, supported by extraparliamentary rightist groupings whose main slogans include early elections to the Sejm and the Senate.

Pawlak's chances of success in the presidential election are small. Therefore, the price for relinquishing peasant votes to some other candidate in the second round would not be very high. However, the price for promising to break up the coalition and to lead to early elections, which would enable the new president to keep his preelection promise, would be much higher: to be prime minister for the third time.

If, however, voters elected Aleksander Kwasniewski president, dissolution of the parliament would be a very remote possibility. For such a contingency, Pawlak has prepared a different plan: forming a coalition with the Union of Labor and the Freedom Union. However, also in such a case, Pawlak's chances of being appointed prime minister are rather slim; in addition, it is not at all certain whether it would even be possible to form such a coalition. He is certainly not playing this intricate game to allow the post of prime minister to be assumed by some other peasant, such as Roman Jagielinski, who is his most serious rival right now.

The opposition of the peasant parliament members to Pawlak's concept does not, of course, result from their concern over the future of the chairman. What they fear is that the PSL might lose power if Pawlak's secret measures prove to be a failure. They are afraid that, after the next parliamentary elections, the PSL's position will not be that strong. In line with the results of the most recent opinion polls, the PSL would lose 40 seats in the parliament.

In the PSL Club, which consists of 130 persons, Pawlak's behind-the-scenes games are supported by no more than 15-20 people closest to him. These are the estimates of those who have decided to "passively watch" the chairman's activities in the election campaign. "We do not want to get in the chairman's way," says one deputy, "because we do not want anyone to say after-

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

ward that it is because of us that he has achieved a poor election result."

However, being a "passive observer," which is a necessity rather than the result of a choice, offers certain advantages to the chairman's opponents as well. If Pawlak achieves a poor election result and makes mistakes in his behind-the-scenes game, it will be all the easier for them to call him to account for this. If, despite achieving poor results in the elections, he strengthens not only his own position but also the position of the party, Pawlak will be able to remain the PSL leader.

Nonetheless, a decision on breaking up the coalition and forming a new one is not made by one person only. Such a decision is made by the Chief Council and the Parliamentary Club. Janusz Piechocinski is even proposing that the party hold a congress between the first and the second round of the elections. "The decision regarding whom we should endorse in the second round if our candidate fails to get there, the decision whether we should back a candidate of the left or of the right, will have very serious implications for the entire party. This is why it should be made by the entire party."

Progress on Constitutional Draft Reported

95EP0143A Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish 24 Jun 95 No 35, p 7

[Article by Stanislaw Podemski: "Virtuosos and Butchers: A Concerto for the Constitution"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A constitution should be built for decades, for many generations; this comment is made always and on every occasion. However, just as the Constitution of 1921 had been conceived in the shadow of fears of the growing influence of Pilsudski, and its 1935 successor was based on the wishes and views of the Pilsudski Camp, so the work on the current constitutional draft is encumbered by the contest for the future Polish presidency and by all that has been done by Lech Walesa while exercising that office in the last five years.

The Constitutional Committee of the National Assembly mentions the president's right to dissolve Sejm, the president's opposition to laws, the countersignature of the prime minister, and the general role of the head of state, but actually it is wondering whether [the next president] will be Walesa, Kwasniewski [Aleksander, head of the governing Democratic Left Alliance], Zielinski [Tadeusz, ombudsman], or Kuron [Jacek, former minister of labor and social policy]. Thus thinking about the distant future is complicated by apprehensions over what will happen a year hence in the next presidential elections.

At the last meeting of the Constitutional Committee two decisions that are fundamental to the presidency were taken: the president will choose between either vetoing a bill or appealing it to the Constitutional Tribunal, not both as at present. The presidential veto can be overcome by an ordinary majority of votes (50 percent plus one) rather than by two-thirds as at present. The president may not either exercise influence over appointments to heads of the so-called presidential ministries (Foreign Affairs, Internal Affairs, Defense). This will not be repeated in any draft that would be passed. It is difficult to believe that, in taking this decision, the members of the Constitutional Committee did not bear in mind how willfully Lech Walesa handled the recent budget bill, how he waited until the end of the prescribed monthly period before vetoing it, what dispute between the president and Sejm was ignited by questioning the constitutionality of the tax law prior to its signing, etc., etc.

The presidential prerogatives are expressly designed to fit a situation in which the president does not belong to the political camp dominating Sejm and the Ministerial Council. One expert on constitutional law and supporter of change does not share this view. He believes that every political orientation has its nuances and that a president who might happen to belong to the same party as the prime minister does not necessarily have to share all the views of his fellow party members in the government or Sejm. This is difficult to accept. For it is inconceivable for a president to veto a bill adopted by the parliamentary majority to which he is linked politically, or in this case to appeal it to the Constitutional Tribunal or dissolve the chambers of the parliament. After all, in such a case all disputed issues can be resolved through intraparty talks and the differences in opinion between the president and the government, or between the president and the parliament, do not have to be revealed through demonstrative acts by the president.

POLITYKA stands aloof from electioneering, but in my opinion, should the president, the government, and the parliament all be politically like-minded—a situation which was characterized by Prof. Edward Lipinski as "one sheepfold and one wolf"—the prerogatives of the head of state will be reduced to symbolic actions or to zero. I admit that the American and French examples seem to undermine my doubts. The Americans believe that government is more efficient when both Congress and the President belong to the same party, and so do the French following years of political division among the president, the government and the parliament. Of a certainty, the president will then often avail himself of the right to participate

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

in deliberations of the government, because political partisanship will involve such cooperation between the ministerial council and the head of state.

The Constitutional Committee has resolved (in the constitutional draft that has not yet been voted upon) to limit the president's right to dissolve Sejm (now termed "shortening its term of office") to two situations: a prolonged impasse in establishing a stable government, and passage of the budget bill. This is the situation, roughly speaking, that has existed since October 1992 (when the so-called Little Constitution was enacted). Thus, this draft rejects the Italian or French model allowing the president—upon consulting the chairmen of parliamentary chambers (and in France upon also consulting the prime minister), to dissolve the parliament without legally defining the consequent situation. That is because leaving such a temptation in the hands of a single individual would be playing with fire in the Polish political cauldron, and such a proposal is based not just on recent experiences.

The Polish president must wrestle with the difficulties of his office without grasping at radical methods costly to the nation. And here a major constitutional question arises: Might not the same package of presidential prerogatives be used differently by different individuals? But of course! After all, even the best Bechstein will sound differently when played by a Paderewski or a Rubinstein and when played by a "constitutionally tone-deaf pianist."

General de Gaulle and the Czech President Prof. Masaryk pounded the same narrow "piano keys," yet the former averted a national crisis while the latter united two different peoples under a single statehood. Every constitution presupposes a minimum of cooperation and collaboration among the branches of government. There is always a place for such cooperation and collaboration whenever national interest is concerned, as this overrides the parochial interests of parties, groups, or individuals. The so-called countersigning, i.e., the prime minister's endorsement of the decisions of the president, provides the best example of such need for mutual cooperation, imposing the obligation of accord and compromise, as for example with regard to appointments to many civilian and military posts. Countersigning of royal acts by ministers had been envisaged as long ago as in the Constitution of 3 May 1791, yet Lech Walesa has been stubbornly refusing to honor this 200-year-old rule.

The president may be a great soloist if he knows how to play to the accompaniment of the orchestra, i.e., the government, parliament, and other authorities, while at the same time adhering completely to the constitutional" music score. This has been sensed from the outset by Vaclav Havel when more than two years ago he declared, "The president's position is such that he cannot behave like a political party, that is, like one of the groups contending for power, and insofar as possible he should not involve himself in day-by-day political disputes or even identify himself with any existing political party" (GAZETA WYBORCZA, 4 Mar 93).

"The president is the guarantor of the continuity of governance," according to an amendment to the draft incorporated by the Constitutional Committee. Yes, precisely, he is the guarantor of "continuity of governance" and more even, the guarantor of the continuity of the state, and he must work in a constructive spirit rather than in the spirit of exacerbating social conflicts and promoting a decay of governmental structure.

But while matters of interest and importance to the future of this country are happening within the Constitutional Committee, opinion polls indicate that a great majority of the public, nearly 90 percent, and sometimes more than that, are paying no attention to this. The rising generation, which is to live under the new Constitution, also displays similar lack of interest.

Have not the constitutional disputes and the constitution itself been made ridiculous by the events of the recent past, the "Falandization" of the constitution [a reference to Lech Falandysz, Walesa's former chief of staff], Walesa's threats to disband Sejm for no substantive reason, Walesa's open disregard of the obligation of countersigning, and his continual questioning and undermining of all the provisions of the present constitution? All this has its price, and this lack of interest among the public bodes ill for the turnout and civic awareness of the participants in the future constitutional referendum. Yet it is precisely the referendum, and not the National Assembly's Committee, nor the meetings of that committee, that is to be the end of the road of the new constitution as symbolized by its publication in DZIENNIK USTAW [Legislative Record].

[Box, p 7]

On 14 June the following principal issues were resolved by the Constitutional Committee:

—The president is the supreme representative of the Republic of Poland and the guarantor of continuity of governance.

—The president watches over adherence to the Constitution and stands guard over national sovereignty and security and the inviolability and integrity of the national territory.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

—The president is elected by the Nation though popular, direct, and universal suffrage and in secret balloting. The president is elected for a term of five years and may be reelected only once.

—The validity of presidential elections is checked by the Supreme Court.

—The president may hold no public office or function other than those relating to the exercise of the presidency.

—The president as the representative of the state in foreign relations, exercises, among other things, the following duties: he appoints and recalls representatives of the Republic of Poland to other countries, and he ratifies and renounces international agreements.

—The president exercises his prerogatives in foreign policy in cooperation with the Chairman of the Ministerial Council and the appropriate minister.

—The president is the supreme commander of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland. In peacetime the president exercises this office through the mediation of the Minister of National Defense.

—The president confers orders and decorations.

—The president exercises the right of pardon. He may not exercise that right so far as persons sentenced by the Tribunal of State are concerned.

—To discuss matters of special importance the president may convene the Cabinet Council. The Cabinet Council is created by the Ministerial Council under the chairmanship of the president.

—Exercising his prerogatives, the president issues official acts. They are:

a) Ordinances and executive orders with the object of implementing laws and on the basis of the authorizations contained in these laws.

b) Executive orders concerning the exercise of presidential prerogatives.

c) Decisions on individual matters.

Bank Presents 1996 Financial Policy Projections

WS2809114695 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 28 Sep 95 p 18

[Article by Konrad Sadurski: "Financial Policy in 1996; Inflation Rates of the NBP"; table not included]

[FBIS Translated Text] *According to the government, next year's inflation will be 17 percent; its 1996 budget draft is based on this prediction. The central bank, in its more optimistic plan, predicts 19-percent inflation.*

The National Bank of Poland [NBP] has prepared a draft of the "1996 Financial Policy Projections." The document is one of the elements that are taken into account in the work on the budget.

Inflation Rates Differ Again

The NBP's inflation forecast is traditionally higher than the government's estimates included in the draft budget (17 percent). However, it is less optimistic than the forecast for 1995. It is worth recalling that, encouraged by the government and Sejm commissions, the central bank planned on 17-percent inflation, but the prognosis proved to be wrong (today the NBP believes that this year's inflation will reach 24 percent).

The more optimistic plan envisions a 19-percent price increase in 1996. However, a consequence of keeping inflation at such a low level might be slower economic growth—approximately 5 percent a year—the document reads.

In line with the pessimistic plan, inflation would be 21 percent. Then economic growth would come close to 6 percent of the GDP (over the next six to eight quarters). In the long run, however, higher inflation might turn out to be an impediment to growth.

The NBP emphasizes that implementation of either of the two plans calls for cooperation between the central bank and the government.

How Much Money on the Market

NBP analysts are proposing lower tariffs and import taxes. They believe that such a step would reduce the increasing rate of foreign exchange reserves, which would consequently limit the amount of money coming onto the market. An excessive amount of this money may threaten price stability.

The 1996 budget projections allow for such a need only to a very small degree, the "Projections" read. According to the NBP, delaying steps that would limit the amount of money coming onto the market ruins even the pessimistic plan—that is, reducing inflation to 21 percent.

On the other hand, the NBP expects that, in three to five years' time, the "registrable and border-area" exports may encounter a demand barrier. Then the foreign exchange reserves will begin to dwindle, which will coincide with the time when we will have to earmark more money for the repayment of the foreign debt.

The NBP suggests that it would be good to find a way to maintain the foreign exchange increase rate over a long period and to bring price increases under full control. For example, the Czech Republic has managed

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

to reconcile its foreign exchange increase with economic growth and to keep inflation under control at the same time, as well. This was made possible by a slight budgetary surplus, which we will not be able to achieve very soon.

What About the Budget

According to the NBP, the crisis of public finances, which surfaced in 1991 and 1992, was not stopped, only smothered. The budget's expenditures continue to increase, chiefly expenditures for the servicing of the public debt and subsidies to social insurance. As a result, the budget is increasingly less engaged in promoting development of the economy.

The NBP would like to give up financing the budget deficit and stop buying Treasury bonds in 1996. Then the burden of financing the deficit would be borne by banks.

Minister Scierski Interviewed on Power Industry

WS2709150095 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA (Elektroenergetyka IV supplement) in Polish 6 Sep 95 p I

[Interview with Polish Industry Minister Klemens Scierski by Beata E. Nawracka and Zbigniew Weseli; place and date not given: "Dilemmas of the Power Industry"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [RZECZPOSPOLITA] Mr. Minister, can the "Guidelines for the Power Industry Policies Up to the Year 2010" be regarded as the white paper for the Polish power industry?

[Scierski] In a certain sense, yes. The "Guidelines" set down essential goals for the Polish power industry at the threshhold of the 21st century. They present forecasts based on an assessment of the current situation and map out the main directions for the development of this sector.

It is the government's responsibility to insure that the country's power supply needs are met, i.e., that there is a continuous and safe supply of power. The "Guidelines" are a practical expression of the economic policies carried out by the government. The basic principles underlying these long-term energy policies are an integral part of the "Strategy for Poland."

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] What then, are the present goals for the power industry in Poland?

[Scierski] The power industry plays an essential role in economic development, economic competitiveness, the general standard of living, as well as the ongoing process of European integration.

We therefore have to create solid legal and financial-economic foundations, for example, by passing the bill titled the "Power Industry Law" and the "Gudelines for the Power Industry."

Reforms must be carried out, as well as modernization and the introduction of a prodevelopment course of action to adapt the power industry to a market economy, to reduce environmental pollution, and to safeguard the power-supply needs of the country. Huge investment and significant financial means are therefore necessary, and, as I would like to emphasize, persistence in carrying out extremely difficult reforms.

One of the key instruments in implementing them will be the "Power Supply Law," whose draft, together with the executive acts, was accepted by the Council of Ministers on 8 August of this year. It is, by Polish standards, an innovative legal framework. What it contains are, generally speaking, regulations related to the conditions for the fuel and energy supply and, in addition, rules for price structuring. In the draft, we propose limitations on the state's ownership functions in favor of its ability to define power-industry policies and act as a regulatory agent.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] What will the success of the reforms depend on?

[Scierski] On a number of factors. First and foremost, on very tough decisions being made by the Sejm, the government, the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, and the management boards of power-industry companies. These decisions must be tenaciously carried out with the agreement of the work force engaged in these processes, which is always the most difficult part.

Last year's massive strike in the bituminous coal mines, this year's protests in the Zielona Gora heat- and power-generating plant, and the privitization of the Krakow-Leg heat- and power-generating plant that has continued for years all demonstrate what an uneasy task the reform of this sector of the economy is.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] How, in your capacity as minister of industry and the nations's chief power engineer, would you evaluate the status of Poland's energy safety?

[Scierski] The strength of the Polish power industry lies in its highly qualified staff and the fact that the industry relies on an internal raw-materials' base.

This, however, does not mean that there is nothing left to be done. Within a few years, our production capacity will no longer be sufficient and will not fill the current needs of the economy. At that point, the threat may lie not only in the insufficient capacity of power stations, inadequate mining of fuels, or unforseeable natural

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

phenomena. I see the greatest threat to the power safety of Poland in the postponement of the implementation of the modernization plan and in an unfavorable energy price structure.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] Most enterprises in the sector have already gone through their period of splendor. More than 40 percent of the power plants have been in operation for over 30 years, and demand for energy consumption is expected to rise by 40 percent over the next 10 years.

[Scierski] That is why the primary objective is the modernization of power-industry plants and the industry as a whole, to make it less energy-consuming, and, in the future, the building of new power stations.

Many power stations are implementing their own modernization programs. The Turow power station is currently carrying out an enormous modernization and restoration investment project worth $370 million. Modern combustion desulfurization systems are being installed in the Belhatow, Jaworzno III, Rybnik, Laziska and Opole power stations. A new 360-MW capacity power block will be started in the Opole power station early next year.

We are considering the possibility of building a hydroelectric power station, the so-called Vistula River Cascade and the Mloty pumped storage power station. We are planning expansion and modernization of the distribution system, especially the medium- and low-tension system.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] You spoke of the need for changes in the energy sector. What will those changes involve?

[Scierski] The advent of a market economy has forced the power supply industry to restructurize. That, in itself, is a large-scale project.

It is impossible to mention here all of the planned tasks. I will, therefore, just describe a few of them.

Most enterprises have been transformed into state-owned independently managed companies.

Apart from the Opole power plant and the Patnow-Adamow-Konin complex, both already transformed, the remaining large power plants that form a part of the energy-supply system have remained state-owned. Many are being prepared for commercialization.

Internal company restructurization boils down in essence to simplifying company management, allowing organizational units a greater measure of independence and the creation of new, small businesses, significantly improving the effectivess of their operations.

Just as in the oil industry, there is an urgent need for companies in the power industry to integrate.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] The investment needs of the fuel and energy sector of the economy are estimated at over $53 billion. Will companies be able to cope with such expenditures by themselves?

[Scierski] Of course not. Yet it is equally true that sufficiently high levels of funding from the state budget will not be possible and strategic investors will have to be procured.

Privitization can guarantee a substantial inflow of financial means for development. It will be conducted in stages, so as not to disorganize production in this sector of the economy. Distribution companies and heat- and power-generating plants will have the most leeway in the coming period.

Capital privitization will practically be possible only after economic prices for energy are guaranteed.

Many well-established Western companies are interested in participating in the privitization of the power industry. Such plants as the Leg heating and power plant, the Wroclaw complex, and Patnow-Adamow-Konin are interested in joint-venture-type privitization.

Plans call for enormous expenditures in the years 1996-2005: $1.2 billion for the restoration of the existing production capacity, $1.1 billion for proenvironment investment, and $3 billion for investment in the development of the power-generation, transmission, and distribution branches of the power industry. It is understandable that this program cannot be carried forward without bringing energy prices to economic levels.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] The average energy consumer is interested primarily in prices. Will not marketization of the power industry simply turn out to be a drain on consumer pockets?

[Scierski] Well, a certain price hike is unavoidable. The price for electric energy has remained one of the few state-regulated prices.

Restructurization measures generally aim to give prices and energy rates a permanent economic quality. That, for instance, means dthat there will be regional variations in final prices, just as actual energy transmission costs vary with each recipient. To attain economically justified price levels in the years 2000-02 will necessitate real price increases by about 5 percent per annum, starting in 1996.

Unless the Sejm decides otherwise, the freeing up of prices should take place within two years after the power industry law has become effective.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

It should be openly admitted that, in a market economy, energy must be treated just like any other commodity. Energy is a mass product, and it is in the interests of us all to have it produced on a rational, economic basis.

How much should it cost? Some say the price is too high, others are convinced it is too low. Whom should we say is right? How should we calculate prices? That is an extremely difficult task, difficult from a social perspective.

One of the fundamental problems that has to be solved so that we may speak of prices as an economic category is the reassessment of fixed assets belonging to the power-supply industry. This gives companies the possibility of making greater deductions due to depreciation and, as a result, the possibility of allocating larger means for restoration and modernization.

The costs of protecting the natural environment are also reflected in prices. These costs are due to gigantic outlays for desulfurization, dedusting, storage and utilization of ash. Sums invested in these pollution-controlling installations will have to be increasingly higher. All of this will have an additional impact on the rise in the price of one kilowatt hour.

Therefore, despite the fact that prices for electric energy remain state-controlled and regulated, new forms of price control will be introduced within the next few years. They will be more effective, more flexible, less arbitrary and closer to market-driven criteria.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] Is Poland joining the European power-supply system?

[Scierski] Naturally. That is yet another cornerstone for building the power-supply safety of the country.

Our power supply system is already working together with that of the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary, and with the VEAG system (former East Germany) within the scope of the CENTREL organization.

We are planning to hook up to the West European UCPTE system (Union for the Coordination of Production and Transmission of Electricity) soon. Technical tests fully confirm such cooperation is possible. On the other hand, the cable link to Sweden will be a part of the so-called Baltic ring. Other countries engaged in the project, apart from Poland and Sweden, include: Germany, Finland, and the Baltic states. There are many more international links planned.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] One can observe a tendency in Western countries to move away from pit coal as the basic source of energy and potential toxic waste producer. However, here in Poland...

[Scierski] There is a parallel tendency. The long-range goal of the energy supply policies is to change the structure or, more specifically, to diversify the primary energy sources. This means that, in our national balance of fuel consumption, there will have to be an increased proportion of environmentally safer energy carriers.

The basic role of pit coal and bituminous coal shall be maintained. We do not forsee utilizing nuclear energy in the near future. We will, however, direct efforts to promote more widespread use of gaseous fuels, both from domestic and external sources, and will, in addition, support the development of renewable energy sources such as hydroenergy.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] Energy production brings about the degradation of the natural environment. Is there a chance that some time in the future the air we breathe will be fresher than it is today?

[Scierski] Unfortunately, we are still one of the heavier polluted countries. The power industry's share in pollution is large, though so-called low emission, from chimney stacks and automobile engines, is more hazardous to health. Also, the "import" of pollution from our southern and western neighbors has a negative effect on the level of air pollution.

Nevertheless, as I have said, Polish power engineers are not insensitive to present standards for environmental protection. With the implementation of many modernization projects and the combustion of better quality fuel, ash and hazardous gas pollution has already dropped by more than 25 percent.

New coal treatment plants are being put up next to mines, new installations for desulfurizing and denitriding combustion gases are being built, and electrical filters are being modernized or replaced. Many heating and power plants are converting to heating by gas, and a wide range of recultivation projects is slowly bringing wastelands back to life.

It is clear that Polish power plants are environment conscious. There are many signs that, within the coming five years, the power industry will be much less of a burden for the general population and natural environment.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Poll: Most Want Experienced, Educated President

WS2709153095 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 27 Sep 95 p 2

[Report by Agnieszka Kublik: "CBOS: What President We Are Dreaming Of"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *A single woman, even if she is not very attractive, could become president if she is experienced in politics, educated, and honest.*

This is the result of a research carried out by the Public Opinion Research Center [CBOS] for READER'S DIGEST; CBOS asked Poles about the characteristics of an ideal president.

Most of the respondents (76 percent) would like a president who has already held some political office or a post within a party.

Another important presidential characteristic is having a university diploma. "Such an opinion is also voiced by those who have finished only primary school. The demand for an educated president is very noticeable," CBOS Deputy Director Radoslaw Markowski comments on the results of the poll.

Fewer than half of the respondents believe that the head of state should be a good businessman. Attention to this feature of the president is drawn particularly often by well-educated Poles, rich people, and residents of big towns and cities.

Only 20 percent believe that the head of state should be a Catholic. "If we take into account the fact that 95 percent of Poles consider themselves Catholics, the religiousness of the president is considered a relatively unimportant characteristic," Markowski comments.

It turns out that gender—in this issue at least—does not make much of a difference to Poles: Only 17 percent believe that the president should be a man, and only 9 percent do not want the supreme office assumed by a woman.

Poles are quite liberal as far as the president's personal life is concerned: It does not matter to them whether the president is divorced or single. "We attach less importance to the family status of the candidate than citizens of West European countries and Americans," Dr. Markowski says.

Every fifth person is in favor of a president who is a well-known personage.

Most of the respondents (67 percent) emphasize honesty—they say they would not vote for a person who has made money using dubious means. According to 40 percent of the respondents, the head of state should not have any serious health problems. One-third of those polled do not want a president who "was a supporter of the political forces that governed Poland between 1945 and 1990." Fewer respondents (11 percent) would not vote for a candidate who "supported Solidarity between 1980 and 1989." "A candidate with communist roots must reckon with the possibility of having three times as many opponents as his Solidarity rival," Markowski claims.

A president "who would stand above party divisions, reconcile and unite Poles" is desired by 28 percent. Here is how Markowski comments on the fact that only 18 percent of the respondents dream of a president who would "appropriately represent the country abroad": "The president is to be for domestic rather than foreign use." Only one in six respondents expects that the head of state will "make the right decisions at moments when the state is threatened."

CBOS conducted the poll between 3 and 8 August on a representative random sample of 1,081 adult Poles.

The Ideal President (In percent)

The future president should:	
Be experienced in politics	76
Have a higher education	71
Have experience in business	41
Be a Catholic	20
Be a well-known and popular person	19

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Tinca Sees Need for 'Efficient' Army Intelligence

AU2809075995 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 25 Sep 95 p 8

[Article by Radu Tudor: "The Army Intelligence Services Are Not Under Parliamentary Control Because the Minister Is Responsible for Their Activity"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On Friday, 22 September, the minister of national defense [Gheorghe Tinca] granted an interview to the Romania Actualitati program of Bucharest Radio. Among various interesting items of information, Tinca stated: "I have to tell you that the Army cannot do without intelligence services. First, because we need information so we would not be taken by surprise by military events in which we might also be involved, and so that we know what is happening outside, and, second, we need a counterintelligence service to deal with whatever is happening on the inside, within the Army. The first is subordinated via the chief of the Army's General Staff to myself, while the second is directly under my subordination. Please believe me that both the chief of the General Staff and myself want these services to be very well provided for and very efficient. No one should harbor any objections to the intelligence services. They are useful for the country and for the Army, and our efforts are not directed toward weakening them, rather to improve their working methods and the framework in which they carry out their duty. They are bodies of the National Defense Ministry rather than national bodies submitted to parliamentary control. Parliament has the minister of defense under its control and he is responsible before the legislators for the activity of these two bodies."

Tinca Attends Antiaircraft Firing Drills

AU2609175695 Bucharest CURIERUL NATIONAL in Romanian 21 Sep 95 p 4

[Report by Monica Szlavik: "Yesterday's Test-Firings at Capul Midia—An OSA-Type Rocket Exploded 200 Meters Away From Minister Tinca"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yesterday, at the Capul Midia firing range situated 20 kilometers north of Constanta Harbor, the Air Force and Antiaircraft Defense General Staff in cooperation with the Land Troops General Staff organized a military exercise codenamed "Start '95," during which they test-fired modernized A-94 and A-95 rockets, which are compatible with the U.S.-made Stinger rockets. Before the firing proper began, National Defense Minister Gheorghe Tinca, together with military observers from 10 countries and Romanian military officials, visited a military equipment exhibition, which consisted of several artillery models of various calibers and antiaircraft missiles currently used by the Romanian Army. Minister Tinca expressed his great surprise about the longevity of the 57 mm antiaircraft cannon (being manufactured since 1948,) after which he stopped inquiring about the age of the other exhibits.

At 1345 hours, with a one and a half hour delay, an airplane dropped the first two parachuted targets, which were attacked by means of Russian-made KUB and OSA rockets. Following this they tested the self-destruct mechanisms of a Volhov and a Neva rocket, which were already airborne and on course, by activating their security device. After that they destroyed, by means of Volhov and KUB rockets, a target rocket which had been launched from an offshore oil-drilling platform. This was followed by the firing of two A-94 and A-95 rockets (the Romanian-modernized versions of the Russian Strela-1 and Strela-2 rockets,) and by phase-shifted antiaircraft firings [trageri antiaeriene defazate] with the artillery and machine guns. The firings were carried out according to plan, except for two OSA and Neva rockets which malfunctioned at the start, one of which exploded only 200 meters from Minister Tinca.

During the drills they presented for the first time the Stalker C.A. 94 system, which is an autonomous tactical reconnaissance system able to intercept both terrestrial and airborne targets, at the same time also being a close-range antiaircraft defense system achieved by the Bucharest Army Industrial Group Public Corporation in cooperation with the Rafael company of Israel. As a result of the contract concluded in June 1995 by the National Defense Ministry with the Oerlikon company of Switzerland, within a year's time they will modernize six Romanian-made 30 mm antiaircraft cannons. Beginning with 1996 they will renounce such type of cannons favoring the 35 mm ones.

PRM's Tudor Calls For SRI Chief's Dismissal

AU2609124395 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 20 Sep 95 p 2

["Note" by Radu Tudor: "Corneliu Vadim Tudor Against Virgil Magureanu"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The ROMANIA MARE weekly issue No. 272, of 22 September 1995, publishes, under the signature of Corneliu Vadim Tudor [owner and chief editor of ROMANIA MARE and president of the Greater Romania Party—PRM], a violent attack against Virgil Magureanu, director of the Romanian Intelligence Service [SRI]. The item, which is of a rare virulence, takes the form of a letter addressed to President Ion Iliescu by the PRM senator. It contains serious accusations against the SRI director, such as: conspiracy against the head of state; abuse of position;

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

influence peddling; actions typical of a political police; and so forth.

In view of Tudor's antecedents, such as the "Letter of the 300" [letter allegedly written by 300 officers and published by ROMANIA MARE weekly on 23 June], in which President Ion Iliescu was threatened with the firing squad for "high treason," we can predict that PRM Senator Tudor, who is also the president of a party belonging to the government coalition, will never be able to prove his accusations against Virgil Magureanu, but neither will he have to bear any consequences.

Here follows the open letter:

The Fiend of Political Files Virgil Magureanu (Former Imre Asztalos) Has Seriously Violated the Law on the SRI Organization and Functioning and Has Become a Public Danger!

Esteemed Mr. President Ion Iliescu,

With regret, I have to tell you that I will not participate in the meeting [with party leaders, 14 September] that you have convened at Cotroceni Palace. I will support, out of conviction, your outstanding initiatives for the Romanian-Hungarian reconciliation, but I must tell you that I am experiencing a great disappointment: You have totally lost control over Virgil Magureanu! I hope you remember what we discussed last Wednesday on the telephone, namely, that he should correct the colossal gaffe he deliberately committed by systematically protecting Coposu [Corneliu Coposu, president of the National Peasant Christian Democratic Party], Paler [Octavian Paler, honorary director of ROMANIA LIBERA], Emil Constantinescu [president of the Democratic Convention of Romania], Bacanu [Petru Mihai Bacanu, chief editor of ROMANIA LIBERA], and Paleologu [Alexandru Paleologu, independent senator], while attacking me, with the perfidy of a snake with glasses. What he has done now is not only a serious violation of the Law on the SRI Organization and Functioning, but it is also retaliation, typical of a political police. Both you and I have talked to him. What did he do after that? He put together some kind of stupid communique, in which he exculpates himself from any violations of the law, while leaving me covered with hogwash. Mr. President, the guy hates me terribly, for several justified reasons, of which I would like to recall just a few:

1. In the summer of 1992, I refused to participate in a conspiracy of his against you, when he invited me to a SRI guest house at Baneasa Airport, took me aside for a walk on the grass, and told me: "Dear Vadim, we must help Iliescu rid himself of Romania's presidency. I suggest we support our man, Viorel Salagean [senator of the Romanian National Unity Party—PUNR]!" I burst out laughing, saying that Salagean had been secretary of the Romanian Communist Party [PCR] in charge of the press and publishing houses and that Florea Ceausescu [a relative of the former communist leader Nicolae Ceausescu] had been best man at his wedding. Who would vote for him in this country? I recall that my friend Adrian Paunescu [vice president of the Socialist Party of Labor—PSM and publisher of VREMEA and TOTUSI IUBIREA publications] was also a guest there and a similar proposal was made to him, too (in a separate discussion).

2. I refused to cede the position of prefect of Constanta County to him, so he could appoint a local SRI officer to that post, who would then join the PRM; I found this attempt rather embarrassing.

3. I reproached him for hushing up certain scandalous transactions of General Gheorghe Florica [Major General Gheorghe Florica, former chief of the Financial Guard, removed from that post in 1993], which he had recorded on tape; Magureanu knew that the general took bribes worth hundreds of thousands of dollars from the Arabs, but he did nothing about it and let him continue with his shoddy deals until I published a set of materials and the scandal broke loose.

Mr. President, I could go on talking about other things, too. The party I head is revolted by the diabolical perfidy shown by this harmful agent, who is involved in some disgusting deals, which I will publish in due course, regardless of any new falsehoods that might be said about me. At the extraordinary plenary session of the PRM National Council on Saturday, 16 September, all the people around me will demand his dismissal and investigation. If you are not going to do it, the guy will cause you very serious problems, because blood is thicker than water, and he will always remain Imre Asztalosz, because this is the name he graduated with from the Philosophy University. As for me, I no longer support him. The atmosphere within the SRI is very tense. He dares change his generals and colonels at whim, which is inadmissible. Better find him a position as ambassador somewhere or a chair at some university. Get rid of him in time, since he is not playing fairly: He seems to be drawn to the likes of Coposu, Blandiana [Ana Blandiana, president of the Civic Alliance], and Ileana Lucaciu [journalist with EXPRES MAGAZIN weekly]. I would not like to be misunderstood: I do not want to meddle in other things, but I do not accept being exposed to the malevolent witch-hunting unleashed by Magureanu against me. What use can we to you, Mr. President, the support of a senator and a party, whom the fiend of our files strives to present as leftovers of the Securitate? We do not wish to compromise you; consequently, until the matter is resolved and you kick

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

him out, or at least summon him to publicly issue a statement (as he did in the case of Coposu) in which he unambiguously declares that I did not collaborate with the Securitate—and indeed, I did not, unlike his former chiefs, Generals Ion Coman, Iulian Vlad, and Aron Bordea—we, those from the PRM, will no longer enter Cotroceni Palace. Of course, this has come about through no fault of yours, but we have no other weapon with which to defend ourselves and alert you to the danger. You must prevent the start of a "war," which could be very tough, with unforeseeable consequences, with everybody only standing to lose from it. My honor and the honor of the party I lead is above the mean intrigues of this Hungarian townsman with a changed name, who, in his endeavor to earn points with the "elitist intellectuals," has overstepped the line and entered a very dangerous zone. As a matter of fact, I know from some of his intimates that he dreams of becoming Romania's president.

PUNR Senator Comments

AU2709083795 Bucharest COTIDIANUL in Romanian 20 Sep 95 p 2

[Article by Ioana Lupea and Corina Zaharia: "Vadim Wants To Throw a Bone Between Iliescu and Magureanu"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In the series of declarations against SRI [Romanian Intelligence Service] Director Virgil Magureanu, Corneliu Vadim Tudor [senator and president of Greater Romania Party—PRM] also involved PUNR [Romanian National Unity Party] Senator Viorel Salagean. Vadim Tudor claimed—verbally at the PRM National Council and also in writing in the ROMANIA MARE magazine—that Virgil Magureanu tried to draw him into a plot aimed at overthrowing President Iliescu in favor of Viorel Salagean.

In connection with this information, Senator Salagean told our newspaper: "Virgil Magureanu and I have been friends for 20 years and C.V. Tudor knows it. Tudor tries to use our friendship to throw a bone between Iliescu and Magureanu. He wants to pay back Magureanu for what was written in the White Book of the Securitate, knowing that Magureanu is preparing other things for him as well."

As is known, revealing notes have been published in the White Book of Securitate, which prove that Tudor was visiting the Securitate on his own will, to tell on writers.

Draft Law Seen Giving SRI 'Unlimited Powers'

AU2709124795 Bucharest COTIDIANUL in Romanian 22 Sep 95 p 2

[Article by Corina Zaharia and Ioana Lupea: "The Law on State Secrets Will Turn the Romanian Intelligence Service Into the Securitate's Equal"]

[FBIS Translated Text] After the Law on the Organization and Operation of the Romanian Intelligence Service [SRI] and the Law on National Security, the draft law on the protection of state secrets, which was discussed in the Senate yesterday, practically gives unlimited powers to the SRI. The general debate on the text of the law was suspended at the request of Senator Ion Predescu, chairman of the Legal Commission, on the pretext that a large number of amendments had recently been formulated by the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Justice, and the SRI. The opposition has said from the very start that this draft law establishes new prerogatives for the SRI—other than the ones provided by the law—that are very close to the ones enjoyed by the former Securitate. Moreover, the text of the law introduces the notion of "service secret," which even the chairman of the Legal Commission, who is known for his pleas in favor of the Social Democracy Party of Romania [PDSR], thinks has been hastily defined, given the fact that no law on the status of the public clerk has yet been passed. In this respect, Senator Ion Predescu referred in particular to the term "service secret," which is rather vaguely defined in the draft law.

An abnormally large information spectrum falls under the term "state secret," leaving plenty of room for interpretation: "Information, data, documents, objectives, and activities, whose disclosure (...) may harm the political, economic, scientific-technical, and other interests of Romania (Article 4), constitute state secrets." By restricting access to information considered without justification to be state secrets, the draft law limits the transparency of state institutions and deprives the citizen of information that he is entitled to know. The Draft Law on State Secrets may also encourage denunciations, because, according to Article 20, any person who accidentally comes into possession of information that is considered a state secret is obliged to reveal it to the SRI.

The most shocking section of the legislative initiative is the chapter dealing with SRI prerogatives and obligations. We learn that—at the request of the authorities, public institutions, public corporations, and trade companies—the SRI may carry out investigations and checks, and may provide information about individuals hired for posts involving access to information or activities of a state or service secret nature. But this is

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

not all. The SRI will also control the selection of those suitable for hiring in special documentation or protocol sectors, since the managements of the respective institutions are required to seek the SRI's approval in this respect. However, the text of the draft law does not mention the criteria for the selection of the future employees, and it should come as no surprise to find out that they resemble the political files of the Securitate.

Organization, Duties of Development Agency

95BA0270A Bucharest BULETINUL OFICIAL in Romanian 19 Apr 95 pp 5-7

[Text of Decision No. 216 of the Romanian Government on Organization and Operation of the Romanian Development Agency]

[FBIS Translated Text] On the basis of the provisions of Article 115 of the Romanian Constitution and of other legal regulations, the Romanian Government has decided the following:

Article 1. The Romanian Development Agency, as a specialized organ of the central public administration under the Government, applies its strategy for development and economic policy in the area of attracting foreign investments and developing small and medium-sized private enterprises.

Article 2. In achieving its goal of activity, the Romanian Development Agency has the following duties:

1. It ensures application of the Government's laws and decisions in its area of activity, respecting the limits of authority and the principles of independence of the economic agencies and local independence;

2. It works out and presents for Government approval the annual general and sectional programs for attracting foreign investments in collaboration with institutions of the same kind and, in accordance with provisions of the law, it participates in fulfilling their goals;

3. It works out and presents for approval by the Council for Economic Coordination, Strategy and Reform unified methodological norms according to the legislation in effect with regard to attracting and carrying out foreign investments in Romania; the norms are published in MONITORUL OFICIAL AL ROMANIEI.

4. In collaboration with the concerned institutions, commercial companies and independent offices, it draws up investment offerings;

5. It examines proposals of the foreign partners for making investments in Romania and it sets actions for utilizing them by consulting the involved commercial companies and institutions, according to the case;

6. It selects foreign partners and proposals for foreign investments by consulting the involved institutions, making verifications and documentations in accordance with international practices upon its own initiative or at the request of the concerned partners with regard to the subject and volume of investments, the solvency of the investor, the source of capital, the amount of and forms of participation in the investment;

7. It organizes the activity of promoting foreign investment opportunities in Romania in relations with foreign partners in a unified way;

8. It gives the specialized assistance requested by foreign or Romanian partners to carry out investment projects with foreign capital participation, including the process of finalizing formalities for confirmed foreign investments;

9. It analyzes acts concluded in applying legal provisions regarding making foreign investments in Romania;

10. According to the case, it records, analyzes, and confirms requests for investment investments in Romania under the conditions provided by law;

11. It issues the investor certificate under conditions provided by the law, as the sole document revocable by Romanian authorities that proves the quality of the foreign investor;

12. It works out and presents to the Government analyses and comparable situations in connection with international policy and legislation in the area of foreign investments;

13. It initiates, works out and presents to the Government draft normative acts concerning attracting foreign investments to Romania;

14. It advises on draft normative acts initiated by other institutions and those that are connected with the activity of attracting foreign investments to Romania;

15. It organizes a unified record-keeping and information system for foreign investments, taking action for this purpose in conformity with the duties set by law in this area;

16. Periodically it presents information to the Council for Coordination, Strategy, and Economic Reform in connection with the development of the actions taken to carry out foreign investment projects, proposals for solving the requests for investments that may affect the major interests of the national economy as well as problems beyond the competency of the Romanian Development Agency;

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

17. It is concerned with and is responsible for fulfilling the provisions of Law 83/1994 on Providing Incentives for Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises;

18. It works out and fulfills programs to develop small and medium-sized enterprises;

19. Once every three years it presents programs to the Government on the strategy for development of small and medium-sized enterprises;

20. It collaborates with ministries, other specialized organs of the central public administration and authorities of local public administration, as well as nongovernmental organizations and economic agents for the purpose of creating a framework that is favorable for developing the small and medium-sized enterprises;

21. It works out or advises on draft normative acts, according to the case, whose goal for regulation refers to the sector of small and medium-sized enterprises;

22. In the cases and under the conditions provided by government decision, it coordinates and gives out favors and advantages as provided by this ordinance;

23. It organizes selections of small and medium-sized enterprises that are apt to benefit from special programs, on the basis of performance criteria;

24. It organizes and keeps records of the favors and advantages given as well as the effects of them;

25. It presents a report to the Government annually on the stage of development of small and medium-sized enterprises and this report is made public;

26. Together with the organs of the local public administration and with specialized nongovernmental organizations it aids in establishing centers to develop small and medium-sized private enterprises in the counties;

27. It coordinates and is responsible for carrying out programs to develop small and medium-sized private enterprises that are built with foreign financial assistance and cofinanced by the Romanian side;

28. It fulfills any other duties established by normative acts for its area of activity.

Article 3. In carrying out its duties and in respecting legal provisions, the Romanian Development Agency is authorized to do the following:

1. Carry out promotional actions connected with attracting foreign investments;

2. Use foreign consultants;

3. Publish promotional material in collaboration with and with the aid of other concerned institutions;

4. Take necessary actions through its representatives in Romania and abroad to attract foreign investments to Romania;

5. Furnish consulting services, informational material, and publications in the area of foreign investments and for the aid of small and medium-sized enterprises at the request of the interested parties at cost, as well as other services in conformity with its purpose of activity;

6. Set tariffs and prices for goods and services it supplies;

7. In accordance with legal provisions, receive material and monetary resources free from legal and physical persons and utilize them to improve conditions for carrying out activity and in conformity with legal regulations;

8. Conclude conventions of collaboration with specialized institutions in Romania and abroad, the purpose of which is to exchange information, experience, and mutual aid in the area of promoting foreign investments and aiding the sector of small and medium-sized private enterprises;

9. Enjoy programs of foreign assistance and technical supply in its area of activity and ensure forms for vocational training of the personnel;

10. Obtain the information needed to fulfill its tasks from foreign diplomatic and economic missions of Romania and from specialized institutions in Romania or abroad, with or without payment;

11. Request that the partners present their expertise to evaluate the contribution, including intangible values, of the Romanian partner and/or the foreign partner.

Article 4. (1) General directorates, directorates, services, and offices may operate within the Romanian Development Agency.

(2) The maximum number of positions is 128, excluding the top official and personnel of the Office for Providing Services and Publication.

(3) The organizational structure of the Romanian Development Agency is provided in the Appendix to this decision. [Appendix omitted] Salary scales for personnel of the Romanian Development Agency are set according to Appendix 8 to Republished Law 40/1991. Services and offices as well as temporary collectives may be organized in it by presidential order.

(4) Within the maximum number of positions approved, the Romanian Development Agency is to include in its listing of jobs the specialized personnel for territorial coordination, who carry out their activity with the aid of the prefects' offices.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Article 5. (1) For the activity of providing services and publication, the Romanian Development Agency has under it the Office for Providing Services and Publication, whose operating expenses and investments are covered from the profit gained outside the budget, under conditions of the law.

(2) The number of positions and the organizational structure are approved by order of the president of the Romanian Development Agency. The salary levels for personnel of the Office for Providing Services and Publication are as provided in Appendix 10 to Government Decision 281/1993.

Article 6. (1) The leadership of the Romanian Development Agency is provided by a president, whose salary is in line with the job of state secretary, and he is appointed by decision of the prime minister. Operating alongside the president is the college of the agency as a consulting organ. The makeup of the college is set by order of the president of the Romanian Development Agency, with advisement of the government member coordinating this activity.

(2) The president heads all the agency's activity and represents it in relations with ministries, other specialized organs of the central public administration as well as organs, organizations, institutions, economic agents, and other legal and physical entities in Romania or abroad.

(3) The president issues orders and instructions in carrying out his duties.

Article 7. The Permanent Secretariat of the Balkan Center for Cooperation Between Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises is organized at the service level.

Article 8. (1) In carrying out its duties, the Romanian Development Agency collaborates with ministries, other central specialized organs under the Government, local public authorities, economic agents, regardless of the type of ownership and form of their organization, and with other public and private legal entities in Romania and abroad.

(2) The prefects' offices are to provide the necessary areas for salaried personnel of the Romanian Development Agency to carry out their activitity in the field and are to bear the material expenses for maintenance and communication from its own budget.

Article 9. The Romanian Development Agency has cars in its supply in accordance with legal provisions.

Article 10. The Ministry of Finances is authorized to introduce appropriate changes in the 1995 state budget, in the budgets of the Romanian Development Agency and of the Government's General Secretariat that result from applying this decision.

Article 11. The appendix comprising the organizational structure of the Romanian Development Agency is an integral part of this decision. [Appendix omitted]

Article 12. The present decision goes into effect 30 days from the date of its publication in MONITORUL OFICIAL AL ROMANIEI.

The following are to be repealed on this same date: Government Decision No. 35/1993 on Organization and Operation of the Romanian Development Agency, published in MONITORUL OFICIAL AL ROMANIEI, Part I, No. 28, 28 February 1993; Government Decision No. 260/1993, published in MONITORUL OFICIAL AL ROMANIEI, Part I, No. 148, 2 July 1993; Government Decision No. 715/1992, published in MONITORUL OFICIAL AL ROMANIEI, Part I, No. 306, 27 November 1992.

Prime Minister Nicolae Vacaroiu

Countersigned: Mircea Cosea, president of the Council for Coordination, Strategy and Economic Reform and state minister; Dan Mircea Popescu, state minister and minister of labor and social protection; Florin Georgescu, state minister and minister of finance

Bucharest, 10 April 1995No. 216

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Drnovsek: Sea Access 'Precondition for Everything'

AU2709215895 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 27 Sep 95

[Report by Nadja Pengov—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Pengov] In an interview for Radio Koper today, Prime Minister Drnovsek said that Croatia had taken a step backward with regard to expectations and, in light of its electoral campaign, had decided to exercise additional caution.

[Drnovsek] The statements of Dr. Kacic [president of the Croatian State Border Commission], that is, the interview that you have quoted, imply that the Croatian side has probably really decided to toughen the stance for the electoral purposes rather than actually to solve the problem, because a solution also involves compromises, which means that they, too, would have to yield a little. I suppose that they believe that this could then be politicized, that there would be too many attacks by the opposition, and for this reason they have probably decided on, I would say, a gutsy statement and an actual postponement of the solution of this problem until after the elections.

[Pengov] If they do not wish to solve problems prior to the elections, we cannot force them to, Dr. Drnovsek said. He said that before the Maribor meeting everything appeared as though the expert views within the interstate commission had drawn closer. However, at the very beginning of the meeting matters became complicated again.

Slovenia, Drnovsek said, is insisting on direct territorial access to the open sea. This is precondition for everything else. The Croatian offer of the free sailing regime is not sufficient. U.S. Defense Secretary Perry has also been informed about the problem of the sea border, Drnovsek said, and he was also presented with the Slovene proposals, which he found good. The visits of the U.S. military ships to Piran Bay are also confirmation of this in a way. [passage omitted]

Carinthian Slovenes Ask For Seat in Local Diet

AU2709092595 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 26 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] In Ljubljana today, representatives of the United List, an independent political movement of Carinthian Slovenes, have been presenting their efforts to acquire a permanent seat for the Slovene minority in the Carinthian provincial Diet. They have also been talking about the bankruptcy of a IPH company from Sittersdorf.

The Carinthian Slovenes do not have a permanent representative in the Carinthian Diet as the threshold for entry is too high. The United List proposes that the number of the representatives in the provincial Diet be increased from 36 to 37. The 37th seat would be reserved for the Slovene representative.

In their efforts they are counting on the support of Slovenia, which should demonstrate a statemanslike attitude toward the minority as a subject. At the same time, they are aware that the unity of the Carinthian Slovenes on key issues is most important.

Economic Chamber Opens Information Center

AU2609085995 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 23 Sep 95 p 3

[FBIS Summary] The Slovene Economic Chamber presented its new business information center Infolink, which will supply information about domestic and foreign enterprises to consumers. Director of the Slovene Economic Chamber hopes that this center will boost "a relatively poorly developed" information market in Slovenia and facilitate decisionmaking for the companies. The center reportedly sports "the strongest database" containing, among other things, foreign trade figures as well as information about 60,000 Slovene companies.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Federal

Foreign Minister Comments on Peace Accord

Cease-Fire Before Peace

AU2709211895 Paris AFP in English 2058 GMT 27 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] United Nations, Sept 27 (AFP)—The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY] comprised of Serbia and Montenegro said Wednesday [27 September] there must be a ceasefire across Bosnia-Hercegovina within a week for an overall peace settlement to be achieved.

"We need some kind of political framework of cessation of hostilities which has to be arranged during the coming days, end of the week or beginning of next week," Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic told a news conference here.

Serb Position 'Improved'

LD2709141895 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1245 GMT 27 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Sept. 27 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic has stated that an accord on constitutional arrangements in a future Bosnian state that was reached in New York on Tuesday, has improved the position of the Republika Srpska, the Bosnian Serb state.

Speaking for a BBC programme in English, monitored in Belgrade on Wednesday, Milutinovic said the Bosnian Serbs would now be granted a high degree of independence because they would have the right to block all decisions they believed to be against their interests.

Serbia will exert pressure as much as it can on the Bosnian Serbs to honour the agreement, he said. He added that the largest pressure would be if the process that had begun in Geneva and New York continued.

Milutinovic said if all parties to the conflict were equally treated as regards maps which he said were in their true interest, then no pressure would be necessary.

Milutinovic and his Croatian and Sarajevo Moslem government counterparts Mate Granic and Muhamed Sacirbegovic adopted in New York on Tuesday, a 'Contact Group'-brokered document on the constitutional arrangements in a future Bosnian state where two state entities are to coexist—the Moslem-Croat federation and the Republika Srpska.

Equal Status Won

LD2709215395 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2002 GMT 27 Sep 95

[By Borislav Lalic]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] New York, Sept. 27 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic has said that the most important achievement of the agreement on the constitutional structure of the future joint state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, reached in New York on Tuesday [26 September], is the equal status of Republika Srpska (Bosnian Serb state) and the Muslim-Croat federation.

Republika Srpska Vice President Nikola Koljevic said that the Serb side had fought for an equal status in Bosnia from the very beginning.

Expressing his satisfaction with the decisions from Geneva and New York, Koljevic said that the thesis of the Yugoslav diplomacy—that a peaceful solution should be sought through an equal treatment of all three nations in Bosnia—had been accepted at the talks.

The New York agreement on constitutional principles says not only that the two ethnic state entities would independently pursue their affairs, but also that it would not be possible for any side to outvote or dominate the other in the joint institutions of power, primarily parliament and the presidency.

Republika Srpska Foreign Minister Aleksa Buha, who was in the Yugoslav delegation together with Koljevic, said that the peace process was heading in the right direction despite all difficulties and that this was the only way to end the war.

The Yugoslav foreign minister, who also had difficult talks in New York with the other two negotiating sides, primarily with the Bosnian Muslims, believes that it is extremely important for the fate of peace that the next phase—the signing of a ceasefire agreement—be carried out as soon as possible.

Once agreement to that [word indistinct] has been signed, Milutinovic believes that the peace process will be able to progress more maybe with greater speed than until now. [passage indistinct]

These days, the Clinton Administration is making intensive preparations for sending a 25,000-strong U.S. peace contingent.

A possible engagement of a Russian contingent is also being mentioned, although it is still unknown who would command the force and coordinate their actions.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

These are complicated issues, said Milutinovic, but they also depend on the kind of peace agreement that will be drawn up. It is easy to preserve and maintain [word indistinct] if it is just, he said.

Independence Achieved

AU2709163395 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 27 Sep 95

[Statement by FRY Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic for Belgrade Radio; place and date not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yesterday's document is actually a continuation of the Geneva document and it essentially follows the same principles, except that they have now been implemented as regards, so to speak, a type of state structure in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Namely, it was again confirmed that two completely independent entities are to exist in Bosnia-Herzegovina; in this respect, the Serb Republic has gained something, so to speak, as regards the division of power within Bosnia: complete independence and this is the essence of everything that took place yesterday. In addition to this, we have erected, so to speak, a little umbrella over this whole Bosnia-Herzegovina state structure, which is embodied in the presidency. However, in this presidency, when one reads the documents carefully, the Serbs have the right to veto everything; the same is true in the assembly.

Moreover, the essence is that all the tasks at the level of Bosnia-Herzegovina pertain only to foreign policy, not even foreign relations, which means only to the most general of issues. A Serb Republic representative on the presidency, if he should feel that the vital interests of the Serb people have been threatened, can at any time veto any decision and to call for the support of the Serb Republic assembly.

Moreover, the assembly cannot pass any decision if at least one-third of Serb Republic deputies do not vote for it. In comparison with common practice in such interparliamentary unions as the Council of Europe or the EU parliament, such an institution does not exist, but it was included in the document because it absolutely prevents any majority domination over the Serb Republic. [sentence as heard]

'No Central Government'

AU2709191395 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 27 Sep 95

[Report by Tereza Guld from New York]

[FBIS Translated Text] At a joint news conference in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's UN mission, FRY Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic and Serb Republic [Serb-held entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina] representatives Aleksa Buha and Nikola Koljevic issued a joint statement that the New York round of negotiations has confirmed the advantages of a joint appearance by the Serb Republic delegation as part of the FRY delegation.

To quote Minister Milutinovic, the result is that the constitutional principles agreed yesterday grant the Serb Republic complete equality in the future state of Bosnia, which will comprise two state entities. There will be no central government and the joint presidency will have authority at the level of foreign policy and nothing more, Milutinovic said. Everything else is open to further negotiations.

The New York round of talks has identified all the principles and the next phase will focus on a ceasefire and cessation of hostilities throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina, Milutinovic said.

Serb Republic vice president Nikola Koljevic said that the basic principles will ensure that there will be no supremacy in the Bosnian triangle, because the Muslim-Croat coalition wanted secession and supremacy over the Serbs. The Serbs have now been given not only equality, but also constitutional mechanisms for limiting supremacy.

Serb Republic foreign minister Aleksa Buha said that he had reason to be satisfied with the New York round of talks because the Serb Republic has been officially acknowledged [ozvanicena] by five of the world's superpowers, the EU, and the United Nations. We are now equal to the Muslims and the Croats and we hope that we shall soon have a document on this, Buha said.

Ready for Conference

LD2809052995 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2352 GMT 27 Sep 95

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] New York, Sept. 27 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic said the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was ready for a peace conference on Bosnia-Herzegovina even if it should be held tomorrow.

He told a press conference at U.N. Headquarters in New York that first an agreement should be reached on total ceasefire in Bosnia-Herzegovina, enmeshed in three and a half years of war.

Milutinovic assessed Tuesday that he and the foreign ministers of Croatia and the Sarajevo Muslim government agreed on a good paper resolving some of the key issues for ending the drama in Bosnia-Herzegovina,

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

which was perhaps more difficult to do than drawing the maps of the two future entities in this former Yugoslav republic.

According to Milutinovic, the two entities—the Bosnian Serb Republic and the Muslim-Croat Federation—were put under the same roof, which was thin but was nevertheless a roof. Whether one or the other entity would incline to one or the other side, time would show as well as the will of the people in Bosnia-Herzegovina and those who could join them in confederal relations, he said.

He pointed out clearly that both entities in Bosnia-Herzegovina have received equal rights. That which has been given the Muslim-Croat Federation by the Washington agreement in March 1994, that is, that it could have confederal ties with Croatia, was given also to the Bosnian Serb Republic as regards the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, he said.

The Yugoslav foreign minister, however, noted that implementing the peace agreement would be hard and complex, especially as regards composition, mandate and coordination of action of the new peace forces that were being announced for Bosnia-Herzegovina.

This, he said, depended most what type of peace would be concluded. If just peace was concluded, then it would be easy also to preserve and maintain it, he said.

The minister set out that the lifting of comprehensive and binding sanctions of the international community against Yugoslavia was part of the package which would appear at the peace conference, when all issues would jointly be resolved.

In the context of everything that Yugoslavia has done in the way of resolving the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, sanctions not only should have been lifted long ago but there had not in fact been any justification in their imposition, he said.

In the end, Milutinovic said that Yugoslavia had the same attitude towards war criminals as any other country that respected law and international norms. But it must be remembered that there have been war criminals on all sides, but that Serbs alone have been singled out, concluded Milutinovic.

Serbia

Milosevic, Stoltenberg Welcome New York Accord

LD2709204095 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1848 GMT 27 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 27 Sep (TANJUG)—Slobodan Milosevic, president of the Republic of Serbia this evening received Thorvald Stoltenberg, the cochairman of the international conference on the former Yugoslavia and his colleagues, among whom were General Bertrand de Lapresle and Ambassador Kai Aide.

In their cordial talks, both sides expressed satisfaction with the success achieved at the meeting of the delegations just concluded in New York, which was headed by the foreign ministers of the FRY, Croatia, and the Muslim government in Sarajevo.

It was stressed that with the acceptance of the basic principles for the future structure of relations between the Bosnian Serb Republic and the Muslim-Croat federation a major step has been taken toward establishing a final peace and achieving a complete political solution to the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Both sides felt that this offers an important contribution to speeding up the peace process with the aim of successfully completing it in the shortest possible time at an international conference.

The latest New York agreement, as stressed at this evening's talks between Milosevic and Stoltenberg, is an encouraging sign, which affirms without a doubt the policy of peace and the persistent efforts of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and of the representatives of the international community to resolve the long crisis in the war-torn regions by political means, through negotiations, and thereby achieve a victory for the forces of peace.

Sainovic Claims Peace Means Lifting Sanctions

AU2709170595 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 27 Sep 95

[Report by Miroslav Pisarevic—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Pisarevic] Deputy Prime Minister Sainovic then addressed the current political moment.

[Sainovic] Today we finally face the reestablishment of peace in the region. [Words indistinct] The continuity of the peace process has been accelerated; this was confirmed by the signing of the agreement in New York yesterday. The reestablishment of peace means lifting sanctions, opening our country for trade with the world, and reestablishing its normal economic existence. This means development, influx of capital, and as a consequence inherent in the lifting of the gray pressure of sanctions from our economy, it means more order and the strengthening of the legal state in the sphere of economy [words indistinct]. [passage omitted]

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

'Sources' Hint Bosnian Peace Deal Signed Soon

AU2709164395 Belgrade TELEGRAF in Serbo-Croatian 27 Sep 95 p 2

[Report by Dj.K and Z.L.: "Milosevic, Tudjman, and Izetbegovic in Washington by the End of Week To Sign a Peace Agreement on Bosnia in Clinton's Presence"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A joint meeting of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, and leader of the Bosnian Muslims Alija Izetbegovic [president of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina] could take place in Washington by the end of this week. On that occasion they would sign a document on peace in Bosnia under the watchful eye of U.S. President Clinton ....

TELEGRAF has obtained confirmation of this spectacular piece of news from several sources. True enough, Belgrade diplomatic circles are somewhat more cautious. The meeting in Washington to a great extent depends on the success of the talks of the foreign ministers in New York. If Milan Milutinovic, Mate Granic, and Muhamed Sacirbegovic (the last arrived at the last moment following U.S. persuasion) put "a peace package" together, then there is nothing else left for Milosevic, Tudjman, and Izetbegovic to do but to satisfy the tireless peacemaker Richard Holbrooke, who it is anticipated will stand right next to President Clinton in Washington at a ceremonial proclamation of peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

TELEGRAF has received confirmation in Banja Luka that a tripartite Balkan meeting could really be held in Washington within the next few days. Nikola Koljevic, vice president of the Serb Republic [Serb-held entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina], told TELEGRAF's reporters, "Everything suggests that peace is at hand. The United States and Bill Clinton have shown some understanding for the Serbs in Bosnia and our struggle in general. The international impression that has already been created, that the United States has played the key role in the peace process, suits Clinton and the U.S. Administration perfectly. According to our findings, there are serious indications that Presidents Milosevic, Tudjman, and Izetbegovic could even meet in Washington this week. On that occasion, in the presence of Clinton, they should sign a peace agreement."

The contents of the peace package for Bosnia remains a diplomatic secret of the three ministers, at least for the time being. TELEGRAF's sources remark that Holbrooke himself would be the best interpreter of the peace plan and that the Serbian, Croatian, and Muslim foreign ministers are entering into a debate on the peace arrangements with extensive authority from their bosses. The crucial role in the coordination of their stance, ranging from any possible correction of the maps to detailing of the constitutional solution for the two "entities" of former Bosnia-Herzegovina, will, of course, be played by U.S. mediator Holbrooke.

Radical Party's Seselj Assails New York Accord

LD2709190095 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1555 GMT 27 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 27 Sep (SRNA)—Dr. Vojislav Seselj, leader of the Serbian Radical Party, [words indistinct] BETA that the New York agreement on the constitutional system of the "nonexistent" Bosnia-Herzegovina "is completely to the detriment of Serbs from the Bosnian Serb Republic."

"[Words indistinct] Croatian and Muslim government in Sarajevo represents another diktat of the U.S. Administration and the treacherous regime of Slobodan Milosevic," Seselj said.

He said the Americans are "stubbornly" trying to implement the idea of a single and unitary Bosnia in which "ultimately there will be no place for the Serbs." The leader of the Serbian Radical Party disputed the notion of a single parliament in the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina, especially if two thirds of its deputies are from the Muslim-Croat Federation and only one third are Serbs.

Any possible Bosnia-Herzegovina parliament, in the assessment of Seselj, should be made up of deputies in proportion to the territorial division of the two entities, that is 49 percent to 50 percent [as received].

Milosevic will use "blackmail and bribery" to ensure [words indistinct] and thus "continue its policy of capitulation and betrayal of Serb interests," Seselj said.

In the assessment of the Radicals' leader, the New York agreement on Bosnia "introduces by the back door a plan for the disarmament of the Bosnian Serb Republic army and at the same time strengthens the forces of the unitary forces [words indistinct] in Sarajevo."

Commentary Sees Causes, Results of Air Strikes

AU2809083895 Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian 22 Sep 95 pp 12-14

[Article by Miroslav Lazanski: "Tomahawk in Grass"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Great haste and secrecy reigned along the long corridors of the Supreme Command of Allied Forces in Europe in a small Belgian town of Mons on the Franco-Belgian border during the two

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

weeks of air raids on Serb targets in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina. The SHAPE [Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe] building was under increased guard and access to the central operations hall was granted only to selected officers from selected states. Greek officers could only watch their colleagues from more security reliable NATO member states hurry into the SHAPE war room, from where constant communications were maintained with NATO's southern wing and Admiral Leighton Smith.

NATO has finally lived to find its lost defense identity, to carry out live exercises with some of its combat units, to use air raids to change the military balance of force between the Serbs and the Muslim-Croat coalition, and to use bombs and missiles virtually to draw new territorial division maps of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina. For the SHAPE officers, this means new military budgets and a continuation of the good life at a time when there is only one military alliance in the world. So in the past few days in Bosnia, NATO has had real combat exercises, in fact real video games in which many Serb military, but even more civilian targets, have been targeted and destroyed. It is in fact the collateral damage that most worries the "public relations" officers in Mons, something that they would rather not talk about at all.

Poor Assessment

It is important to go now into the past and analyze why the Serb Republic's [Serb-held entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina] political and military leadership was caught in the strategic trap of taking Zepa and Srebrenica, which was followed by the Croatian occupation of Bosansko Grahovo and Glamoc, the fall of Knin and the RSK [Republic of Serbian Krajina], the exodus of the people, the arrival of the Rapid Reaction Force on Mt. Igman, the NATO air raids against Serb targets, the loss of Srbobran [Donji Vakuf], Jajce, [Bosanski] Petrovac, Drvar, Kljuc, Sipovo, and a new exodus. An attempt to analyze this is also important for the future of the Serbs in former Bosnia-Herzegovina. The facts are inexorable: Sarajevo had been kept under the blockade of humanitarian convoys and the roads, and Sarajevo airport had been closed for far too long to be able to remain so. Warnings were coming from the United Nations and NATO that these two things would have to be urgently solved; the airport opened and the humanitarian routes deblocked.

Keeping Sarajevo, a city of over 300,000 people, under a blockade was politically damaging and militarily irrational if there was no plan to take the entire city. In other words, it should have been clear that the world would not allow Sarajevo to starve, UN officials not to be able to land at Butmir Airport, and all that to go on without the Serb side trying to bring a radical military change of the situation in the region. The West would have probably agreed much more easily to Serb Republic soldiers taking the entire Sarajevo in the course of two days than to peacefully watching the "strangulation" of Sarajevo in stages.

That some Serb towns, such as Doboj and Nevesinje, were coming under Muslim [Bosnia-Herzegovina Army] attacks, that the Serb parts of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina were not receiving humanitarian aid either and were hungry, that the Muslims from the center of Sarajevo had already attempted a large-scale offensive against Serb positions around the city and Serb parts of Sarajevo, cannot excuse wrong political and military moves by the Serb side in this bloody civil war because, owing to international circumstances and everything that has happened around the breakup of the earlier Yugoslavia, the Serbs in the Serb Republic simply have no right to make mistakes. This is particularly so if the mistake is one such as the entire story about Sarajevo. You can block an airport and send Western diplomats stumbling along muddy paths over ravines and high mountains and you may set up various checkpoints in their way, but you must then also be ready to have them shower you with missiles and bombs without any scruples or regret.

We can now wonder whether the United Nations would at all have insisted on the withdrawal of heavy arms from around Sarajevo, if humanitarian corridors and Sarajevo airport had been opened. Perhaps it would, but the sheer force poised against the Serb side would certainly have been weaker. Therefore, one may justify the balance of Serb heavy arms against the much more numerous Muslim infantry in the Sarajevo region, that is true, but one should have analyzed the consequences of keeping an airport closed for two months and then closing all roads leading into the city. One should also have anticipated that, once the NATO military action started, there would be fierce air raids followed by a Muslim-Croat offensive.

It is true that NATO military commanders ignored current UN resolutions, that a secret memorandum was reached by United Nations and NATO regarding the open options of bombing the Serbs in Bosnia, it is true that in this region NATO has taken the role of a free lancer and a cowboy, that this was sheer aggression to the benefit of the Muslim-Croatian coalition, and that all this has nothing to do with international law and order. However, could the Serbs in Bosnia expect or dare hope for equal treatment, did they think that NATO would "pamper" them, did they really expect fair play, were not the Markale case [the Serb mortar attack on the Sarajevo

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

market] and other tricks enough for them? Nobody had any right to such political and military foolhardiness and particularly not to flex his muscles at NATO.

Russian Experts

General Radovan Grubac is one of the youngest generals of the Serb Republic army. Calm, with a cold expression in his eyes and displaying no excessive movements or emotions, Gen. Grubac has not experienced a single defeat in this war. True, he had an excellent group of associates, assistants, and deputies, such as Colonel Milosevic, Prstovic, and others. Gen. Grubac is the commander of the Herzegovina Corps of the Serb Republic army and over the last few days, his corps has come under the fiercest NATO strikes: the regions of Foca, Kalinovik, Trnovo, Cajnice, the Gorazde region, etc. Gen. Grubac's soldiers have endured all that, although at some moments they did not have it easy, as the Western aircraft were dropping bombs and projectiles of as much as 2,000 kg. Underground command centers and telecommunication relays were targeted, as well as some purely civilian targets in the theater of operations of the Herzegovina Corps. Underground command centers located at a depth of as much as 70 meters withstood all the hits, even with these 2 metric ton bombs, although the soldiers did feel the detonations. Gen. Grubac says that these bombs were dropped by B-52 aircraft, the strategic bombers from Vietnam times. One can only guess where they flew from; probably from Spain or Great Britain. They dropped dozens of 2,000kg bombs.

The Herzegovina Corps managed to down several Western aircraft, among them two pilotless aircraft of the Predator type. Some vital parts of these aircraft survived, such as Sony cameras and mini video recorders, the main computer navigation instrument that ensures programmed flight, as well as automatic autodestruct on the command from the ground, hollow tubes [pitocev], and parts of the wings. A Predator costs about $2 million and installed in it is the most modern Japanese electronics made by Sony. With a smile, Herzegovina Corps officers list what Russian military experts might offer for parts of the Predator....

However, the Predator is not the only military delight to have fallen into the Serb Republic army's hands. The U.S. cruiser Normandy launched Tomahawk cruise missiles from the Adriatic and guided them along the valleys of the Neretva and Vrbas. Three of these missiles lost their way and in fact had a soft landing at the foot of Mt. Kozara. Namely, by using various decoys, models, obstacles, and deflectors, the air defense around Banja Luka managed to confuse the Tomahawk missiles' guidance systems, so at a relatively low speed, these three expensive "toys" slid into meadows. The TERCOM satellite guidance system, as well as the warheads, were undamaged and Russian military experts are probably already in the area. This is in fact the first time that the Americans have lost an entire Tomahawk, apart from in James Bond films. Along with the undamaged air-to-air Magic missiles from the downed French Mirage-2000 and several unexploded U.S.-made bombs with laser guidance, a lot of technically and technologically interesting Western weapons have been found in former Bosnia-Herzegovina.

"True, this has all been paid for" with the large-scale destruction of the information and communications control system of the Serb Republic army, with the most important relays having been demolished. As a consequence of these NATO hits, the command and logistic support system in the western part of the Serb Republic has been disturbed. The NATO aircraft also directly raided the positions of the Serb Republic army's 30th infantry division near Srbobran [Donji Vakuf], so in the wake of these attacks, the Muslim army simply took advantage of the NATO strikes to take Srbobran. Before that, the Muslim soldiers could not crush the 30th division even after two years of fighting on this section of the front. The NATO aircraft dropped their bombs and fired their missiles on Serb positions near Doboj and Mt. Ozren, so Muslim military successes and an exodus of the Serb population followed on that section of the front. We do not even have to mention the activity of the British, French, and Dutch soldiers of the Rapid Reaction Force.

All the facts clearly show that the current successes of the Muslim-Croat forces in Bosnia are a direct consequence of NATO strikes on Serb targets and that there are no dilemmas about that. However, there is also an explanation that Serb withdrawal is a result of the new maps. By destroying the communications relays in some places, hitting arms and ammunition dumps, directly attacking Serb troops, as well as civilian targets such as hospitals, farms, waterworks, schools, and municipal buildings, NATO was working for itself, President Clinton's election campaign, and the Muslim-Croat coalition.

Whether the Serb Republic army will stabilize its defense lines along the Mrkonjic Grad-Sanski Most line and whether the Croatian Army will manage to build a bridgehead across the Una will be seen soon. If the fall of Drvar, Kljuc, [Bosanski] Petrovac, and Sipovo is to be explained by saying that "the soldiers who were defending these towns and villages had not tasted war all this time and fled at the first fierce clash," now when the fate of Banja Luka is at stake, there is no more room for "excuses" and maneuvers. The Serbs in Bosnia have lost everything that they could; what now remains is

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

either to keep and preserve what they still have or a mass exodus.

Earning a Nobel Prize

If the withdrawal to the line drawn in some new and final maps of separation, of which there are an increasing number of indications, is not at stake, we are left with numerous dilemmas about current Serb military "failures." Since the fall of Glamoc and Grahovo and the triumphant announcement of a counteroffensive to retake these towns, which was all obviously unfounded, irresponsible, and patently counterproductive, to the present "series of lost towns," which is worrying, not a single Serb Republic military or political leader has appeared in public to give a serious explanation to the people, a realistic picture of the situation with no embellishments or illusions, with assessments of the future, however grave and bitter they may be, and finally admitting their own errors and mistakes.

Without again considering the very realistic possibility of the loss of the towns in the western parts of the Serb Republic in fact being only the creation of new lines of the division of Bosnia, as seems to be very probable if one sees on the map what some are gaining and what some others are losing, then the whole story has been brought to an end in an excellent way. The Croats have gained territory and the image of a militarily respectable partner and so have the Muslims; the Serbs have kept the territories that belong to them according to the 49:51 ratio plan, with their military glory tarnished only a little; NATO has "helped" draw the new maps; Clinton has solved his problems with Congress and Yeltsin his with the opposition....

Any evidence to support the hypothesis? The Serb Republic army did not defend the western Bosnian towns at all. The Serb army possesses about 300 tanks and 250 heavy artillery pieces in that region. There are also aircraft with the airport near Banja Luka and 45 Orao, G-4, and Jastreb warplanes, as well as about 40 combat and cargo helicopters. All that was standing there, along with numerous Frog surface-to-surface missiles, the modified navy Styx, Orkan, and modified SA-2 missiles in their surface-to-surface version. To have so many missiles and not to fire a single one is a little naive. It is even more naive to have the Serb army not even attempting street fighting in any of the abandoned towns. Well, if all that is true, and it seems to be, the only thing left is to sign the peace plan and, of course, award this year's Nobel Prize for that.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

BULK RATE
U.S. POSTAGE
PAID
PERMIT NO. 352
MERRIFIELD, VA.

This is a U.S. Government publication produced by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). Its contents in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

FBIS collects, translates, disseminates, and analyzes foreign open-source information on behalf of the U.S. Government. Its publications may contain copyrighted material. ***Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.***

— Bracketed indicators before the first sentence of each item describe the way in which the material was processed by FBIS.

— Headlines and all bracketed explanatory notes are supplied by FBIS.

— Personal and place names are rendered in accordance with the decisions of the U.S. Board on Geographic Names as adapted by FBIS. Unverified names in radio and television material appear in parentheses and are spelled phonetically; words and phrases in parentheses preceded by a question mark are unclear in the original and deduced from context.

SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION

U.S. Government Customers

For a list of FBIS products, to subscribe to an FBIS publication, or to indicate a change of address contact:

FBIS
P.O. Box 2604
Washington, DC 20013-2604
Telephone: (202) 338-6735
FAX: (703) 733-6042

Non-Government Customers

Subscriptions are available from the National Technical Information Service:

NTIS
5285 Port Royal Road
Springfield, VA 22161
Telephone: (703) 487-4630
FAX: (703) 321-8547

New subscribers should expect a 30-day delay in receipt of the first issue.